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Transnational Mass Claim Processes 
(TMCPs) in International Law and Practice 
Arturo J. Carrillo 
Jason S. Palmer** 
I.  
INTRODUCTION 
Mass claims processes implicating transnational issues have traditionally 
been inter-state. The modern era of international mass claim processes, or 
“IMCPs,” began with the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in 1981 and reached an 
institutional milestone when the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(“UNCC”) was set up in 1991.1 With the exception of the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal, IMCPs are usually created to redress losses suffered as a consequence 
of international or internationalized armed conflict and tend to focus primarily 
on compensation and restitution for property claims.2 In parallel fashion, several 
 
 Professor of Clinical Law and Director, International Human Rights Clinic, The George 
Washington University Law School. B.A, Princeton University; J.D. The George Washington 
University Law School; LL.M. Columbia Law School. Senior Henkin Fellow and Deputy Director, 
Transitional Justice Program, Human Rights Institute, Columbia Law School (2001-03). The author 
wishes to thank Deans Fred Lawrence, Phyllis Goldfarb and Paul Butler for their support, as well as 
Sean Murphy and Dinah Shelton for their detailed feedback on an early draft of this article. Special 
thanks are due to Courtney Hague for her research assistance. 
** Assistant Professor of Legal Skills at Stetson University College of Law. B.A. University of 
Virginia; J.D. The George Washington University Law School. Former Attorney-Adviser in the 
Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. Representative of the United States 
before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. Claims Judge for the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant 
Accounts in Switzerland. Coordinator of Palestinian “Late Claims” against Iraq at the United 
Nations Compensation Commission. The author would like to thank Dean Darby Dickerson and 
Dean James Fox for their support, Lucy Reed for her guidance and suggestions, and R. Dallan Bunce 
and Chase Hattaway for their research assistance. 
 1. See John R. Crook, Mass Claims Processes: Lessons Learned over Twenty-Five Years, in 
REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES 41, 54-55 (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ed., 2006)  [hereinafter REDRESSING INJUSTICES]. By “mass claims processes” in this 
context, we mean simply “the resolution of an enormous volume of claims arising out of a similar 
event or circumstance….” Tjaco T. van den Hout, Introduction, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES, at xxix. 
 2. Inter-state mass claims procedures are not an invention of the 21st century. Early examples 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652203
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intra-state experiences involving mass claims type processes in the form of 
domestic reparations programs have taken place since the early 1980s. These 
programs have been directed at redressing gross violations of international 
human rights law involving thousands of victims of internal conflicts and/or 
political repression. The Argentine experience is one well-known example; 
South Africa‟s is another. Such programs can be viewed as mass claims 
procedures that take place in the human rights or transitional justice context, 
which we call transitional justice claims processes, or “TJCPs.”3 Though co-
existing, these two currents in the field of mass claim processing – IMCPs and 
TJCPs – have over the past quarter century evolved separately, in relative 
isolation from one another. 
Only recently have the two currents begun to converge. On the one hand, 
IMCP experts have started to acknowledge the rise of domestic human rights 
related reparations programs as a practice connected to their field. An example 
is the book published by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”) entitled 
Redressing Injustices Through Mass Claims Processes.4 Although it focuses 
mainly on analyzing typical IMCPs, this publication somewhat disjointedly 
dedicates a final part to transitional justice issues. Entitled “Reparations: 
Recourse to Justice,” this section contains chapters that examine the role of civil 
society actors in promoting domestic reparations legislation in Germany, 
Argentina and South Africa; the rights of victims of gross human rights and 
serious humanitarian law violations to reparations under international law; as 
well as the reparations provisions for victims pursuant to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court.5 The Introduction to Redressing Injustices 
nominally justifies including the unorthodox chapters on the grounds that the 
book covers “mass claims programs [. . .] created in the aftermath of war, 
revolution, terrorist attacks, and other atrocities,” and that “reparations are 
often important components of settlement and emotional closure for victims.”6 
Yet TJCPs, as essentially intra-state experiences, do not sit easily alongside 
conventional mass claim processes in either theory or practice. The minimalist 
rationale given by the PCA editors of Redressing Injustices for including them 
 
include the United States-Mexican Claims Commission in the late 19th century and the United 
States-German Mixed Claims Commission after World War I. For a short history of earlier mass 
claims processes, see Crook, supra note 1, at 41-43. 
 3. By intra-state transitional justice we mean “the conception of justice associated with 
periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoing of 
repressive predecessor regimes.” Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 69 (2003). The transitional justice context, therefore, is one of radical political transformation in 
which state institutions move away from autocratic and/or repressive practices and towards greater 
acceptance of liberal democratic principles and practices such as elections and the rule of law.  
 4. REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1. 
 5. Id. § III. 
 6. T. van den Hout, supra note 1, at xxxii (emphasis added). As will be discussed infra, an 
important distinction should be made between the traditional remedy of restitution in IMCPs and the 
notion of reprarations in TJCPs. 
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seems strained and out-of-place in light of the traditional focus of most IMCP 
literature, which as a rule does not contain such references or comparisons.7 For 
instance, another leading treatise in the field published by the PCA, 
International Mass Claims Processes: Legal and Practical Perspectives, 
tellingly makes no reference to the well-known TJCPs in Argentina and South 
Africa, or to any other domestic reparation programs for victims of grave human 
rights abuses.8 More to the point, Redressing Injustices‟ editors and authors 
simply assume that IMCPs and TJCPs are substantially similar. In his chapter on 
past and current mass claim processes, for example, John Crook comments only 
that “[o]ther comparable claims processes have been established at the national 
level in many countries, aimed at identifying and compensating large numbers 
of individuals who suffered human rights deprivations or other types of injuries 
from past government actions.”9 But there is no reference anywhere in the book 
to the significant contextual, legal, political, philosophical, and economic 
differences between mass claims procedures occurring in the domestic human 
rights context and the international mass claims processes analyzed in the first 
two-thirds of the volume.10 
The same phenomenon appears in the TJCP field, where important 
transitional justice studies hail the apparent synergies that exist with 
international mass claims processes, but fail to actually address, much less 
analyze, the precise nature of the presumed compatibility. An example is Out of 
the Ashes: Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations, a tome dedicated entirely to reparations issues and TJCPs.11 The 
authors of the principal section in the book make a passing, but significant 
reference, to international arbitral tribunals and claims commissions. They 
succinctly observe that  
the practice developed in this [traditional IMCP] context [. . .] is highly relevant 
for our purpose, to the extent it provides principles and precedents that may be 
applicable or useful in addressing similar issues in the context of human rights 
law.12  
The accuracy of this statement notwithstanding, the point here is that despite 
 
 7. See, e.g., INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEMS (International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2000) [hereinafter 
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS]. 
 8. INTERNATIONAL MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES 
(Howard M. Holtzmann, Edda Kristjansdottir eds., 2007) [hereinafter HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR]. 
 9. Crook, supra note 1, at 55 (emphasis added). However, he does not mention any TJCP in 
particular, nor does he provide any explanation as to how or why these national claims processes are 
comparable. 
 10. See T. van den Hout, supra note 1, at xxxii-xxxiii. 
 11. OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Koen de Feyte et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter OUT OF THE ASHES]. 
 12. Heidy Rombouts et al., The Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross and Systematic 
Violations of Human Rights, in OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11, at 417-18 (emphasis added). 
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their cited significance, no effort is made to explain which principles and 
precedents those are, or just how they should be determined, analyzed, and 
applied to the formulation of reparations policies and programs in the 
transitional justice or human rights framework.13 
The trend, in other words, is to assume the existence of significant parallels 
between IMCPs and TJCPs without examining them in any detail. Oxford 
University Press‟s landmark Handbook of Reparations focuses expressly on 
domestic reparations programs created by a country in response to human rights 
atrocities.14 But the book contains case studies of the September 11 Victims‟ 
Fund as well as the United Nations Claims Commission, despite the fact that 
admittedly neither is “a typical [domestic] reparations program.”15 Tellingly, the 
Handbook‟s editor explains in the Introduction that the common denominator 
unifying the volume is a focus on compensation for victims, and “in particular 
on measures of material compensation.”16 A number of additional similarities 
are assumed to exist between the IMCPs selected and TJCPs generally.17 And 
though the IMCPs studied in the Handbook of Reparations may indeed offer 
insights to domestic policymakers working in the transitional justice context, the 
methodological approach chosen in this respect seems to miss the forest for 
staring at the trees: important parallels between IMCPs and TJCPs are presumed 
to exist at a fundamental level while the myriad, substantive differences reigning 
between the two realms of mass claims experiences are minimized or ignored. 
The literature analyzing IMCPs and TJCPs clearly reveals a growing 
convergence.18 The central question that remains unanswered – indeed, 
 
 13. A couple of points are leisurely flagged, such as observing that a “salient and 
unprecedented” feature of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission is that it was charged with 
establishing liability and awarding compensation for violations of international humanitarian law. Id. 
at 418. 
 14. Pablo de Greiff, Introduction – Repairing the Past: Compensation for Victims of Human 
Rights Violations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 1-3 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS]. 
 15. Id. at 4. De Greiff is referring specifically to the 9/11 Commission here, but the same is 
certainly true of the UNCC. At least one prominent commentator, Professor Dinah Shelton, 
considers the UNCC through the lens of redress for gross and systematic human rights violations. 
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 404-05 (2d ed. 2005). Most 
experts, however, view the UNCC as an inter-state mechanism designed to provide compensation for 
property “loss” and personal “injury” resulting from Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, without explicit 
reference to or grounding in international human rights law.  S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 
(Apr. 3, 1991); see also HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 56-60. 
 16. De Greiff, supra note 14, at 2. 
 17. Id. at 4-5 (pointing to the risks of individualizing procedures and assuming shared 
principles of reparations). 
 18. See, e.g., REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens eds., 2009) (combining parts on the 
“internationalized” context of mass claims and Holocaust claims resolution experiences with parts 
dedicated to „national‟ domestic reparations programs) [hereinafter REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS]. 
According to the editors, “[t]his book explores the practice of governments, national and 
international courts and commissions in applying, processing, implementing and enforcing a variety 
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unaddressed – is to what extent are these two types of experiences truly 
comparable? A number of related inquiries arise as well. Which IMCP 
principles and precedents are most relevant to domestic reparations programs, 
how are they to be identified, and just how transferable are they? When 
comparing the two, to what extent are the seemingly shared elements in claims 
processing procedures, or other basic characteristics, such as monetary 
payments, functionally interchangeable? And is this a two-way street? Are there 
principles and precedents from the TJCP context that might nourish ongoing or 
future IMCP initiatives? When drawing such parallels, regardless of the 
direction in which they flow, what limitations or caveats exist? In other words, 
to what extent are IMCPs and TJCPs different? What is the nature of these 
differences, and what do they tell us about the underlying compatibility of the 
experiences and mechanisms contrasted? In our view, a new framework for 
thinking about mass claims processes is required to answer these threshold 
questions, one that can apply to situations arising in either the inter-state or 
transitional justice contexts. 
The pressing need for a different approach to the comparative study of 
these experiences is underscored by the prescriptive nature of the above 
referenced publications and their normative agenda. In their writings many 
commentators assume a degree of kinship between international and transitional 
justice mass claims mechanisms that ostensibly gives rise to “common trends, 
best practices and lessons learned.”19 In addition, most observers have 
heretofore suggested or presumed that the potential “lessons” flow primarily 
from the realm of IMCP experience to that of TJCPs.20 However, as noted 
already, none have engaged in a systematic study of the nature of this 
convergence, thus limiting the scope, depth and – as this Article will 
demonstrate – accuracy of their comparative suggestions. Underlying these well-
intentioned initiatives is the desire to improve upon the design and 
implementation of new mass claims mechanisms in novel settings. Since such 
mechanisms are intended to benefit tens if not hundreds of thousands of victims 
and their families who have suffered terrible abuses at the hands of state agents 
(and sometimes private actors), it is important that any comparative analyses 
 
of reparations awards.” Id. at 7. This convergence is evidenced in earlier publications as well, such 
as Professor Shelton‟s treatise on remedies in international human rights law. While neither a text on 
IMCPs or transitional justice per se, her book addresses both types of mass claims processes side-by-
side in chapters dedicated to analyzing remedies for “Gross and Systematic Human Rights 
Violations” and “Reparations for Historical Injustices.” SHELTON, supra note 15, chs. 13, 14. Thus, 
in the former, Professor Shelton canvasses claims procedures focusing on compensation by starting 
with the war reparations paid by Germany after the Second World War before turning to a detailed 
overview of the UNCC. She then proceeds to conduct a survey of “National Compensation 
Schemes” such as those TJCPs in Argentina, Chile and Hungary. 
 19. Carla Ferstman et al., Introduction, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 7. 
 20. See, e.g., De Greiff, supra note 14, at 1-5 (recognizing expressly that a pathway of 
enlightenment flows in the direction of TJCPs), and T. van den Hout, supra note 1, at xxxix-xxxiii 
(implying a pathway of insight).  
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offered as guidance be well-structured and constructive. In other words, the 
“best practices” and “lessons” implied or recommended by such studies must 
truly translate from one context to another, or their instructiveness as a practical 
matter will surely be minimal. 
The Article‟s objective is to generate constructive debate around the study 
of what we will call TMCPs or “transnational mass claims processes” – IMCPs, 
TJCPs, as well as other internationalized mass claims mechanisms – with a view 
to reorienting the normative discussion in a more productive direction. The 
TMCP rubric we employ is an analytical tool derived from our respective 
experience working on contemporary IMCPs and TJCPs.21 It is premised on a 
framework of core characteristics resulting from the systematic scrutiny of both 
international and national mass claims experiences. We have utilized this 
framework to isolate and evaluate several of the basic differences between 
IMCPs and TJCPs; this in turn has facilitated our ability to map more accurately 
the extent to which these two types of claims processes can be said to be 
comparable in practical terms. Without disregarding the issue of substantive 
redress, this Article favors a more innovative focus on exploring the procedural 
dimensions of reparations in the comparative study of mass claims processes. In 
so doing we seek to better bridge the IMCP and TJCP divide and enable more 
effective comparisons across differing contexts. 
The TMCP methodology we propose can also be applied to dissecting other 
novel initiatives in mass claims processing. The International Criminal Court 
(ICC), whose „victim-focused‟ approach to international justice is currently as 
undefined as it is unprecedented, presents one such challenge.22 Unlike any of 
its forerunners, the ICC is mandated to create a reparations regime for victims, 
“including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.”23 To this end, the 
Rome Statute also establishes a special Trust Fund for victims.24 Several of the 
international crimes that could be prosecuted, such as genocide or crimes against 
humanity, will typically create victims numbering in the thousands if not tens of 
thousands, thus requiring a mass claims process to provide redress. For these 
reasons, as the ICC proceeds to lay the groundwork for its as yet unrealized 
reparations program, it is widely “advised to closely examine the approaches 
and solutions developed by modern international and national mass claims 
programs that have faced similar challenges.”25 But just how should the ICC go 
 
 21. We are grateful to Professor Sean Murphy for his assistance in defining this new proposed 
category. For a detailed exploration of the concept of “transnational law,” see PHILLIP JESSUP, 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). 
 22. Elizabeth Odio-Benito, Introduction, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 2. 
 23. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 75 (July 
17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 24. Id. art. 79. 
 25. Marc Henzelin et al., Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal Court: 
Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes, 17 Crim. L.F. 317 (2006); see also 
REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 7-15. 
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about “examining” these programs, given their wide diversity? Which will be 
relevant and why? What “approaches and solutions” should it be looking to in 
light of its unique mandate? 
To answer these queries as well as those posed regarding the compatibility 
of IMCPs and TJCPs, this Article offers a new perspective on the subject of 
mass claims processing that draws from both the traditional and human rights 
contexts. It proceeds as follows. Part II paints a spectrum of contemporary mass 
claims processes by examining seminal experiences in both the international and 
domestic arenas. Part III then engages in a systematic comparative analysis of 
these experiences to contrast key characteristics and identify areas common to 
mass claim type procedures. In Part IV we provide a working definition of 
TMCPs and, drawing from the prior discussion, outline an applied framework 
for the effective study of such procedures. We conclude that despite 
fundamental differences, there is a cache of experience on each side of the 
IMCP-TJCP equation that, when properly contextualized, can enrich the design 
and implementation of transnational mass claim processes in any setting. At the 
same time, we highlight new opportunities that exist to promote enlightened 
cross-fertilization between them. 
II.  
A SPECTRUM OF MASS CLAIMS EXPERIENCES 
The first challenge in setting up a discussion of transitional mass claims 
processes, TMCPs, was to identify paradigmatic examples of IMCPs and TJCPs 
from which to create the respective baselines. While recognizing that no claims 
process in either field is exactly like any other, our experience suggested that a 
handful of examples could be selected from the international and transitional 
justice contexts that would lend themselves usefully to the type of comparative 
analysis we sought to carry out. Accordingly, this section contains six case 
studies, comprised of three influential international mass claims processes 
alongside three historic political transitions that produced domestic reparations 
programs. The former are the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (1981- 
present), the United Nations Compensation Commission (1991-2005), and the 
Holocaust-era Claims Resolution Tribunals (CRT I and CRT II) (1999-2002, 
2001- present); the latter are the reparations programs adopted in Argentina 
(1984 - present), South Africa (1994 - 2004), and Hungary (1991 - present). 
They are presented below in rough chronological order, to better illustrate the 
parallel development of experiences in both fields.26 While the subsequent 
 
 26. This approach may strike some readers as unusual or unorthodox. Our purpose in breaking 
with tradition to present these case studies in sequential order rather than group them thematically 
was to integrate them temporally and highlight the overlap that in reality existed among them. This 
chronological integration, we think, de-emphasizes the domestic/international divide and allows the 
reader to better focus on the convergences and divergences between both types of claims processes. 
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discussions in Parts III and IV rely to a great extent on these case studies, we 
will draw from other significant mass claims processes in both areas as 
necessary to complement the analysis.27 
Before turning to the case studies, a word about the criteria employed to 
select them is in order. Each IMCP is widely considered to be a successful mass 
claim process that broke new ground.28 Together they represent the 
quintessential mass claims processes through their use of arbitration principles 
to resolve a “large number of claims arising from common circumstances”29 and 
to compensate victims for losses suffered.30 These three case studies reflect a 
range of settings, goals, procedures, methods, and other characteristics typical of 
IMCPs, thus providing a spectrum of contemporary experience from which to 
draw useful lessons. Similarly, the TJCP examples were selected from a broader 
pool of domestic reparations programs because they offer a variety of widely 
consulted perspectives on the question of how mass claims processes are created 
and carried out entirely within a state.31 The three case studies are from Latin 
 
 27. Primary among these are the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission (EECC) (2000-present), 
the Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CRPC) – Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1996-2003), and the reparations program in Chile (1990-2003). Similarly, we will 
refer to ongoing TJCP experiences in Colombia and Peru. A related area that we do not draw upon is 
that of lump sum settlements under international law, under which countries resolve international 
claims of injured nationals by paying a fixed sum to the claimant state. Richard B. Lillich & Burns 
H. Weston, Lump Sum Agreements: Their Continuing Contribution to the Law of International 
Claims, 82 AM. J. INT‟L L. 69, 69-70 (1988); see also BURNS H. WESTON, RICHARD B. LILLICH & 
DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
(1975-1995) 21 (1999) (providing that “Settlement Agreements expressly state that the distribution 
of the negotiated lump sum falls within the „exclusive‟ or occasionally „sole‟ jurisdiction of the 
claimant state”). These lump sum payments tend to be bilateral and unidirectional, as when a 
defeated country pays reparations to injured states. Id. at 65 (discussing payments by West Germany 
to countries such as The Netherlands, Greece, and Switzerland, as a result of claims arising from 
World War II and Nazi persecution).  The main difference, of course, is that the recipient of such 
payments is the State, which has the discretion to make payment to its nationals, and not strictly 
speaking the individuals themselves. Jennifer Bodack, International Law for the Masses, 15 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT‟L L. 363, 367 (2005). 
 28. These enterprises figure prominently in the roster of 10 select IMCPs analyzed by 
Holtzmann, Kristjansdottir, and the PCA Steering Committee on Mass Claims Processes. See 
HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8. The others are Commission for Real Property 
Claims of Displaced persons and Refugees, Housing and Property Claims Commission, Holocaust 
Claims Processes administered by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), Eritrea-
Ethiopia Claims Commission, and the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance. 
 29. Howard M. Holtzmann, Mass Claims Settlement Systems: Potentials and Pitfalls, in 
INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 7. 
 30. The three IMCPs discussed, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the United Nations 
Compensation Commission, and the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in 
Switzerland (CRT I), had a significant volume of claims, ranging from approximately 4,000 filed at 
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, to almost 10,000 claims at the CRT and over 2.6 million at the United 
Nations Compensation Commission. See Hans Das, Innovations to Speed Mass Claims: New 
Standards of Proof, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1, at 7; HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 25. 
 31. Perhaps the most substantial reparation programs not included are those enacted by 
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America, Africa, and Eastern Europe, respectively, each illustrating to a certain 
extent the regional experience in transitional justice. A defining characteristic of 
each transitional justice case study is that large numbers of victims were actually 
awarded reparations, including compensation, a fact that limited the field of 
possibilities.32 In sum, while one may reasonably point to other IMCPs or 
TJCPs, omitted due to space limitations, as pertinent case studies, we are 
confident of the significance and utility of those selected given the goals of this 
Article. 
A. Seminal Mass Claims Processes 
1. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 
The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal was established as a result of the 
conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America 
that began with the 1979 taking of the U.S. Embassy hostages. These two 
countries, with the assistance of the Government of Algeria, developed this 
dispute resolution mechanism to “promote the settlement of . . . claims.”33 It 
was established in 1981 to decide contract and expropriation claims that United 
States citizens asserted against the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as to resolve 
contract disputes between the two governments. 
Even though the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was the direct and intended 
result of the agreement negotiated between Iran and the United States, the 
Tribunal‟s method of creation was unique. Unlike its predecessors,34 the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal was not the result of direct bilateral negotiations between 
the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States to foster and develop 
 
Germany after World War II to compensate Holocaust survivors as well as forced and slave laborers. 
See ARIEL COLONAMOS & ANDREA ARMSTRONG, German Reparations to the Jews after World War 
II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations and J. Authers, Making Good Again: German 
Compensation for Forced and Slave Laborers, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, 
respectively. Other TJCPs of note include those in Brazil, Malawi, the United States (Japanese-
American Internment), and Rwanda. Excluded from the definition of TJCPs (infra Part II) are 
internationalized reparations regimes like these created by the Rome Statue for the International 
Criminal Court, or by the Dayton Peace Accords with respect to the Human Rights Chamber for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. See GILBERT BITTI & GABRIELA GONZÁLEZ, The Reparations Provisions for 
Victims Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES, 
supra note 1, at 299 and MANFRED NOWAK, Reparation by the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11, at 245, respectively. 
 32. Transitional justice scenarios where reparations programs have not been created or 
substantially implemented include El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, East Timor, Sierra Leone, and 
Poland. 
 33. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. 1, Jan. 19, 1981 [hereinafter Claims Settlement 
Declaration]. 
 34. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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improved economic and diplomatic relations.35 Rather, indirect negotiations 
through the Government of Algeria, complicated by an increasingly dramatic 
U.S. political stage36 and an intense international standoff,37 led to the 
Tribunal‟s birth. This conflux of domestic and international events required the 
negotiators to develop a distinctive protocol, which would allow the two 
Governments to successfully satisfy their varied constituencies at home.38 
The United States and the Government of Iran reached an agreement 
memorialized in two Declarations of the Government of the Democratic and 
Popular Republic of Algeria, known as the Algiers Accords, on January 18, 
1981, after four months of intense and often frustrating negotiations.39 The two 
Declarations - the General Declaration and the Claims Settlement Declaration - 
addressed the obligations of the two governments vis-à-vis one another.40 
 
 35. The two principals involved in the negotiations – Iran and the United States – never signed 
an agreement or treaty between them.  The Government of Algeria reported to the United States that 
Iran refused to sign any document that the United States signed.  This recalcitrance on the part of 
Iran “led to the idea of separate, parallel, mutually reinforcing promises to the Algerians by both the 
United States and Iran.” Warren Christopher, Introduction, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN – THE 
CONDUCT OF A CRISIS 21 (Paul H. Kreisberg ed., 1985) [hereinafter AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN]. 
 36. Public opinion regarding the Iranian hostages was so intense that Time Magazine posited 
that that the handling of the hostage situation would be the dispositive factor in the 1980 Carter-
Reagan election. George J. Church et al., Battling Down the Stretch, TIME, Nov. 3, 1980, available 
at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,924482,00.html.  
 37. The United States, on November 29, 1979, filed a case before the International Court of 
Justice demanding that Iran release the U.S. hostages.  U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran 
(U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 5 (May 24). Moving quickly, in early December of 1979, the ICJ ruled 
that Iran‟s seizure of the Embassy and taking of hostages was a clear violation of international law.  
Id. at 6.  The United Nations also weighed in on Iran‟s illegal actions.  On December 4, 1979, the 
Security Council unanimously joined in demanding that Iran immediately release the hostages. see 
Warren Christopher, Introduction, in AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra  note 35, at 9. 
 38. Two of the most important issues to be resolved during the negotiations between the two 
countries for the release of the U.S. hostages were how to deal with the Iranian assets that were 
frozen in the United States and how to address the many thousands of claims that U.S. citizens had 
against Iran in an appropriate forum. See R. Owens, The Final Negotiation and Release in Algiers, in 
AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, supra note 35, at 301. 
 39. CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS 
TRIBUNAL 141-52 (1998); GEORGE ALDRICH, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES 
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISIONS OF THE TRIBUNAL 5 (1996).  Even though the 
two governments only “adhered to” the provisions of the Algiers Accords and neither the U.S. 
Senate nor the Iranian Majlis ratified the Accords, the document constitutes a “treaty” under 
international law. See U.S. v. Iran, Dec. 37-A17-FT (June 18, 1985), reprinted in 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. 
Trib. Rep. 206, 207 (1985) (noting that “[t]his Tribunal has frequently resorted to the [Vienna] 
Convention in interpreting the Algiers Accord and the State Parties have declared the Convention to 
provide the applicable law of interpretation.”); see also NASSER ESPHAHANIAN & BANK TEJARAT, 
AWD 31-157-2 (Mar. 29, 1983), reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib..Rep. 157, 160 (1983) (stating that 
“[s]ince the Claims Settlement Declaration and the General Declaration together constitute a Treaty 
under international law, we are guided in interpreting them by Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention”). 
 40. General Declaration of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (Jan. 19, 1981), 
available at http://www.iusct.org/general-declaration.pdf, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 
(1981) [hereinafter General Declaration]; Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33. 
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The General Declaration provided that Iran would release the hostages and 
that the United States would perform a series of actions and financial 
transactions, including releasing and returning the assets frozen by President 
Carter41 and nullifying judicial attachments against Iran obtained by litigants in 
U.S. courts.42 The General Declaration also specified that U.S. branches of U.S. 
banks would transfer U.S. $1 billion of Iranian assets to a Security Account to 
secure and pay the claims against Iran adjudicated at the Tribunal.43 Paragraph 7 
of the General Declaration specified that Iran would replenish the Security 
Account to a minimum balance of $500 million, whenever it fell below this 
level, until all arbitral awards against it were paid.44 
The Claims Settlement Declaration provided for the creation of the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal.45 This declaration provided that a Tribunal would be 
“established for the purpose of deciding claims of nationals of the United States 
against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the United States…[which 
arose] out of debts, contracts, … expropriations or other measures affecting 
property rights ….”46 It could also adjudicate “any counterclaim which [arose] 
out of the same contract, transaction or occurrence that constitute[d] the subject 
matter of that national‟s claim ….”47  Additionally, the Tribunal had jurisdiction 
over claims of the two governments against each other arising out of contractual 
arrangements between them for the purchase of goods and services, and over 
disputes as to the interpretation or performance of any provision of the Algiers 
Accords.48  However, the Tribunal decided that it did not have jurisdiction over 
direct claims brought by one government against the nationals of the other 
government.49 Similarly, claims by the hostages as a result of their illegal 
 
 41. The sanctions were revoked by Executive Order issued contemporaneously with the 
Algiers Accords. See Exec. Order Nos. 12,276-12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913-31 (1981); Exec. Order 
No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).  
 42. General Declaration, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 7. 
 44. Id.  However, in November 1992, the Iranian Government balked on its commitment to 
shoulder the burden of maintaining the Security Account at the required minimum amount. Sean D. 
Murphy, Obligation to Replenish Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Security Account, 95 AM. J. INT‟L L. 
414, 415 n.3 (2001).  In response, the United States Government filed a claim with the Tribunal 
demanding that Iran replenish the account pursuant to the Claims Settlement Agreement.  U.S. v. 
Iran (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal), Case No. A/28 ¶¶ 1-2 (1993) (Statement of Claim). Nearly eight 
years after the infraction, the Tribunal ruled in favor of the United States and ordered Iran to 
replenish the Security Account. U.S. v. Iran (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal), Decision No. 130-A28-FT 
¶ 95 (2000). 
 45. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, art. II, ¶ 1. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 
 49. Jurisdiction over Claims Filed by Iran Against U.S. Nationals (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal), 
Case No. A/2 (1982). As a result of this case brought by Iran and the decision by the Tribunal, Iran 
withdrew approximately 1,400 claims filed with the Tribunal. David P. Stewart and Laura B. 
Sherman, Developments at the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: 1981-1983, 24 VA. J. INT‟L L. 1, 
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captivity were specifically excluded from the Claims Settlement Declaration.50  
This decision was subsequently ratified through Executive Order51 and has been 
upheld consistently by the judiciary, despite numerous cases filed by the former 
hostages.52 
The beginnings of the Tribunal were not without controversy in the United 
States. Upon the approval of the Algiers Accords, President Reagan suspended 
all lawsuits in United States courts against Iran that were within the Tribunal‟s 
jurisdiction.53  When U.S. claimants decided to challenge the constitutionality of 
this Executive Order, the United States Supreme Court, in expedited 
proceedings, upheld the President‟s authority to suspend lawsuits in the U.S. in 
favor of the alternative forum of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.54 After this 
ruling, U.S. citizens and corporations filed several thousand claims with the 
Tribunal. 
In order to adjudicate the claims filed at the Tribunal, the Claims 
Settlement Declaration provided that the Tribunal have nine arbitrators, with the 
United States and Iran each appointing three.55 The six party-appointed 
arbitrators selected the three remaining non-party arbitrators. The nine 
arbitrators were divided into three panels (chambers).  Each chamber was 
comprised of one U.S. arbitrator, one Iranian arbitrator, and one non-party 
 
9 (1983). 
 50. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, art. II, ¶ 1; General Declaration, supra note 
40, ¶ 11. 
 51. Prohibition Against Prosecution of Certain Claims, 31 C.F.R. § 535.216(a) (1976).  The 
exclusion was necessary in order to successfully implement the Algiers Accords. Exec. Order No. 
12,294, supra note 41. The focus of the Claims Settlement provisions were solely on property issues, 
specifically expropriation claims and contract losses. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, 
art. II, ¶ 1 
 52. See, e.g., Persinger v. Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843, (D.C. Cir. 1984); Ledgerwood v. Iran, 617 
F. Supp. 311, 316 (D.D.C. 1985). The United States Government agreed to bar claims by the 
hostages because it concluded that, since the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act would likely 
preclude United States courts from hearing claims of that nature, these claims would be valueless.  
The Iran Agreements: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong. 32 (1981).  
However, to ensure that the hostages were not left empty-handed, Congress passed two statutes – the 
1980 Hostage Relief Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5561 (1998) and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and 
Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, § 803, 100 Stat. 853 (1986).  The hostages, despite 
the commitment of the United States in the Accords and the explicit waiver by the United States of 
their lawsuits, have filed claims against Iran for monetary damages. To date, all of these lawsuits 
have been unsuccessful. Most recently, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages in 
the amount of 33 billion dollars. Roeder v. Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  However, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that, since Congress did not 
expressly indicate a clear intent to abrogate the Algiers Accords with amendments to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, the court had to uphold the commitments that the United States made to 
the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to secure the freedom of the hostages in 1981. Id. at 237. 
 53. See Exec. Order No. 12,294, supra note 41, § 1. 
 54. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
 55. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, art. III, ¶ 1. 
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arbitrator, who was designated as the presiding arbitrator for that chamber.56 All 
of the private claims were assigned to one of the three chambers. The Full 
Tribunal heard contract disputes between the two governments and disputes 
related to the interpretation and application of the Algiers Accords.57 
The Algiers Accords specified that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
would govern procedural matters.58  In addition, the Algiers Accords provided 
that the UNCITRAL Rules could be modified by the Tribunal or the Parties.59  
Once appointed, the arbitrators undertook extensive deliberations to determine 
the necessary modifications, such as the publication of decisions.60  The 
Tribunal accepted the modifications to the Rules by majority vote, after 
consultation with the Agent of the United States and the Agent of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran,61 and then issued its “Tribunal Rules,” which were modified 
as required by continuing circumstances.  
 The Claims Settlement Declaration determined how the Tribunal was to be 
funded.  It required that the Governments of the United States and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran62 would bear the “expenses of the Tribunal . . . equally” unless 
the parties agreed otherwise.63 The Tribunal set its own salaries, expenses, and 
other budgetary amounts, and the two governments had only an advisory role in 
the process.64 Once the budget was set, requests were made to the two 
governments to deposit equal amounts as advances for costs on a quarterly basis, 
 
 56. Id.; see also Iran-U.S. Claims Procedure, Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure art. 7 (1983), 
reprinted in Annex I to INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 7, at 81-82 
[hereinafter Procedural Rules]. 
 57. Presidential Order Number One, ¶ 5 (Oct. 1, 1981) (reproduced in C. Pinto, Institutional 
Aspects of the Tribunal, in THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE PROCESS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS RESOLUTION 117 (Caron & Crook eds., 2000) [hereinafter Caron & 
Crook]). 
 58. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 3, art. III, ¶ 1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Procedural Rules, supra note 56, art. 32, ¶ 5.  The UNCITRAL Rules do not contemplate 
the publication of decisions. The Tribunal modified this article to ensure that its decision would be 
available to the public. 
 61. H. Holtzmann, Drafting the Tribunal Rules, in Caron & Crook, supra note 57, at 76.  
“Each government shall designate an agent at the seat of the Tribunal to represent it to the Tribunal 
and to receive notices or other communications directed to it or to its nationals, agencies, 
instrumentalities, or entities in connection with proceedings before the Tribunal.”  Claims Settlement 
Declaration, supra note 33, art. VI, ¶ 2.  The U.S. Agent‟s primary functions included presenting the 
U.S. government‟s position to the Tribunal, consulting with claimants, reporting developments at the 
Tribunal to the Department of State, and conducting settlement negotiations.  See A. Rovine, The 
Role of the Agent, in Caron & Crook, supra note 57, at 19. 
 62. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, art. VI, ¶ 3. 
 63. Procedural Rules, supra note 56, art. 41; Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, 
art. III, ¶ 2. 
 64. Christopher Pinto, Institutional Aspects of the Tribunal, in Caron & Crook, supra note 57, 
at 107. 
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with both governments paying those costs simultaneously.65 
While the two governments established the Tribunal, claimants filed their 
own statements of claim, statements of defense, and rebuttals, setting forth legal 
arguments, witness statements, and documentary evidence, directly with the 
Tribunal.66 The parties were then represented by their own attorneys at a hearing 
before a panel of three Tribunal arbitrators. Each side presented its legal 
arguments and produced witnesses and experts who testified on its behalf.67 
These witnesses were subject to cross-examination, not only from the opposing 
side, but also from the arbitrators. 68 After each side had presented its case-in-
chief, the Tribunal allowed rebuttal arguments by each party.69 
Article 24 provided the applicable rule for the burden of proof for 
evidentiary submissions: “Each party shall have the burden of proving the facts 
relied onto support his claims or defence.”70 It further provided that the Tribunal 
“shall determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the 
evidence offered.”71 As is typical of arbitral proceedings, these rules gave the 
Tribunal broad discretion in evaluating the parties‟ evidentiary submissions and 
did not bind the Tribunal to any specific rules of evidence.  The Tribunal‟s 
decisions, however, demonstrate that it preferred that the parties provide 
contemporaneous documentary evidence to support their claims.72 
The Claims Settlement Declaration also specified that “[a]ll decisions and 
awards of the Tribunal shall be final and binding”73 and that “[a]ny award which 
the Tribunal may render against either government shall be enforceable against 
such government in the courts of any nation in accordance with its laws.”74 By 
design then, once the Tribunal issued an award, no appeal from that decision 
was possible. Payment of all awards issued against Iran was paid from the 
Security Account created pursuant to the Algiers Accords.75 Upon rendering an 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Procedural Rules, supra note 56, art. 15, ¶ 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  One category of claims did not follow this claims processing model. The United States 
filed approximately 2,300 claims of less than $250,000 on behalf of U.S. citizens at the Tribunal.  
Rather than individualized dispute resolution of each of these claims, the claims were settled en 
masse by the two governments for U.S. $105,000,000. Claims of Less than US $250,000, 25 Iran-
U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 327 (1990) (Case Nos. 86, B38, B76 and B77).  
 70. Procedural Rules, supra note 56, art. 24, ¶ 1. 
 71. Id. art. 25, ¶ 6. 
 72. See, e.g., Avco Corp. v. Iran Aircraft Industries, AWD 377-261-3 (July 18, 1988), 
reprinted in 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 200, 209 (1998) (finding that the testimony of claimant‟s 
officers, supported by an audit of the evidence, but not by the documentary evidence itself, 
inadequate to prove unmitigated losses). 
 73. Claims Settlement Declaration, supra note 33, art. IV, ¶ 1. 
 74. Id. art. IV, ¶ 3. 
 75. Id. art. II, ¶ 7. 
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award the Tribunal notified the Escrow Agent (Banque Centrale d‟Algerie), 
which then instructed the N.V. Settlement Bank to make the payment to the 
intended recipient.76 
As of April 2009, 3,936 claims were finalized by award, decision, or order, 
including the lump sum settlement of 2,388 claims for less than $250,000, as 
well as 92 government-to-government claims.77  The Tribunal has awarded 
more than $2.5 billion to the United States and U.S. nationals and more than 
$900 million to Iran and Iranian nationals.78 The decisions on these claims have 
been reported in the Iran-U.S. Claim Tribunal reporter and most are available on 
the Tribunal‟s official website.79 Over the years, the Tribunal‟s published 
awards and decisions resolving these disputes have contributed significantly to 
the expansion of international law in this field.80 The Tribunal decided that 
making its decisions public was essential to ensure uniformity for the parties and 
to guarantee that the jurisprudence would be accessible for its precedential value 
in developing principles of international law.81 
 
 76. Technical Agreement with the N.V. Settlement Bank of The Netherlands, para. 3(e)(1) 
(Aug. 17, 1981), reprinted in BROWER & BRUESCHKE, supra note 39, at 708, 710. 
 77. Communiqué from the Office of the Secretary-General, No. 09/2 (Apr. 22, 2009) 
[hereinafter Communiqué of Apr. 22, 2009]. 
 78. Yulia Andreeva et al., International Legal Developments in Review: 2007 Disputes - 
International Courts Committee, 42 INT‟L LAW. 345, 358 (2008).  According to the Communiqué 
issued by the Secretary-General of the Tribunal, the “total amount awarded to United States Parties 
and notified to the Escrow Agent to date: US$2,166,998,515.43 and the US equivalent of 
£303,196.00, DM297,051.00 and Rls.97,132,598 (excluding any interest to be calculated by the 
Escrow Agent).”  Communiqué of Apr. 22, 2009, supra note 77. Additionally, “a total amount 
(excluding any interest to be calculated) of US$1,013,716,179.13 and the U.S. Dollar equivalent of 
Rls. 7,977,343 was awarded or ordered to be paid to Iran and Iranian parties . . . .” Id. 
 79. Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org. 
 80. Judge George Aldrich, a long-standing arbitrator of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, stated 
that he “never doubted that the hundreds of awards and decisions made by the Tribunal would be 
recognized for their lasting value as legal precedents in international law and perhaps in a nascent lex 
mercatoria.” George Aldrich, Book Review, 102 AM. J. INT‟L L. 213, 214 (2008) (reviewing THE 
IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AT 25: THE CASES EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW FOR INVESTOR-STATE 
& INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Christopher R. Drahozal & Christopher S. Gibson eds., 2007)). 
 81. As explained by one of the Agents of the United States, Lucy Reed, the transparency of 
publication assisted “literally hundreds of US claimants and their counsel” in that “the availability of 
procedural precedents allowed parties to write better memorials and conduct better hearings.” Lucy 
Reed, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, in THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION/PEACE 
PALACE PAPERS: INSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF MASS CLAIMS SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEMS 9, 13 (Kluwer Law Int‟l ed., 2000). The decisions to these claims are reported in the Iran-
U.S. Claim Tribunal reporter and are available on the Tribunal‟s official website at www.iusct.org. 
The decisions focused on a variety of international and commercial law issues.  These issues 
included, inter alia, interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention and other principles of 
treaty law, the application of the International Monetary Fund, expropriation, breaches of contract, 
interest on awards, rights of dual nationals, and force majeure. Warren Christopher & Richard M. 
Mosk, The Iranian Hostage Crisis and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal: Implications for International 
Dispute Resolution and Diplomacy, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 165, 173 (2007). 
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2. Argentina 
Argentina‟s transition to democracy is most often recalled for the work of 
its groundbreaking truth commission and the trials of high-level officers 
responsible for the “dirty war” (guerra sucia) that took place between 1976 and 
1983 under a succession of military juntas. During that period of severe 
repression, state security forces forcibly disappeared at least twelve thousand 
persons.82 State forces also created many more thousands of victims through 
systematic killings, torture, and arbitrary detention.83 Once democracy was 
restored, the country and its civilian leadership began to grapple with this 
devastating legacy of atrocities. Economic reparations for victims were among 
the measures pursued. The administrations of presidents Raúl Alfonsín (1983-
89), Carlos Menem (1989-99), and Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) each enacted 
laws to provide redress to victims of the dictatorship. 
Although we refer to this patchwork of legislation compensating victims as 
Argentina‟s reparations program, it more closely resembles a cumulative series 
of domestic policies that evolved over two decades. The different stages of this 
development are summarized below. But a denominator common to nearly all 
the policies enacted is that they were (i) legally anchored by legislation and (2) 
implemented administratively by a specialized executive agency of the 
Argentine Ministry of the Interior.84 Though hampered by economic hardship, 
among other obstacles, the resulting program continues to represent one of the 
most comprehensive and generous reparatory efforts in the transitional justice 
context.85 
 
 82. Carlos H. Acuña, Transitional Justice in Argentina and Chile: A Never-Ending Story, in 
RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 206, 208-09 (Jon Elster ed., 
2006). In 1984, the Committee on Disappeared Persons (CONADEP) documented the disappearance 
of 8,963 persons and estimated that the number of forced disappearances exceeded 9,000 cases. 
From 1984-1999, the Under-Secretariat of Human Rights in the Ministry of the Interior confirmed 
an additional 3,000 cases. 
 83. See generally id. 
 84. Exec. Decree No. 3090, Sept. 20, 1984; see also María José Guembe, Economic 
Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: The Argentine Experience, in HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 21, 23, 44. Initially, this was the Subsecretaría de Derechos 
Humanos y Sociales [Under-Secretariat for Human and Social Rights]. When the structure of the 
Ministry of the Interior changed, the Under-Secretariat was renamed Dirección Nacional de 
Derechos Humanos [National Directorship for Human Rights] in 1991 before eventually returning to 
its original name in 1996. In 1999, the Under-Secretariat was transferred to the Ministry of Justice 
and Human Rights by Executive Decree No. 20, Dec. 13, 1999. Finally, in 2002 it became the 
Secretaría de Derechos Humanos y Sociales [Secretariat of Human and Social Rights], its current 
name. 
 85. See De Greiff, supra note 14, at 13. Argentina‟s reparations program was especially 
munificent in the sense that its individual awards were, relatively speaking, very substantial. But the 
Argentine transition has been rightfully criticized on other grounds, particularly its early penchant 
for impunity. See, e.g., Instrucciones a los fiscales militares [Instructions to Military Prosecutors] 
(1986) (requiring Military Prosecutors to exempt from liability those human rights violators who 
could demonstrate that they were acting according to orders); Ley de Punto Final [Full Stop Law], 
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The foundation for reparations was set almost immediately once President 
Alfonsín took office in December 1983. The first set of remedial measures 
adopted in 1984 and 1985 resulted in the reinstatement of public servants who 
had been dismissed from their posts during the dictatorship for political or 
arbitrary motives. Among those who benefited were public employees of state 
owned banks and companies, Foreign Service officers, and teachers.86 At the 
same time, the Commission on the Disappearance of Persons or “CONADEP,” 
established by presidential decree only days after Alfonsín‟s inauguration, was 
charged with investigating the practice of forced disappearances.87 It 
recommended in 1984 that “economic assistance” be provided to the next of kin 
of persons disappeared, including “scholarships, social assistance and job 
positions.”88 
In 1986, the Alfonsín government passed a law granting pensions to the 
spouses and children of persons who had been disappeared.89 To establish a 
claim, beneficiaries had to point to a judicial or administrative “accusation” or 
complaint made in response to the forced disappearance of their loved one, 
which included those collected from victims by CONADEP.90 Under Argentine 
law, where documentary or other evidence was lacking, the sworn testimony of 
two or more persons would be sufficient to establish the claim.91 Once the claim 
was established, beneficiaries of the pension regime received payments 
equivalent to the “minimum ordinary amount received by a retired public 
 
Law No. 23492, Dec. 29, 1986, B.O. (implementing a 60-day period after which no additional 
accused human rights violators could be indicted); Ley de Obediencia Debida [Law of Due 
Obedience], Law No. 23521, June 9, 1987, B.O. (granting impunity to all officers and subordinates 
who committed crimes during the dictatorship if they were obeying orders from their superiors). 
Although impunity measures strongly influenced the reparations calculus described in this case 
study, those issues are beyond the scope of this paper. For a detailed analysis, see Acuña, supra note 
82, at 209-15. 
 86. See Guembe, supra note 84, at 23-24 (citing Law 23505, Feb. 22, 1984 (reincorporating 
into the Foreign Service those diplomats who were dismissed during the dictatorship); Law 23117, 
Sept. 30, 1984 (reincorporating into State-controlled entities those employees who were dismissed 
because of their political views or affiliation with trade unions); Law 23238, Sept. 10, 1985 
(reincorporating teachers who were dismissed during the dictatorship because of their political views 
or affiliation with trade unions); Law 23523, June 24, 1988 (reincorporating bank workers who were 
dismissed for political motives); Law 23278, Sept. 28, 1985 (aimed at individuals who were 
dismissed or forced to quit their public or private positions because of their political views or 
affiliation with trade unions)). In some cases, they received back pay and benefits. 
 87. Exec. Decree No. 157, Dec. 15, 1983, reprinted in MARCELO A. SANCINETTI, DERECHOS 
HUMANOS EN LA ARGENTINA POSTDICTATORIAL 177-79 (1988); see also PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, 
UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 174 (2001). 
 88. COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN DE PERSONAS (CONADEP), 
Recommendations, in NUNCA MÁS: INFORME DE LA COMISIÓN NACIONAL SOBRE LA DESAPARICIÓN 
DE PERSONAS, 5TH ED., pt. VI (1999). 
 89. Law 23466, Oct. 30, 1986. Under certain circumstances such as disability or 
unemployment, parents and siblings could be eligible as well. 
 90. Guembe, supra note 84, at 26. 
 91. Id. 
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servant.”92 They also received state sponsored health care benefits.93 
The reparations regime in Argentina entered its most active phase from 
1989 through 1999 during President Carlos Menem‟s back-to-back 
administrations. As a former political prisoner, Menem was sympathetic to the 
cause of other victims, especially those who had been detained and/or 
disappeared. His interest in redressing victims directly flowed also from a desire 
to counter-balance the intensely controversial measures he and Alfonsín, his 
predecessor, championed vis-à-vis the perpetrators.94 While Alfonsín sponsored 
legislation that ensured immunity from prosecution for most members of the 
armed forces, Menem pardoned the convicted junta members and other high-
ranking military officers still on trial. 95 In 1992, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights found these measures to be incompatible with 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American 
Convention on Human Rights.96 The Commission urged Argentina to devise a 
reparations program for the victims of state terrorism, as well as to prosecute the 
perpetrators.97 As a result, the Menem government tried to “reduc[e] political 
costs by moving forward in a series of human rights aspects . . . namely, 
reparation for the victims and the search for kidnapped children.”98 
Additionally, largely in response to the cases brought before the IACHR, 
Menem issued a presidential decree in 1991, granting economic reparations for 
persons detained during the dictatorship, where they or their next of kin had 
filed a lawsuit for damages before December 10, 1985.99 Many applicants had 
received either a non-appealable judgment on the grounds that the two-year 
statute of limitations had expired on their claim or had claims that were still 
pending when the decree was issued.100 The latter could relinquish their judicial 
claims and accept the benefit or continue to litigate.101 Under this decree, 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id. at 46-47. 
 95. Id. at 27; Acuña, supra note 82, at 209, 214-15. 
 96. See Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
28/92 (1992), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/Argentina10.147.htm; see also 
Guembe, supra note 84, at 28. 
 97. Cases 10.147, 10.181, 10.240, 10.262, 10.309, 10.311, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 
28/92 (1992), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/92eng/Argentina10.147.htm. 
 98. Acuña, supra note 82, at 215. 
 99. Exec. Decree No. 70/91, Jan. 10, 1991. This date represents the cut-off date based on a 
two-year statute of limitations, which started to run on the date the dictatorship was deemed to have 
ended. Menem issued this executive decree when a draft law on the subject presented to Congress 
became bogged down. 
 100. Former political prisoners and their relatives had filed numerous suits starting in 1983. 
Some courts had allowed them; others dismissed them on statute of limitations grounds. This 
inconsistent treatment generated pressure for an equitable resolution to the issue. See Guembe, supra 
note 84, at 24, 28. 
 101. Guembe, supra note 84, at 30. These litigants could still apply for administrative 
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compensation was calibrated according to the amount earned on a daily basis by 
the highest category of national civil servants; this amount was then paid for 
each day the claimant spent in detention102 In addition, the equivalent of five 
years in detention was paid in cases of death; where severe injuries occurred the 
victim was entitled to 70% of this amount.103 These benefits were payable in 
cash within 60 days of approval by the Ministry of the Interior. 104 Argentine 
authorities calculate that 227 persons benefited from this decree, a small 
percentage of the estimated 10,000 detained during the state of emergency by 
the security forces.105 
Shortly thereafter, the Argentine Congress passed a law extending 
economic reparations to all victims who (i) were detained by military tribunals 
or as a result of executive authority pursuant to the state of siege before 
December 10, 1983, and (ii) had not already received compensation for the same 
violations by a judicial ruling.106 Even though implementation began in 1992, 
the first payments did not issue until 1994.107 The economic reparations were 
paid out in the form of government bonds, though there are no statistics on the 
actual amounts disbursed under this program.108 The period for filing claims 
ended in September 1998, during which time about 13,600 individuals claimed 
the benefit. In the end, some 7,800 former detainees received compensation.109 
Under this law, as under the Presidential Decree, the Ministry of the Interior 
processed applications.110 The law eventually came to augment the decree since 
 
reparations if they lost their cases. Exec. Decree No. 70/91, art. 11, Jan. 10, 1991. However, 
acceptance of reparations under the decree was contingent upon the renouncement of additional 
rights to indemnification. Id. 
 102. Guembe, supra note 84, at 30-31. Individuals received $27 Argentine pesos for each day 
they spent in detention. 
 103. Id. at 31. Individuals who died in detention were entitled to $49,275 Argentine pesos plus 
$27 per day spent in detention. Individuals who suffered severe injuries under the meaning of Article 
91 of the Penal Code (those causing a “physical or mental illness, certainly or probably incurable, 
permanent work disabilities, the loss of one sense, an organ, a member, the use of an organ or a 
member, loss of speech, or the capacity to beget or conceive”) were entitled to $34,492 Argentine 
pesos plus $27 per day spent in detention. 
 104. Id. Claimants had to file applications for benefits with the Ministry of the Interior, which 
in turn had to verify the duration of detentions and the corresponding payment. Claimants had a right 
of appeal to the courts if rejected. Further, if payments were not made in the time allotted, 
beneficiaries could claim the payments through the normal judicial process for executing sentences. 
 105. Id. at 28, 31. No information is available on the actual amounts paid out, though the decree 
itself did charge the expense to the State directly. Exec. Decree No. 70/91, art. 12, Jan. 10, 1991. 
 106. HAYNER, supra note 87, at 175. 
 107. Guembe, supra note 84, at 34. 
 108. Id. at 33. The bonds had nominal values, paid interest, and could be exchanged at any time 
for their market value, or exchanged for their total value at the date of their expiration, in this case in 
2010, 16 years after they were issued. 
 109. Id. at 33. 
 110. See id. at 30-31. 
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it authorized substantially higher payments.111 As with the decree, the amounts 
under the new law were calibrated according to the projected daily income of 
persons in the highest category of national civil servants, but the daily rate came 
out to be nearly three times higher due to delays in the law‟s implementation.112 
Further, in cases of death while in detention, as under the decree, the law paid 
the equivalent of five years in detention, and where severe injuries occurred, 
paid the victim 70% of this amount.113 
When filing a claim, claimants had to declare under oath “that they had 
been detained under the conditions established by the law between November 6, 
1974 and December 10, 1983.”114 As to evidence required to substantiate 
claims, “the guidelines [established by the law and its implementing decrees] 
were broad and took into account the conditions in which detention occurred and 
the difficulties in proving them.”115 Accordingly, judicial, administrative, and 
other official records like those compiled by CONADEP could be 
complemented by press accounts or documentation compiled by international 
human rights bodies such as the Inter-American Commission.116 Claims of 
serious injury in relation to detention were verified by the reviewing agency in 
the Ministry of the Interior based on court-validated medical records from the 
detention facility, a victim‟s medical history, or, if necessary, the evaluation 
from a medical meeting at a hospital conducted for this purpose.117 Under both 
the reparations law and the presidential decree it expanded, unsuccessful 
claimants could appeal to a court of law.118 
The most controversial component of Argentina‟s reparations program was 
the enactment of a group of laws, beginning in 1994, aimed at repairing victims 
of forced disappearances and state-sponsored assassinations (extrajudicial 
executions).119 The first law, enacted in part to respond to inconsistent judicial 
 
 111. Id. at 33. 
 112. Id. at 32. The rate was $74 per day, as the pertinent salary scale, set in 1994 after some 
controversy, had risen substantially since the payments under the decree were issued. In 1994, 
Argentina offered bonds in the national currency (pesos) or in U.S. dollars. In 2002, all of the bonds 
that were issued in U.S. dollars were converted to pesos, and the foreign currency option no longer 
exists for those who have not yet received benefits. Id. at 40-41. 
 113. Id. at 32-33. 
 114. Id. at 32; Exec. Decree No. 1023/92, June 24, 1992. 
 115. Guembe, supra note 84, at 32. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Law No. 24411, Dec. 7, 1994 (granting economic reparations for victims of forced 
disappearance and the successors of victims of extrajudicial execution); Ley Parche [Mending Patch 
Law], Law No. 24823, May 7, 1997 (added to Law No. 24411, establishing the order in which 
benefits should be paid out to successors (i.e. to descendants, spouse, ancestors, and relatives to the 
fourth degree) and applying the law to common law marriages, among other things); Ley de 
Ausencia por Deaparición Forzada [Law of Absence by Forced Disappearance], Law No. 24321, 
May 11, 1994 (forcing the State to recognize victims who were illegally kidnapped by agents of the 
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decisions awarding relatives of victims amounts ranging from $250,000 to 
$3,000,000 Argentine pesos, required a judicial finding or presumption of death 
for successors to qualify for benefits.120 Eventually, however, additional norms 
had to be promulgated to create a new legal status for victims of forced 
disappearance under Argentine law, and to allow the next of kin to claim redress 
on their behalf without first presuming the victim‟s death, which many were 
loathe to do.121 Under the modified regime, a close relative would first bring a 
claim in court to have a judge declare the victim “absent by forced 
disappearance.”122 Upon receiving an application for the corresponding 
benefits, the Ministry of the Interior validated the claim before making payment 
to the victim‟s “assignees.”123 
Under the series of laws enacted starting in 1994, the assignees of the 
nearly 9,000 victims of forced disappearance whose cases were documented by 
the CONADEP were automatically entitled to the compensation.124 In other 
cases, judges could employ a broad evidentiary perspective like the one the 
reparations regime for arbitrary detention adopted. “This is of particular 
importance because repression in Argentina took place under clandestine 
conditions and no exhaustive investigation had been carried out, which made 
many of these cases quite difficult to prove.”125 Thus, cases reported after 
CONADEP could be corroborated “either through a mention in the press or a 
report to a national or international human rights body at the time, or evidence 
that a habeas corpus petition had been submitted to the courts . . . .”126 
 
State never to be seen again, dead or alive); Guembe, supra note 84, at 34-37. These laws were 
controversial: victims and their successors viewed the reparations as blood money received in 
exchange for their silence and the impunity for those responsible. Further, the successors of victims 
of forced disappearance demanded that the disappeared be recognized as such rather than declared 
deceased. Id. at 35. 
 120. HAYNER, supra note 87, 176, n.14 (citing various articles in Clarín (local newspaper)). 
 121. Law No. 24823, May 7, 1997; Guembe, supra note 84, at 35-37. 
 122. Guembe, supra note 84, at 36. The judge could verify the accusations by requesting and 
examining the original accusation of disappearance from the CONADEP or claims filed with the 
Secretariat of Human and Social Rights of the Ministry of the Interior. After reviewing the reports, 
the judge had to order the publication of edicts for three consecutive days and then allow 60 days to 
pass before declaring the individual absent by forced disappearance. Id. at 40. 
 123. Id. In doing so, the Ministry, for example, had to request police records in the victim‟s 
name, dated after the date of alleged disappearance, as a precaution against fraud in the application 
for benefits. A police report subsequent to the alleged disappearance would indicate that the person 
was ultimately released from detention rather than forcibly disappeared. Id. at 36-37. The Mending 
Patch Law also established that an individual who had been judicially declared a victim of forced 
disappearance would receive economic reparations through his or her causahabientes, or assignees. 
The distinction between heirs and assignees was significant for the same reasons it was important to 
distinguish between death and forced disappearance. See supra note 119. 
 124. HAYNER, supra note 87, at 175. Their cases were considered proven. Guembe, supra note 
84, at 40. 
 125. Guembe, supra note 84, at 39. 
 126. Id. at 23, 39. The CONADEP had a limited mandate and was dissolved after publishing 
Nunca Más in 1984 and replaced with an Executive Agency. Executions could be validated with a 
CARILLO_PALMER_FINAL_28.2 4/23/2010  5:18 AM 
364 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:2 
Significantly, the new law shifted the burden of proof from the claimants to the 
state, which had the effect of greatly expanding eligibility criteria.127 
The benefit awarded for extrajudicial execution and forced disappearance 
was the same: $244,000 Argentine pesos payable in government bonds.128 In 
addition, the children of victims of forced disappearance were exempted from 
military service,129 received housing credits, and were entitled to a monthly 
pension of $140 per month until they reached age 21.130 By 2004, the Ministry 
of the Interior‟s specialized agency had received 8,200 claims for economic 
reparations for cases of forced disappearance and assassination, 8,000 of which 
were approved.131 It is estimated that the Government of Argentina paid 
$1,912,960,000 to beneficiaries of this reparations regime. When added to the 
$1,1170,000,000 paid out under the rubric established for victims of arbitrary 
detention, the total for just these two initiatives came to $3,082,960,000.132 
The Argentine government has initiated two much smaller programs since 
2004.  The first program resulted when then-President Néstor Kirchner and the 
Argentinean Congress passed a law extending substantial economic benefits to 
minors who were victims of state terrorism. These victims included children 
born to mothers the military detained as political prisoners, minors who 
remained imprisoned due to the detention or disappearance of their parents for 
political reasons, and victims of identity substitution.133 
The second program was directed at covering persons forced into exile 
 
judicial ruling, a petition received by the CONADEP, or administrative documents indicating that 
security forces or their paramilitary allies were responsible. Id. at 40. 
 127. Andrea Armstrong, The Role of Civil Society Actors in Reparations Legislation, in 
REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1, at 254. 
 128. Guembe, supra note 84, at 40. Payable in U.S. dollars or Argentine pesos, see supra note 
112. Using government bonds as a method of payment was also controversial, especially in light of 
Argentina‟s precarious economic situation. See Christina Marie Wilson, Argentina‟s Reparations 
Bonds: An Analysis of Continuing Obligations , 28 FORDHAM INT‟L L.J. 786 (2005); Guembe, supra 
note 84, at 41. Given the magnitude of the atrocities addressed, the economic reparations represented 
a significant financial burden on the state. Bondholders could sell the bonds at market price to obtain 
approximately 75% of face value or wait until maturity, about sixteen years after issuance. During 
the first six years, the State did not have to pay financial services or amortization for the bonds, an 
obligation that began in 2001 and was set to run through the date of maturity in 2011. In the wake of 
the economic crisis, the State declared the cessation of all public debt titles in December 2001. 
However, in May 2002, the State exempted from the cessation of payments all bonds that were 
issued under the laws redressing forced disappearances that were in the possession of their original 
holders. It also converted all bonds issued in U.S. dollars to Argentine pesos and denied others the 
option to request foreign currency bonds. 
 129. At the time, military service was mandatory. HAYNER, supra note 87, at 330-31. 
 130. Law No. 23466, Oct. 30, 1986. 
 131. Guembe, supra note 84, at 41. 
 132. Id. All amounts are in Argentine pesos pegged to the U.S. dollar. 
 133. Id. at 42. $244,000 Argentine pesos, the same amount paid under Law No. 24411 for 
forced disappearance or extrajudicial execution, but after the devaluation of the peso. 
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during the dictatorship.134 In October 2004, the Argentine Supreme Court held 
that the situation of a person persecuted by the dictatorship and forced into exile 
was analogous to that of a victim of arbitrary detention, and thus should be 
repaired accordingly under the existing reparations laws.135 In 2005 a bill 
providing compensation for those persons forced into exile was introduced and 
passed in the Senate; the Commission of Human Rights in the Chamber of 
Deputies approved it later that same year.136  However, three additional 
legislative commissions must still approve the legislation.137 
3. United Nations Compensation Commission 
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was established 
in 1991 to resolve claims against Iraq as a result of its invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait, after a determination of Iraq‟s liability under international law by the 
United Nations Security Council.138 Over the course of its lifetime, the UNCC 
processed over 2.6 million claims from 96 different countries.139 In order to 
review such an extraordinary number of claims, the UNCC developed novel 
methods for processing mass claims, such as statistical sampling, that greatly 
contributed to the techniques available in the field.140 While these 
methodologies were unprecedented in international practice, the UNCC‟s 
application of legal principles were still firmly rooted in the international 
 
 134. HAYNER, supra note 87, at 176. 
 135. See Hugo Alconada Mon, Ordenan indemnizar a exiliados por la dictadura, LA NACIÓN, 
Oct. 15, 2004; Guembe, supra note 84, at 43-44. 
 136. Guembe, supra note 84, at 43-44; Laura Serra, Avanza el plan para compensar a exiliados, 
LA NACIÓN, Apr. 8, 2005. 
 137. Serra, supra note 136. While the members of the Comisión de Ex Exiliados Políticos de la 
República Argentina (COEPRA) favor the legislation, some former exiles are opposed to the idea of 
economic reparations on the moral ground that exile does not compare to torture and disappearance 
suffered by other victims of the military regime. General polémica el proyecto oficial para 
indemnizar exiliados, LA NACIÓN, Mar. 28, 2005. 
 138. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).  
 139. Norbert Wühler, Institutional and Procedural Aspects of Mass Claims Settlement Systems: 
The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION‟S 
PEACE PALACE PAPERS 18 (2000). 
 140. Due to the enormous number of Category C claims submitted, the UNCC developed a 
mass processing methodology containing criteria for evaluating, verifying and compensating each 
loss element in the Category “C” claim. The computer software was coded so that answers to 
questions would result in the claim being grouped or sub-grouped, as appropriate. Using this 
methodology, “the Panel found that an „aggregate picture‟ of the claims – presented often through a 
review of many sample claims and the respective claimed losses, statistical analyses of claimed 
amounts and evidentiary patterns, and common socio-economic characteristics of claimants – 
provided it with a level of comfort concerning its general criteria and conclusions, and allowed 
certain general presumptions to be made, that would not have been possible in the context of 
resolving claims on an individual basis.” Report and Recommendations Made by the Panel of 
Commissioners Concerning the First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages Up To 
US$100,000 (Category “C” Claims), S/AC.26.1994/3 (Dec. 21, 1994). 
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tribunals that preceded it; most notably, the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.141 
However, the UNCC was not an arbitral body or an international court. Rather, 
as the former chief of the Legal Services Branch of the UNCC noted, it was “an 
administrative body which perform[ed] an essentially fact-finding function of 
examining claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses and making 
payments of compensation.”142  
The UNCC was established as a subsidiary organ of the UN Security 
Council as a result of Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait.143 The United Nations adopted 
Resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, five weeks after the suspension of the military 
operations against Iraq. Specifically, the resolution stated that Iraq was “liable 
under international law for any direct loss, damage, including environmental 
damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign 
Governments, nationals, and corporations, as a result of its unlawful invasion 
and occupation of Kuwait.”144 Three days after the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 687, Iraq accepted its terms. In doing so, Iraq accepted liability for 
all losses incurred as a result of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait.145 
Not only did Resolution 687 codify Iraq‟s liability for the losses suffered 
due to its unlawful actions, but it also established the mechanism for redressing 
those losses. The Security Council created an entity that would process claims 
and pay compensation for losses resulting from Iraq‟s invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.146 Specifically, Paragraph 19 directed the Secretary-General to  
develop and present to the Security Council for decision, no later than 30 days 
following the adoption of the present resolution, recommendations for the fund to 
meet the requirement for the payment of claims established in accordance with 
paragraph 18. . . and for a programme to implement the decisions in paragraph 
16, 17, and 18 . . . .147 
In May of 1991, as required by Resolution 687, the Secretary-General 
 
 141. In deciding claims, the UNCC relied on traditional theories of international law, including 
precedents established by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal in the areas of expropriation, property loss, 
and contract dispute. 
 142. Wühler, supra note 139, at 17. 
 143. Iraq‟s justification for invading Kuwait arose out of territorial and economic claims. John 
Quigley, The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedent for Israel‟s Arab Territories?, 2 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT‟L L. 195, 198 (1992). Based on these claims, Iraq escalated hostilities against 
Kuwait from February through July of 1990, culminating in its invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 
1990. UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CONFLICT, 1990-1996 14 
(1996). 
 144. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 138, ¶ 16. 
 145. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 143, at 35. 
 146. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General regarding creation of a United 
Nations Compensation Fund and the United Nations Compensation Commission as envisaged in 
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22559 (May 2, 1991), reprinted in UNITED 
NATIONS, supra note 143, at 240-45. 
 147. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 138, ¶ 19. 
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presented the report to the Security Council.148 In the report, the Secretary-
General recommended that the proposed Compensation Commission would 
resolve claims filed by countries on behalf of their citizens for losses suffered as 
a result of Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait.149 On May 20, 1991, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 692, which established the UNCC and located the 
Commission at the UN office in Geneva.150 
The UNCC consisted of three parts: 1) the Governing Council, 2) the 
Secretariat, and 3) the panels of commissioners. 151 The Governing Council was 
comprised of the same countries that made up the Security Council.152 The 
Governing Council was responsible for promulgating the UNCC Rules of 
Procedure, establishing the criteria for claims and deadlines for claims, creating 
the sequence of priority for deciding claims and distributing payment of awards, 
considering reports on various aspects of the Commission‟s work, and 
approving the recommendations made by the panels of Commissioners, who 
acted as the primary decision makers on individual claims.153 
The Secretariat was headed by the Executive Secretary, who was appointed 
by the UN Secretary-General after consultation with the Governing Council.154 
The Secretariat was responsible for the technical, legal, and administrative 
support of the UNCC.155 Among those working for the UNCC Secretariat were 
lawyers who reviewed the claims and worked with the Commissioners in 
drafting the reports and recommendations to the Governing Council, accountants 
and loss adjusters who assisted in verifying and valuing the claims, and 
information technology specialists who developed programs that allowed for the 
mass processing of millions of property loss claims.156 
The Commissioners were individuals the Executive Secretariat 
recommended and the Secretary-General approved.157 The function of the 
commissioners was to verify and evaluate claims, and, in so doing, to determine 
 
 148. U.N. Doc. S/22559, supra note 146, ¶ 1. 
 149. The Secretary-General reiterated Iraqi culpability for “any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, 
nationals and corporations, as a result of Iraq‟s unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait.” Id. 
 150. S.C. Res. 692, U.N. Doc. S/RES/692 (May 20, 1991). 
 151. The Secretary-General made his recommendations in U.N. Doc. S/22559, supra note 146. 
The Security Council adopted those regulations in S.C. Res. 692, supra note 150. 
 152. U.N. Doc. S/22559, supra note146, ¶ 5. As the membership of the Security Council has 
changed, so did the membership of the Governing Council.  
 153. To date, all decisions of the Governing Council have been made by unanimous consent. 
Jessica Bodack, International Law for the Masses, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‟L L. 363, 378 (2005). 
 154. Id. 
 155. U.N. Doc. S/22559, supra note 146. 
 156. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 302. 
 157. Id. at 183-84.  During the life of the UNCC, 59 Commissioners were appointed to Panels 
to resolve claims. The United Nations Compensation Commission, The Commissioners, 
http://www.uncc.ch/commiss.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2009). 
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whether they were directly related to Iraq‟s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait.158  In nominating individuals as commissioners, the UNCC Provisional 
Rules for Claims Processing required the Secretary-General to take into account 
the need for geographical representation, experience, and integrity.159 
Additionally, the commissioners were required to be experts in “fields such as 
finance, law, accounting, insurance, environmental damage assessment, oil, 
trade, and engineering.”160 
Governments filed claims on behalf of their citizens for compensation as a 
result of death, injury, loss of or damage to property, commercial losses, and 
environmental damages that occurred due to Iraq‟s invasion of Kuwait.161 
Claimants who were eligible to have their governments file claims for them 
included citizens of Kuwait, citizens of foreign countries, corporations, the 
governments themselves and international organizations.162  Iraqi citizens were 
specifically prohibited from filing claims, unless they were also nationals of 
another country.163 
The Governing Council identified six categories of claims (categories “A” 
through “F”).164 Four of the categories were created for claims for individuals 
(Categories “A” through “D”),165 one was created for corporations (Category 
“E”),166 and one was created for governments and international organizations 
(Category “F”).167  Category “A” claims were those submitted by individuals 
who were forced to depart from Iraq or Kuwait during the period of August 2, 
1990 to March 1991.168  The Governing Council established fixed sums of US $ 
2,500 for individual claimants and US $ 5,000 for families.  However, if 
claimants only filed a category “A” claim, the fixed sum was increased to US $ 
4,000 for individuals and US $ 8,000 for families.169  Approximately US $ 3.2 
 
 158. The United Nations Compensation Commission, supra note 157. 
 159. Provisional Rules for Claims Procedure, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, art. 19, para. 1 (June 
26, 1992) [hereinafter UNCC Provisional Rules]. 
 160. Id. art. 19, ¶ 2. 
 161. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 138. Individuals and corporations who suffered losses could not 
file claims on their own behalf before the UNCC. Rather, claims had to be filed by the country of 
their nationality or citizenship.  UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 5. 
 162. UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 5.  
 163. Criteria for Expedited Processing of Urgent Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, ¶ 17 
(Aug. 2, 1991). 
 164. The United States Compensation Commission, Claims, http://www.uncc.ch/theclaims.htm 
(last visited June 22, 2009). 
 165. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, supra note 163, ¶¶ 10-14. 
 166. Id. ¶ 16. 
 167. Id. ¶ 30. 
 168. Id. ¶ 10. 
 169. The United States Compensation Commission, Category “A” Claims, 
http://www.uncc.ch/claims/a_claims.htm (last visited June 22, 2009).  
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billion was approved for category “A” claims.170 
Category “B” claims were submitted by individuals who suffered “serious 
personal injury” or “whose spouse, child, or parent died.”171  The Governing 
Council established fixed sums of US $2,500 for individuals and up to US 
$10,000 for families.172 Approximately US $13.5 million was approved for 
category “B” claims.173  Category “C” and “D” claims were submitted by 
individuals for 21 different types of losses, including losses of income, support, 
housing, personal property, medical expenses or costs of departure. 174 Category 
“C” claims were capped at $100,000.175  Approximately 1,800,000 Category 
“C” claims were filed and around US $5.2 billion was approved in payment for 
those claims.176 Category “D” claims were for claims above $ 100,000.177 
Approximately 14,000 Category “D” claims were filed and around US $3.4 
billion was approved in payment for those claims.178 Category “E” claims were 
claims filed by corporations, private legal entities, and public sector 
enterprises.179 Approximately 6,500 category “E” claims were filed seeking 
approximately US $79 billion in compensation.180  Finally, approximately 300 
category “F” claims were claims filed by governments and organizations 
seeking US $236 billion in compensation.181 
The UNCC required claimants to file a claim through their government, 
each of which had its own internal processes for collecting and reviewing 
claims.182 However, the UNCC did mandate some uniformity in the procedures. 
 
 170. Id. 
 171. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, supra note 163, ¶ 10. 
 172. The United States Compensation Commission, Category “B” Claims, 
http://www.uncc.ch/claims/b_claims.htm (last visited June 22, 2009). 
 173. Id. 
 174. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, supra note 163, ¶ 14; The United States Compensation 
Commission, Category “C” Claims, http://www.uncc.ch/claims/c_claims.htm (last visited June 22, 
2009). 
 175. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/1, supra note 163, ¶ 14. 
 176. See The United States Compensation Commission, UNCC Status, 
http://www.uncc.ch.status.htm (last visited June 22, 2009).  
 177. The United States Compensation Commission, Category “D” Claims, 
http://www.uncc.ch/claims/d_claims.htm (last visited June 22, 2009). 
 178. Id. 
 179. United Nations Compensation Commission Governing Council, Criteria for Additional 
Categories of Claims, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev. 1, ¶ 16 (Mar. 16, 1992); see also The United 
Nations Compensation Commission, Category E Claims, http://www.uncc.ch/claims/e_claims.htm 
(last visited June 22, 2009). 
 180. See The United Nations Compensation Commission, UNCC Status, 
http://www.uncc.ch.status.htm (last visited June 22, 2009).  
 181. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/7/Rev. 1, supra note 179, ¶ 30; see also The United Nations 
Compensation Commission, Category F Claims, http://www.uncc.ch/claims/f_claims.htm (last 
visited June 22, 2009). 
 182. For instance, the Office of the Legal Adviser, Office of International Claims and 
Investment Disputes, provided the claim forms to potential claimants, received the completed claim 
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For instance, the UNCC mandated that claimants submit their claims on the 
official claim form that the UNCC provided.183 Claim forms were accepted in 
any of the official languages of the U.N. However, as English was the working 
language of the claims procedure and computerized database, if claims were not 
submitted in English, the Rules of Procedure required an English translation.184  
Claim forms and documents in Categories B through F had to be submitted in 
paper, with the option of a duplicate  computerized submission, while Category 
A claims had to be submitted in the computerized format required by the UNCC 
Secretariat.185 
In order to process claims, the UNCC Provisional Rules established a 
minimal evidentiary threshold.  For the expedited Category A, B, and C claims, 
the claimant only had to show “appropriate evidence of the circumstances and 
amount of the loss” and the evidence had to be the “reasonable minimum.”186 
For instance, in claims for departure from Iraq or Kuwait (Category A claims), 
simple documentation that demonstrated the departure, such as a plane ticket or 
passport stamp, would suffice.187  For the Category D, E, and F claims, a stricter 
standard was applied: claimants had to provide “documentary and other 
appropriate evidence sufficient to demonstrate the circumstances and amount of 
the loss.”188 This standard was subject to interpretation by the panels reviewing 
the claims and varied depending upon the type of claim presented.189 
 
forms, reviewed them for compliance with the UNCC filing rules, and transmitted the claims to the 
UNCC registry.  See U.S. Dep‟t of State – Iraq Claims, http://www.state.gov/s/l/3200.htm (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2009). The United States submitted approximately 3100 individual claims, 144 
corporate claims, and five government claims.  See R. Bettauer, Current Developments, 89 AM. J. 
INT‟L L. 416, 417 n.4 (1995). 
 183. UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 6. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. art. 7. 
 186. Id. art. 35(2)(c). The appropriate evidence of the circumstance included the difficult 
conditions claimants faced in making quick departures from Kuwait and Iraq, which resulted often in 
loss of their personal property, passports, and other documents. Wühler, supra note 139, at 20. 
 187. M. Kazazi, An Overview of Evidence before the United Nations Compensation 
Commission, 1 INT‟L L.F. 219, 221 (1999). 
 188. UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 35(3).  Further, Decision 15 required that 
the claim contain “detailed factual descriptions of the circumstances of the claimed loss, damage or 
injury.” Compensation for Business Losses Resulting from Iraq‟s Unlawful Invasion and Occupation 
of Kuwait where the Trade Embargo and Related Measures Were also a Cause, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/1992/15, ¶ 5 (Jan. 4, 1993). 
 189. Kazazi, supra note 187, at 222. For instance, one Category D Panel interpreted the 
standard to require that “the level of proof the Panel . . . considered appropriate [was] close to what 
has been called the „balance of probability‟ as distinguished from the concept of „beyond reasonable 
doubt‟ . . . .” Report and Recommendations Made By the Panel of Commissioners Concerning Part 
One of the First Instalment of Individual Claims for Damages Above US$100,000 (Category”D” 
Claims), U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1998/1, ¶ 72 (Feb. 3, 1998). This panel also gave significant weight to 
and reliance upon a clear explanatory statement in support of the losses claimed in the claim form.   
Id. ¶ 74. “An explanatory statement “must clearly state the nature and extent of the loss . . . make 
clear that the loss was a direct result of the Iraqi invasion and occupation, and . . . clearly explain the 
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The Security Council mandated that the Secretary-General create a method 
for funding the operation and paying the claims.  The Secretary-General 
recommended that the compensation to be paid by Iraq should not exceed 30% 
of the value of its oil exports.190  On August 15, 1991, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 705, which formally accepted the Secretary-General‟s 
recommendation.191 Under Resolution 706, adopted in conjunction with 
Resolution 705, funding for the UNCC and compensation to pay claims was to 
be derived from oil exported from Iraq.  In 1995, funding to pay UNCC awards 
was achieved through the sale of Iraqi oil under the Oil-for-Food Program.192 
Resolution 986 authorized this sale of oil and permitted the United Nations to 
take 30% of the revenue generated from oil exported from Iraq to pay UNCC 
awards.193 In return, the United Nations provided humanitarian relief to Iraqi 
citizens.194 Although Resolution 986 allowed the UN to take 30% of Iraqi oil 
proceeds, the resolution also required regular reviews of the Oil-for-Food 
Program.195  The 30% originally agreed upon was subsequently lowered to 25% 
in 2000196 and then to 5% in 2003.197 
Approved category “A”, “B”, and “C” claims were given priority in 
receiving compensation.198 The Governing Council ordered “successful claims 
in categories „A‟, „B‟ and „C‟ [to] receive all funds available in the 
Compensation Fund for paying claims, until each has received payment of the 
initial amount [of US $ 2,500].”199 Governments, corporations, and international 
organizations were the last groups to receive compensation.200 Because claims 
were filed by countries on behalf of their citizens, payments for successful 
claims were distributed en masse to the filing countries and international 
organizations and those entities were then directed to distribute the funds to 
individuals.201 Governments and international organizations were required to 
 
reasons, regarded as credible and sufficient by the Panel, for the absence of any additional 
documentary evidence. . . .” Id. ¶ 75. 
 190. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General recommending procedures for the 
sale of Iraqi oil and transmitting estimates of humanitarian requirements in Iraq, para. 57(d), U.N. 
Doc. S/23006 (Sept. 4, 1991), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, supra note 143, at 300. 
 191. S.C. Res. 705, U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (Aug. 15, 1991). 
 192. S.C. Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14, 1995).  
 193. Id. ¶ 8(c). 
 194. Id. ¶ 8(a). 
 195. Id. ¶ 4. 
 196. S.C. Res. 1330, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1330 (Dec. 5, 2000). 
 197. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).  
 198. Priority of Payment and Payment Mechanism, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1991/Dec. 17 
(Mar. 24, 1994). 
 199. Id. After the initial US$2,500 was paid to each claimant within categories “A,” “B,” and 
“C”, the balance was then paid to the remaining successful claimants in the other categories.  
 200. Id. 
 201. Distribution of Payments and Transparency, U.N. Doc S/AC.26/Dec. 18 (Mar. 24, 1994). 
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distribute the funds to successful claimants within six months of receiving 
payment and to report on the payments made to claimants within three 
months.202 Any Government that received payments on behalf of claimants was 
required to submit reports to the Governing Council describing the mechanisms 
employed to pay the claimants and detailing the amount and date of each 
payment. 203 After distributing all payments received from the Compensation 
Commission, each Government was to produce a final summary of payments 
made, including who was paid, the exact amount received by each claimant, and 
the date of each payment, as well as a report on amounts not distributed.204 
In June 2005, the Governing Council approved the Commissioners‟ last 
report and recommendation, marking the end of the Commissioners‟ work.205 
Throughout its 12 years of operation, the Commissioners approved U.S. $52 
billion in claims for approximately 1.5 of the 2.6 million claims filed.206 Of that 
$52 billion in claims, approximately $27.6 billion has been made available to 
claimants.207 While the UNCC Commissioners‟ legal work is complete, the 
UNCC itself is still in operation to correct duplicate awards and to make 
additional payments.208 
4. Hungary 
The reparations process in Hungary differs in many respects from that 
experienced by other countries with histories of mass human rights violations. 
The Soviet occupation of Hungary for over four decades complicated attempts 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. U.N. Compensation Commission, Decision Concerning the Return of Undistributed Funds 
taken by the Governing Council of the United Nations Compensation Commission at its 75th 
meeting, held on 2 February 1998 at Geneva, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 48 (Feb. 3, 1998). Money 
that is not distributed within twelve months (for example when a Government cannot locate a 
claimant within twelve months of the receipt of award funds) must be returned to the Commission. 
Id. The UNCC was authorized to suspend payments to Governments and international organizations 
when those entities failed to report on distribution of funds or failed to return undistributed funds on 
time. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 18, supra note 201. When funds were returned to the UNCC, it held 
the returned amounts until the claimant was located, at which time the Government could request 
that the money be returned for distribution to the claimant. U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 48. 
 204. U.N. Doc S/AC.26/Dec. 18, supra  note 201. 
 205. See Press Release, United Nations Compensation Commission, Governing Council of 
United Nations Compensation Commissions Has Concluded Its Fifty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. 
PR/2005/8 (June 30, 2005), available at http://www.uncc.ch/pressrel/pr_56c.pdf.  
 206. Id. 
 207. See Press Release, United Nations Compensation Commission, United Nations 
Compensation Commission Pays Out US$430 Million, U.N. Doc. PR/2009/4 (July 29, 2009), 
available at http://www.uncc.ch/pressrel/Press%20release%20-%2029%20July%202009.pdf. 
 208. Id. After awards have been approved by the Governing Council, the Provisional Rules 
require the Executive Secretary to inform the Governing Council of any computational, clerical, 
typographical, or other errors made in the awards.  UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 41, 
¶ 1.  The Governing Council must then direct the Secretary General as to how the error shall be 
corrected, if it decides to correct it. Id. art. 41, ¶ 2. 
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to address the unlawful state takings of property, the deprivation of life and 
liberty, and the other state sponsored abuses that affected millions of citizens. 
Starting in 1989-90 the new Hungarian authorities struggled to find a balance 
between promoting justice and maintaining the rule of law in the fledgling 
democracy.  Ultimately, Hungary‟s Constitutional Court upheld laws adopted by 
Parliament to hold human rights perpetrators responsible for committing 
violations of international norms, to partially compensate individuals whose 
property was unlawfully seized by the state, and to indemnify individuals who 
were deprived of life or liberty.209 The effects of this process were far-reaching: 
“[b]y mid-1992, nearly one million people – some 10% of the population – had 
[already] applied for compensation” for communist-era abuses.210 
A focal point of reparations for victims of gross human rights abuses in 
Hungary arose as a result of the widespread killings committed during the 
October 31, 1956 popular revolution against the dictatorship. Abetted by the 
Communist Hungarian Socialist Worker‟s Party‟s leaders, the Soviet Army 
carried out mass shootings of unarmed demonstrators throughout the country, 
leaving thousands dead.211 Almost four decades later, after the Soviet Union‟s 
collapse, the Hungarian Parliament sought to hold the individuals who 
participated in quelling the 1956 uprising responsible.212 Many were arrested 
and charged with treason for their collaboration with the Soviets during the 
occupation.213 In 1991, the Hungarian Parliament enacted legislation that 
revived related offenses for which the statute of limitations had already passed, 
permitting the prosecution of crimes state agents and their collaborators 
committed during the 1956 uprising.214  But in 1992, the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court held that this legislation with its retroactive effects was an 
unconstitutional ex post facto law.215  The Hungarian Parliament subsequently 
 
 209. The respective laws are these: Act on Procedures concerning Certain Crimes Committed 
during the 1956 Revolution (1993) (Hung.) [hereinafter Prosecution Law]; Act XXV of 1991, On 
Partial Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State to Properties Owned by Citizens 
in the Interest of Settling Ownership Relations (1991) (Hung.) [hereinafter Act XXV]; Act XXXII of 
1992, On Compensation to Persons Unlawfully Deprived of their Lives or Liberty for Political 
Reasons (1992) (Hung.) [hereinafter Act XXXII]. See generally 2 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 645, 645-
92 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995) [hereinafter Kritz II]. The Compensation Laws are translated and compiled 
in 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 751, 751-68 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995). 
 210. Kritz II, supra note 209, at 646. 
 211. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 95 (2000). 
 212. Jane Perlez, Hungarian Arrests Set Off Debate: Should „56 Oppressors Be Punished?, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/03/world/hungarian-
arrests-set-off-debate-should-56-oppressors-be-punished.html. 
 213. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 38. 
 214. Zetenyi-Takacs Act, Law Concerning the Prosecutability of Officers between December 
21, 1944 and May 2, 1990 (1991) (Hung.), translated in 1 J. OF CONST. L. IN E. & CENT. EUR. 131 
(1994). 
 215. Alkotmánybíróság [Constitutional Court], Judgment of Mar. 5, 1992, Magyar Közlöny 
[Hungarian Gazette] No. 23/1992 (1992) (Hung.), translated in 1 J. OF CONST. L. IN E. & CENT. 
EUR. 136 (1994).  “From the principle of predictability and foreseeability, the criminal law‟s 
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enacted a new statute that authorized the prosecutions but limited it to 
prosecutions for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in 
contravention of Hungary‟s international obligations, which are 
imprescriptible.216 Although Hungary‟s Constitution is silent on the precedence 
of international law over domestic law, the Constitutional Court upheld the latter 
statute, declaring in relation to the statute of limitations issue, that “Hungary 
[would] respect the universally accepted rules of international law, and . . . 
ensure . . . the accord between [its international] obligations . . . and domestic 
law.”217 
During this time the Hungarian Parliament also promulgated two laws that 
indemnified victims for certain abuses of the previous regime. The first provided 
compensation for property that the state had unlawfully seized; the second 
granted compensation to individuals who were deprived of their rights to life 
and liberty for political reasons.218 With the transition to democracy following 
the Soviet collapse, the Hungarian Government recognized the importance of 
protecting private property, and its responsibility to indemnify individuals 
whose property was wrongfully seized.219 The purpose of the Act on Partial 
Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State to Properties 
Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Settling Ownership Relations (the 
“Property Act”) was to settle ownership relations and to provide incentives for 
investment.220 To qualify for compensation, beneficiaries were required to 
submit a claim within ninety days of the enactment of the Property Act.221 
Originally, only individuals whose property was forcibly nationalized after 1949 
were eligible for reparations under the Property Act.222  But for reasons of 
equality, the Hungarian Constitutional Court extended the scope of the law back 
to 1939 to ensure that victims of Nazi-era takings were also indemnified.223 
Compensation was based on the value of the seized property.224  Farmland was 
 
prohibition of the use of retroactive legislation, especially ex post facto . . . directly follows . . . .  
Only by following the formalized legal procedure can there be valid law.”  
 216. Prosecution Law, supra note 209; see also Kritz II, supra note 209, at 646. 
 217. Alkotmánybíróság [Constitutional Court], Resolution of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court of Oct. 12, 1993 on the Justice Law, Magyar Közlöny [Hungarian Gazette] No. 53/1993 
(1993) (Hung.), quoted in Krisztina Morvai, Retroactive Justice based on International Law: A 
Recent Decision by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 2 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 32, 34 (Fall 
1993/Winter 1994). 
 218. Act XXV, Act XXXII, supra note 209. It should be noted that in 1992 the Parliament 
further adopted legislation voiding the convictions of persons jailed for crimes committed against the 
state and political order. See Kritz II, supra note 209, at 691. 
 219. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 130. 
 220. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 413-414. 
 221. Id. at 414. 
 222. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 136. 
 223. Id. (citing Alkotmánybíróság [Constitutional Court], Land Reform Decision (1991) 
(Hung.)). 
 224. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 414. 
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valued based on special gold crown value.225  If beneficiaries were unable to 
produce a deed to establish the value of the expropriated land, the land was 
valued using average gold crown data of the village where it was located.226 
Once the value of the land was established, property owners were 
compensated in interest-bearing coupons. Individuals who owned property 
valued at 200,000 Hungarian forints or less (approximately US$2,000) were 
entitled to the entire amount in compensation.227 But as the value of the 
expropriated property increased, the percentage of compensation the property-
holder was entitled to decreased.228 The total amount of compensation was 
capped at HF 5,000,000 (approximately US$50,000) per property owned per 
former owner.229 The interest-bearing coupons could be used in three principal 
ways: to purchase property sold during the privatization of state property, to buy 
farmland, or to receive a life annuity in the social security system.230 In 1993, 
Hungarian nationals challenged the Property Act and its voucher system, 
asserting that it violated Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights because it did not distinguish “between such cases where the 
expropriation was the consequence of breaches of the Covenant [as in the case 
of the petitioners] and the majority of cases where the expropriation had been 
the result of the nationalization of private property.”231  The United Nations 
Human Rights Committee found, however, that the Property Act did not violate 
the claimants‟ right to equal protection under the law.232 
In addition to the Property Act, Hungary promulgated the Act on 
Compensation to Persons Unlawfully Deprived of their Lives or Liberty for 
Political Reasons (“Human Rights Violations Act”).233 The Human Rights 
Violations Act provided redress to individuals who were unlawfully deprived of 
their life or liberty between March 11, 1939 and October 23, 1989.234 Potential 
beneficiaries initially had four months to file claims under the Human Rights 
Violations Act, although the deadline was subsequently extended through 
2006.235 Individuals were considered to be deprived of liberty under the 
 
 225. Id. One gold crown equals 1,000 Hungarian forints. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id.  For losses over HF200,000, individuals were entitled to HF200,000 plus fifty percent 
of the excess up to HF300,000; for losses over HF300,000, individuals were entitled to HF250,000 
plus thirty percent of the amount in excess of HF300,000; for losses over HF500,000, individuals 
were entitled to HF310,000 plus ten percent of the amount in excess of HF500,000.  
 229. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 414. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Somers v. Hungary, Comm‟n No. 566/1993, § 3.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/566/1993 
(1996). Petitioners demanded full restitution of their property and home on this basis. 
 232. Id. § 10. 
 233. Act XXXII, supra note 209. 
 234. Id. This covered the period from the beginning of World War II until the Soviet collapse. 
 235. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 415. See Separate Compensation and Documentation 
CARILLO_PALMER_FINAL_28.2 4/23/2010  5:18 AM 
376 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:2 
meaning of the Human Rights Violations Act if they were the subjected to 
political condemnations, preventive detention, forced medical treatment, 
internment in camps, forced labor, forced resettlement, and deportation.236 
Individuals who suffered serious restrictions on personal liberty of longer than 
thirty days were eligible for an indemnification that increased depending upon 
the length of their detention. Significantly, the law specified that an individual 
identified as a human rights perpetrator would be ineligible for compensation, 
“unless it can be proved that he has suffered serious prejudice in consequence of 
criminal procedure due to his activity displayed in the interest of democracy 
after the violation of basic rights.”237 
Once beneficiaries or their heirs had established that they were subjected to 
qualifying human rights abuses, they were compensated depending upon the 
nature of the violations that they suffered and the identities of their 
successors.238 The successors of individuals who were killed for political 
reasons were originally entitled to lump sum payments of HF1,000,000,239 
though this sum was substantially reduced in later years due to budgetary 
restraints.240 Individuals who were deprived of their personal liberty for more 
than thirty days but less than six months received a lump sum, payable in two 
installments.241 Beneficiaries received the baseline amount of HF11,000 for 
each two months of detention, up to a total of six months.242 Victims detained 
for longer than six months received an annuity that was calculated by dividing 
the duration of the detention by an official life expectancy schedule and 
multiplying by the baseline amount.243 
According to the department within the Hungarian Central Office of Justice 
charged with implementing the Human Rights Violations Act and other relevant 
norms, it received a total of 97,600 claims by the extended cut-off date of 
 
Department, Hungarian Central Office of Justice, Information about the progress rate of the claims 
submitted pursuant to Act XLII on reopening the deadlines stipulated in Act XXXII of 1992 on 
compensation due to persons unlawfully deprived of life and liberty, available at 
http://www.kih.gov.hu/english_pages/Compensation/Information/information_090810.html (last 
visited Aug. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Compensation Information]. 
 236. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 415. 
 237. Id. 
 238. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 414-15. All reparations were tax-exempt. 
 239. Id. at 414.  This comes to about US$10,000.  The amount was divided equally among the 
victim‟s living spouse, parents, and children. Or, if none of these were present, siblings could claim 
half the prescribed sum, or HF500,000, to be divided among them. 
 240. See Lajos Szabo, Republic of Hungary Central Compensation Office Director-General, 
Letter to Claimants, May 5, 2005, available at 
http://www.kih.gov.hu/english_pages/Compensation/customer_information.html (last visited Aug. 
13, 2009). 
 241. SHELTON, supra note 15, at 415. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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December 31, 2006.244 As of July 31 2009, the 41 agency “decision-makers” 
had adopted a total of 57,438 final resolutions and orders. The total 
compensation the Hungarian government paid by mid-2009 was HF 
2,109,174,689 (about US$ 9,153,450.00); a monthly life annuity had been 
awarded in 190 cases, with additional compensation paid for claims arising from 
unlawful deprivations of liberty reaching HF18,117,000 (approximately US$ 
78,625.00).245 Difficulties slowing the process include the high number of 
claims, the advanced age of most claimants, and the fact that many are “aliens” 
residing outside of Hungary.246 Moreover, despite flexible and straightforward 
evidentiary standards, petitioners apparently have experienced difficulty in 
properly documenting their claims.247 The goal of the Hungarian Office of 
Justice is to resolve all outstanding compensation claims by the middle of 
2011.248 
5. South Africa 
Although unique in many respects, prior transitional experiences, most 
notably those in Argentina and Chile, shaped the creation of the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”).249 It is perhaps best known for 
offering individual perpetrators amnesty conditioned upon full disclosure of 
their politically motivated abuses during the apartheid regime. Indeed, a 
pervasive criticism of the TRC process is that perpetrators received amnesty 
relatively quickly, while monetary payments promised to their victims were 
repeatedly delayed.250 While many viewed the payment of reparations as a 
counterweight to amnesty, the clear emphasis of the TRC was on truth telling 
 
 244. Compensation Information, supra note 235. 
 245. Id. The US figures are calculated based on the exchange rate in 2009.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. As for evidentiary standards, requisite criteria such as the loss of life or liberty, or 
family relationship to the victim, could be established through a fairly flexible range of official 
documentation or its functional equivalent. For instance, to prove loss of life an official death 
certificate or its equivalent (e.g from the Hungarian Red Cross) would suffice. Where such 
documents were not available, the loss of life might be established by notarized testimony to the 
same effect provided “it is based on direct knowledge.” Likewise, a family relationship to the victim 
could be established through a range of official documents like birth or marriage certificates or, in 
their absence, “contemporary” sources attesting to it, such as school records. See Central Office of 
Justice, Frequently Asked Questions, available at 
http://www.kih.gov.hu/english_pages/Compensation/FAQ (last visited Aug. 13, 2009). 
 248. See Compensation Information, supra note 235. 
 249. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa Amnesty: The Price 
of Peace, in RETRIBUTION AND REPARATION IN THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 299, 301 (Jon 
Elster ed., 2006). 
 250. Wendy Orr, Reparation Delayed is Healing Retarded, in LOOKING BACK REACHING 
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
239, 242-43 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds., 2000).  
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“in the search for reconciliation and unity.”251 By some accounts the TRC 
succeeded in revealing the truth, but was less effective in promoting 
reconciliation.252 
The TRC was established to facilitate a peaceful transition from apartheid 
to a new democratic system.253 Secret negotiations between the ruling National 
Party (“NP”) and the outlawed African National Congress (“ANC”) culminated 
in the 1990 dismantling of the apartheid regime under President de Klerk.254 
During subsequent talks between the legalized ANC and the NP government, the 
ANC proposed the creation of a truth commission along with other transitional 
measures aimed at promoting accountability for past abuses.255 Ultimately, both 
sides reached a compromise reflected in the Interim Constitution and Postamble, 
which called for the creation of mechanisms that would promote reconciliation 
primarily by “offering the opportunity for storytelling by victims and truth 
telling by perpetrators.”256 Amnesties figured prominently in the transitional 
formula prescribed by the Interim Constitution. Reparations, on the other hand, 
scarcely received a mention. 257 
The issue of reparations fared only slightly better in the debates on the 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (“Act” or “TRC Act,” since 
its principal function was to create the Truth and Reconciliation Commission) 
preceding the law‟s enactment by newly elected President Nelson Mandela in 
1995.258 Despite the highly participatory nature of the drafting process, which 
included public hearings and extensive consultations with NGOs on the 
proposed Act, the specific question of how to design a reparations program as 
part of the ongoing transitional process was never fully discussed.259 One reason 
cited for this is the fact that the subject of reparations generally, and 
compensation in particular, had become controversial within the victim 
community active in the process.260 Another is that, in practice, reparations 
 
 251. Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 193. 
 252. See Ronald W. Walters, THE PRICE OF RACIAL RECONCILIATION 60 (2008). “[A] common 
criticism [at the time was] that the Commission had been strong on truth and had little or no 
contribution to reconciliation.” But see Boraine, supra note 249, at 315-16. 
 253. Boraine, supra  note 249, at 302. 
 254. Colvin, supra note 251, at 177. 
 255. Boraine, supra note 249, at 301. 
 256. Colvin, supra note 251, at 178. “The decision to opt for a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was an important compromise . . . [because otherwise], a bloody revolution sooner 
rather than later would have been inevitable. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is therefore 
a bridge from the old to the new.” Boraine, supra note 249, at 302 (quoting Judge Richard 
Goldstone). 
 257. Colvin, supra note 251, at 178-79. In fact, reference to reparations was left out of the final 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa entirely. 
 258. Id. at 179-80. 
 259. Id. at 180. 
 260. Graeme Simpson & Paul van Zyl, South Africa‟s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
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continued to be overshadowed by other priorities defined by the parties to the 
political negotiation.  Thus the first two TRC priorities as defined in the final 
Act were the need (1) to establish an historical account of apartheid, including 
the first-hand perspectives of the actors involved; and (2) to promote truth 
telling by perpetrators through the exchange of amnesties for confessions. The 
third goal was to 
promote national unity and reconciliation [by] making known the fate or 
whereabouts of victims and by restoring the human and civil dignity of such 
victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of the 
violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending reparation 
measures in respect of them.261 
In this regard it is important to note that the Act defined reparations as 
“include[ing] any form of compensation, ex gratia payment, restitution, 
rehabilitation or recognition.”262 However, in contrast to the authority it had to 
directly realize the first two objectives, with respect to the third, the TRC was 
authorized only to 
make recommendations to the President with regard to (i) the policy which should 
be followed or measures which should be taken with regard to the granting of 
reparations to victims or the taking of other measures aimed at rehabilitating and 
restoring the human and civil dignity of victims; (ii) measures which should be 
taken to grant urgent interim reparation to victims [.]263 
The TRC Act defined victims as persons who “suffered harm in the form of 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial 
impairment of human rights (i) as a result of a gross violation of human rights; 
or (ii) as a result of an act associated with a political objective for which 
amnesty has been granted.”264 Close relatives or dependents of such persons, as 
determined by South African law, were also recognized as victims.265 Under the 
Act, the definition of “gross violation of human rights” was drawn narrowly. It 
was defined as 
(a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person; or (b) any 
attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit 
 
585 TEMPS MODERNE 394 (1996), available at http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papgspv.htm. 
“The whole area of compensation/reparation in relation to the Truth Commission has become fairly 
controversial. This is because the compensation that will be offered to victims by the government 
will be considerably less than if they brought a civil action against the responsible perpetrator. 
Certain activists who were assassinated may well have filled top-level government positions if they 
were alive today. In such cases, their wives/husbands and their dependants would be entitled to civil 
claims of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of rands. Once amnesty is granted to a perpetrator 
then these claims are extinguished – and there is simply no way that a new government will be able 
to offer a comparable compensation package to such victims.” 
 261. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 ch. 2, ¶ 3(1)(c) (1995) (S. 
Afr.) [hereinafter TRC Act] (emphasis added). 
 262. Id. ch. 1. 
 263. Id. ch. 2, ¶ 4(f)(i). 
 264. Id. ch. 1. 
 265. Id. 
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an act referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past and 
which was committed during the period 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date within 
or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was advised, planned, 
directed, commanded or ordered, by any person acting with a political motive.266 
The TRC Act came into effect once the members of the TRC were 
appointed.267 Though the Act empowered President Mandela to appoint the 
commissioners directly, he declined to do so. Instead, he created a committee 
comprised of representatives from major political parties and civil society to 
review nearly 300 nominations.268 It conducted public hearings, eventually 
narrowing the list of nominees to twenty-five names.269 In December 1995, 
President Mandela chose fifteen of the appointment committee‟s twenty-five 
nominees; he named Archbishop Desmond Tutu as the Commission‟s 
Chairperson and Alex Boraine as its Deputy Chairperson.270 The resulting TRC 
was racially representative of the South African population; it included seven 
women, ten men, seven Africans, two bi-racial individuals, two Indians, and six 
whites.271 The TRC was given two years to fulfill its mandate as stipulated in 
the Act.272 
To implement its mandate, the TRC relied on three committees defined in 
the Act: the Committee on Human Rights Violations Committee (“CHRV”), the 
Amnesty Committee (“AC”), and the Committee on Reparations and 
Rehabilitation Committee (“CRR”).273 The CRR, comprised of a chairperson, a 
 
 266. Id. 
 267. Alex Boraine, A COUNTRY UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA‟S TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 71  (2000) [hereinafter Boraine II]. 
 268. Id. at 71-72. 
 269. Id. at 73. See University of the Witwatersrand, Traces of Truth: Documents relating to the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, available at 
http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat_descr.php?cat=1. The short-list submitted to President Mandela 
included academics, religious leaders, former politicians, and individuals drawn from the NGO, 
legal, and medical fields. 
 270. Boraine II, supra note 267, at 73. 
 271. Id. at 75. 
 272. TRC Act, supra note 261, ch. 2, ¶ 3(1). The objectives of the TRC were to “promote 
national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past” by investigating the causes and extent of the gross violations of human rights 
that were committed, granting amnesty to human rights perpetrators in exchange for full disclosure 
of their actions, establishing the fate and whereabouts of victims, giving victims an opportunity to 
tell their story, devising a plan to make reparations to the victims, and compiling a comprehensive 
report on its activities and findings. Boraine, supra note 249, at 304. An additional three months was 
added in order to complete the Final Report.  
 273. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 chs. 3, 4, 5 (1995) (S. 
Afr.). For detailed descriptions of the HRVC and the AC, see LOOKING BACK, REACHING 
FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
[hereinafter LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD] (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd 
eds., 2000). These committees investigated and, in a sense, “adjudicated” cases of gross human 
rights violations by establishing the responsibility of perpetrators for historical and amnesty 
purposes, respectively. In this regard, they employed standards and techniques similar to those used 
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vice chairperson, and five other members selected by the Commission at large, 
was charged with implementing the TRC Act‟s directives regarding reparations 
as described above; it was also tasked with recommending urgent interim 
measures.274 In addition to setting forth the CRR‟s powers and duties, the Act 
provided a general framework for processing applications for reparations.275 It 
further outlined the political procedure whereby the CRR‟s recommendations 
would be submitted to the President for subsequent consideration and approval 
by Parliament.276 The Act also provided for the creation of a President‟s Fund, 
to consist of all funds appropriated by Parliament or contributed from other 
sources for the payment of reparations.277 
In discharging its functions, the CRR first had to determine who qualified 
as a victim. According to the Act, “[a]ny person who [was] of the opinion that 
he or she [had] suffered harm as a result of a gross violations of human rights 
[could] apply for reparation.”278 Because presenting the Government with an 
open-ended list of victims was impractical, the CRR limited the possible 
reparation recipients to those individuals who had made victim statements 
before the CHRV prior to December 15, 1997, when the process ended.279 The 
final list of victim applicants the CRR compiled for the TRC numbered 
22,000.280 Of these, over 14,000 received cash payments ranging from US$250 
to US$750 as beneficiaries of the Urgent Interim Reparations (“UIR”) Program 
which began in July 1998.281 In a departure from the terms of the TRC Act, the 
CRR was authorized to distribute the compensation directly to those claimants it 
 
by some IMCPs charged with arbitrating claims, like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. But the key 
distinction is that the decision regarding who is a victim and therefore a claimant was not tied to the 
determination of perpetrator responsibility per se, but rather decided in a separate, less formal 
process by the CRR. See Orr, supra note 250, at 243. 
 274. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 s.25(1)(a) (S. Afr.).  
 275. Id. at s.25, 26. The rules stipulated by the TRC Act in respect of the CRR were few and 
fairly broad, especially when compared to the extensive and detailed procedures explicitly dictated 
to govern the Amnesty Committee‟s more politically charged work.  
 276. Id. at s.27. Under the Act, the President was responsible for issuing the regulations to 
implement Parliament‟s resolution on reparations. See Colvin, supra note 251, at 183. 
 277. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 s.42 (S. Afr.). 
 278. Id. ch. 5, ¶ 26. 
 279. Orr, supra note 250, at 243. Dumisa Ntsebeza, The Struggle for Human Rights: From the 
UN Declaration of Human Rights to the Present, in LOOKING BACK, REACHING FORWARD, supra 
note 273, at 2, 6-8. The CHRV determined whether individuals were victims of gross human rights 
violations under the meaning of the TRC Act by an elaborate statement-taking process generally 
followed by fact-finding by the Investigative Unit. All of the CHRV‟s findings had to be based on 
verified or corroborated evidence and were required to meet the standard of proof employed by the 
TRC – proof on a balance of probabilities. 
 280. Colvin, supra note 251, at 192. 
 281. Id. at 188-89. See also Oupa Makhalemele, Still not Talking: The South African 
Government‟s Exclusive Reparations Policy and the Impact of the R30,000 Financial Reparations 
on Survivors, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, 547 (noting that “[b]y the end of 1999, 
the President‟s Fund had paid out R16,754,921 in urgent interim reparations to 15,078 survivors.”).  
CARILLO_PALMER_FINAL_28.2 4/23/2010  5:18 AM 
382 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28:2 
determined had “urgent medical, emotional, educational, material and/or 
symbolic needs.”282 For example, beneficiaries included individuals who were 
not expected to outlive the TRC and claimants who had no fixed home or 
shelter.283 The UIR process was complete by 2001, with payments totaling 
US$5.5 million.284 
To design a general reparations policy to recommend to the government, 
the CRR relied heavily on nationwide consultations with victims, though it 
looked to international sources and experiences as well.285  Most victims 
surveyed requested monetary or other forms of compensation; second on their 
list of desired reparations were official investigations into the violations 
suffered.286  A lawsuit filed soon after the creation of the TRC challenged its 
legality on the grounds that the amnesty provisions contravened the new 
Constitution by foreclosing criminal and civil remedies, including 
compensation, for victims of persons the TRC granted amnesty.287  The 
Constitutional Court, however, disagreed. It found that the amnesty provisions 
were a necessary means for securing greater truth telling, which was essential to 
advancing the constitutional goals of reconstruction and reconciliation.288 In 
other words, because Parliament was authorized to balance competing goals in 
the national interest, “the abrogation of victims‟ rights to civil and criminal 
redress was . . . constitutionally certified.”289 
Several other issues arose during the CRR process.  One was a conflict in 
the perceptions of pecuniary versus non-pecuniary or symbolic measures, 
reflecting the tension between individual and collective reparations.290 A related 
concern was whether compensation should consist of monetary payments to 
victims, or whether a package of social services represented a better 
approach.291 In the end, after consulting with an economist, the CRR decided to 
recommend the payment of “individual reparations grants” over a six-year 
 
 282. Measures to Provide Urgent Interim Reparation to Victims, GN R545 of 3 April 1998, in 
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE 18822; 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
REPORT, ch. 5, ¶ 56 (Oct. 29, 1998) [hereinafter TRC REPORT]; see also Colvin, supra note 251, at 
187-89. Direct compensation was permitted because of the delays experienced in responding to 
victims with urgent needs, and the desire to avoid further obstacles to the implementation of the 
UIR. 
 283. Colvin, supra note 251, at 188. 
 284. Id. at 189. 
 285. Orr, supra note 250, at 242. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Colvin, supra note 251, at 185. 
 288. Azanian People‟s Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Rep. of South Africa 1996 (4) 
SA 672 (CC), ¶¶ 17-21 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/1996/16.html.  
 289. Colvin, supra note 251, at 185. 
 290. Brandon Hamber, Repairing the Irreparable: Dealing with the Double-Binds of Making 
Reparations for Crimes of the Past, 5 ETHNICITY & HEALTH 221 (2000). 
 291. Orr, supra note 250, at 244-45. 
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period to victims on the final list compiled with input from the CHRV.292 The 
suggested amount was based on the median annual household income for a 
family of five in South Africa in 1997, with the amount increased for 
beneficiaries in rural areas to facilitate access to services.293 
The CRR‟s recommendations on reparations were published in October 
1998 as part of the TRC‟s “Interim” Report.294 In addition to the individual 
grants, the TRC‟s recommended reparations policy included symbolic measures 
to be adopted at the individual (e.g. issuing death certificates), community (e.g. 
erecting memorials), and national levels (e.g. establishing a day of 
remembrance).295 It recommended community rehabilitation (e.g. resettlement 
of displaced persons) and institutional reform aimed at preventing the recurrence 
of human rights violations in the future.296 The TRC also advocated for the 
establishment of an elaborate governmental entity under the President‟s 
direction to implement the program.297 The TRC Report affirms that reparations 
play an important role in the process because they concretize the state‟s 
recognition of its responsibility for past abuses, help to restore the dignity of 
victims, and raise public awareness of the need to reconcile past wrongs to 
ensure future reconciliation as a nation.298 
After years of foot-dragging in the face of intense pressure from victims‟ 
organizations, the South African government under President Thabo Mbeki 
finally decided in April 2003 to announce its final reparations program.299 
Rejecting the TRC‟s recommendation of a grant program, it instead to provided 
a one-time payment of R30,000, or roughly US$4000, to each of the 18,000 
survivors named by the TRC.300 The government similarly agreed to provide 
 
 292. Colvin, supra note 251, at 194; see also Ntsebeza, supra note 279.  See supra note 31 for a 
brief description of the process employed by the CHRV. 
 293. TRC REPORT, supra note 282, vol. 5, ch. 5, ¶¶ 69-70; Colvin, supra note 251, at 194. The 
CRR‟s final recommendation called for yearly individual reparations grants ranging from R17,029 
(US$2,129) to R23,023 (US$2,878) to be paid out in six-month installments over a six year period. 
 294. Brandon Hamber, Reparations as Symbol: Narratives of Resistance, Reticence and 
Possibility in South Africa, in REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES 252, 254 (Jon Miller & 
Rahul Kumar eds., 2007) [hereinafter Hamber II]; Colvin, supra note 251, at 193. The Final Report 
was submitted in 2003 after the work of the Amnesty Committee was complete. 
 295. Colvin, supra note 251, at 195. 
 296. Id. at 195-96. 
 297. Id. at 196-97. 
 298. TRC REPORT, supra note 282, vol. 5, ch. 8. 
 299. Hamber II, supra note 294, at 256-57. See TRC Act: Regulations Regarding Reparation to 
Victims, REGULATION GAZETTE 7821 of 12 November 2003, 461 GOVERNMENT GAZETTE 25695, 
available at http://us-cdn.creamermedia.co.za/assets/articles/attachments/00932_regulation1660.pdf. 
The regulations granted reparations to those victims and beneficiaries of victims who were identified 
as eligible by the CRR based on the CHRV‟s statement-taking process. The reparations were paid 
out of the President‟s Fund, which was administered by an appointed accounting officer. The final 
reparations were available to the identified victims or their beneficiaries by request only.  
 300. Makhalemele, supra note 281, at 542. It is important to note that in 2003, President Mbeki 
charged the South African Department of Justice and Constitutional Development with 
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“community reparations and assistance through opportunities and services,” and 
to advance with measures to establish national holidays and memorials in 
remembrance of this legacy.301 The President‟s Fund established for this 
purpose began making the promised cash payments in November 2003; within a 
year it had distributed most of them, totaling approximately US$80 million, or 
one-fifth of the reparations amount originally recommended by the TRC.302 As 
noted at the outset, the South African reparations process has been criticized as 
“too little, too late” in regard to both the urgent interim reparations and the final 
reparations programs.303 It is evident that the government‟s emphasis on truth 
telling, amnesty and reconciliation in the TRC process dampened the impact of 
the reparations component to a significant degree.304 
6. Swiss Banks Dormant Accounts (CRT-I, CRT-II) 
While the Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Account in Switzerland 
(CRT- I) and the Claims Resolution Tribunal (CRT-II) provide classic examples 
of mass claims processing to provide restitution for property losses, i.e. Swiss 
bank accounts that have been dormant since the end of World War Two, their 
creation is overlaid with a modern day human rights goal of correcting an 
historical wrong perpetrated by Nazi Germany.305 Prior to and during World 
War II, many subsequent victims of the Nazi regime sought to move their assets 
to safety in neutral or allied countries.306 Due to Switzerland‟s geographic 
proximity to Axis and Axis-occupied countries and its bank secrecy laws, many 
victims opened accounts with the Swiss National Bank and various other Swiss 
 
implementing these and other TRC recommendations. In 2005, a specialized unit, the TRC Unit, was 
created within this Department to complete the work. Id. at 544. 
 301. Colvin, supra note 251, at 209. 
 302. Hamber II, supra note 294, at 257. The TRC‟s projected budget for its proposed 
reparations program was US$460 million. The Accounting Office of the President‟s Fund reported 
that by March 2007, nearly 16,000 applicants for reparations approved by the TRC had received the 
one-off payment. See Makhalemele, supra note 281, at 544, 558. 
 303. Makhalemele, supra note 281, at 541-42, 565-56; see also Orr, supra note 250, at 294; 
Colvin, supra note 251, at 177, 189, 200-03. 
 304. See generally Orr, supra note 250; Colvin, supra note 251. “Economic justice and the 
restoration of the moral order should be seen as two sides of a single coin. Whereas the focus of the 
Commission was on truth seeking in the search for reconciliation and unity, serious delays in 
delivering social services could bring into disrepute any talk of reconciliation.” Boraine, supra note 
249, at 300. 
 305. See Alfonse D‟Amato, Justice, Dignity and Restitution of Holocaust Victims‟ Asset , 20 
CARDOZO L. REV. 427, 431 (1988).  Senator D‟Amato explained that in meeting with Edgar 
Bronfman, who was negotiating with the Swiss banks regarding the dormant accounts, Bronfman 
told D‟Amato that it was not a question of settling for a specified amount of money. Rather, it was 
“a question of getting an accounting and getting justice.” Id. 
 306. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMITTEE OF EMINENT PERSONS REPORT ON DORMANT 
ACCOUNTS OF VICTIMS OF NAZI PERSECUTION IN SWISS BANKS, ¶ 8 [hereinafter VOLCKER REPORT], 
available at http://www.crt-ii.org/ICEP/ICEP_Report_english.pdf. 
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commercial banks.307 However, as many account holders perished in the 
Holocaust and their heirs were unable to prove ownership of the accounts, the 
assets in the banks remained unclaimed.308 
The effort to resolve assets held in Swiss banks resulted in two distinct 
processes to adjudicate claims for dormant Swiss bank accounts.  In July 1997, 
due to pressure on the Swiss Bankers Association (SBA) and the Swiss Federal 
Banking Committee (SFBC), the SBA published the names of account holders 
whose accounts were opened prior to World War II and had been dormant since 
the end of that war.309 In October 1997, the SBA published additional names in 
a second list.310 From 1997 until 2001, CRT-I resolved claims to these accounts. 
Beginning in 2001, CRT-II was established under a new set of procedures and 
utilizing new rules to resolve claims to an additional 21,000 accounts. 311 These 
CRT-II accounts were published in 2001, after an independent audit of the Swiss 
Banks that the Independent Committee of Eminent Persons (“ICEP”) initiated in 
November 1996, 312 which concluded that these accounts possibly or probably 
belonged to victims of Nazi persecution.313 
The CRT-I was created as a result of negotiations between Jewish groups 
and the major Swiss banks to rectify the denials by those banks of access to the 
accounts held by victims of the Nazi government who died during the 
Holocaust.314 In May 1996, the Swiss Bankers Association entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)315 with the World Jewish Restitution 
Organization (WJRO) to establish an independent investigation of the bank 
accounts that had been dormant since the end of World War Two and their 
rightful ownership by victims of Nazi persecution.316 To conduct this 
 
 307. Id.; Rolf Weber, Holocaust-Related Claims and Liability of Swiss Banks – Political and 
Legal Implications, 36 INT‟L LAW. 1213, 1215 (Winter 2002). 
 308. For a discussion of the history of Swiss Holocaust bank accounts, see Roger Alford, The 
Claims Resolution Tribunal and Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks, 20 BERKELEY J. INT‟L L.  
250, 252-59 (2002) [hereinafter Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks]. 
 309. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 25. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 260. 
 312. Sylvain Beauchamp, The New Claims Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in 
Switzerland – Distribution Organ, Mass Claims Adjudicative Body or Sui Generis Entity?, 3 J. OF 
WORLD INVESTMENT 999 (2002). Paul Volcker, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
United States Federal Reserve System, was the chair of ICEP, and as a result, ICEP was also referred 
to as the “Volcker Committee.” HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 24.  The report 
issued by the Volcker Committee at the end of the four-year audit is referred to as the “Volcker 
Report.” See supra note 306. 
 313. Beauchamp, supra note 312, at 1011. 
 314. J. Crook, REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1, at 49. 
 315. See Memorandum of Understanding, Appendix A to VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 306, 
available at http://www.crt-ii.org/ICEP/ICEP_Report_Appendices_A-W.pdf. 
 316. Thomas Buergenthal, Arbitrating Entitlement to Dormant Bank Accounts, in LIBER 
AMICORUM IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA 79 (Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2001). 
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investigation, the Memorandum of Understanding established ICEP,317 which 
was tasked to conduct an investigative audit to determine the existence of 
dormant accounts, financial instruments, and other assets of the victims of Nazi 
persecution that were deposited in Swiss Banks before and during the Second 
World War.”318 After conducting audits of the dormant Swiss banks and 
building databases of the names of victims of Nazi persecution, ICEP and the 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) jointly organized a foundation, the 
“Independent Claims Resolution Foundation”, to monitor a Claims Resolution 
Tribunal (CRT-I). 319 
Like the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the CRT-I operated as an international 
arbitral tribunal. As Lucy Reed, one of the principal architects of CRT-I, aptly 
stated “the basic principles of international commercial arbitration provided 
certain foundation stones of this unique multiple claims resolution process.”320 
The CRT-I was comprised of seventeen arbitrators, which included a Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman.321Article 30 of the Rules of Procedure established a 
secretariat,322 which a Swiss law firm staffed and then supplemented with 
additional foreign lawyers, paralegals and secretaries.323 Sole Arbitrators or 
Claims Panels, comprised of three arbitrators, issued the CRT-I decisions.324 If 
a Claims Panel decided the claim, the panel consisted of one Swiss and two non-
Swiss arbitrators. 
The CRT-I‟s mandate was to adjudicate all claims pertinent to the dormant 
accounts.325 In July and October 1997, the Swiss Bankers Association published 
in the world press and on the Internet the names and last known domiciles of 
account holders that held accounts prior to the end of the Second World War and 
that have been dormant since that time.326 The two lists included approximately 
5,570 bank accounts.327 Approximately 9,900 claims related to these account 
 
 317. Id. at 80. 
 318. VOLCKER REPORT, supra note 306, ¶¶ 13-17. 
 319. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 80. 
 320. Lucy Reed, Arbitration Principles in Resolving Holocaust Bank Claims, in INSTITUTIONAL 
AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS, supra note 7, at 61. 
 321. See Shai Wade, Mass Claims Arbitration: The Experience of The Claims Resolution 
Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland, 14 MEALEY‟S INT‟L ARB. REP. 1, Annex 1, for a list 
of the arbitrators and their brief biographies. 
 322. Rules of Procedure for the Claims Resolution Process, art. 30 (1997), available at 
http://www.crt-ii.org/_crt-i/frame.html [hereinafter CRT-I Rules of Procedure]. 
 323. Hans Van Houtte et al., Winning the Parties‟ Hearts and Minds, POST-WAR RESTORATION 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOLUME 1: INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND 
SUBSTANTIVE LAW 73, n.89 (2008) [hereinafter Hans van Houtte et al.]. 
 324. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, arts. 3-5. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Volcker Report, supra note 306, ¶12; Wade, supra note 321, at 1, n.7 (1999). 
 327. Volcker Report, supra note 306, ¶12. 
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were received for adjudication.328 
Once a claimant submitted a claim, it was forwarded to the bank holding 
the account.  Due to Swiss bank secrecy laws, the bank‟s name and the amount 
in the account were not disclosed to the public.329
 
The bank would then review 
the claim, decide whether it wanted its name and the amount in the account 
disclosed to the claimant and have the claimant sign a Claims Resolution 
Agreement, or it would deny the claim.330 In either case, the claim was 
transmitted to CRT-I, either to proceed in arbitration if the bank had disclosed 
its name and the amount in the account to the claimant, or for an initial 
screening by the CRT-I if the bank had denied disclosure of the information. 331 
The Initial Screening process was “an admissibility proceeding with a very 
low threshold.”332 Its purpose was to screen out claims that had no merit in 
order to simplify and quicken the claims process. The Sole Arbitrator, after 
reviewing the claim, would order that the name of the bank and the amount in 
the account be disclosed to the claimant, unless it was determined that “(i) the 
claimant has not submitted any information on his or her entitlement to the 
dormant account, or (ii) if it apparent that the claimant is not entitled to the 
dormant account.”333 A written Initial Screening decision was mailed to the 
claimant and if the claimant disagreed with the decision of the Sole Arbitrator, 
the claimant could, within 30 days, re-submit the claim for an additional Initial 
Screening by a Claims Panel of three arbitrators, which would consider the 
claim de novo.334 
Once the bank or the Tribunal determined that the claimant should receive 
the pertinent bank information, the claim proceeded in arbitration – either as a 
“fast track” 335 or “ordinary” procedure.336 The “fast track” procedure was used 
when a bank believed the claimant was entitled to the assets in the account and 
the bank was willing to pay the amount pursuant to an award or via a settlement 
agreement between the bank and the claimant or claimants.337 In addition to 
claims that were subject to “fast track” procedures by the bank, another 
expedited procedure was developed by the CRT-I and SBA to deal with small 
 
 328. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 81. 
 329. Hans Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 73. 
 330. Wade, supra note 321 at 3; see also R. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, 
and The Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT‟L L. 675, 713-14 (2003) (noting that one of the 
fundamental tenets of arbitration is that the parties submit to the jurisdiction of the arbitral panel).  
 331. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 10. 
 332. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 83. 
 333. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 10(3). 
 334. Id. 
 335. Id. Arts. 11-12. 
 336. Id. Arts. 14-15. 
 337. Wade, supra note 321, at 12; Hans Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 74; Holocaust 
Claims Against Swiss Banks, supra note 308, at 261. 
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amount claims on accounts that had a balance of less than 100 Swiss Francs, and 
where the bank was willing to pay ten times the reported amount in full and final 
settlement of the claims.338 
All claims that were not resolved in either Initial Screening or “Fast Track” 
proceedings were resolved in Ordinary Procedure.339 This procedure required “a 
full review of the claim and all available evidence in an expedited 
procedure.”340 It was used when multiple unrelated claimants filed claims to the 
same account or when the claims to the account presented difficult inheritance 
or conflict of laws questions.341 The procedure itself was governed by Article 17 
which provided that the Claims Panel “conduct the proceedings in an informal 
manner and under relaxed procedural rules that are convenient for the claimants 
and take into account their age, language and residence.”342 Most important, the 
rules gave the arbitrators full discretion in conducting the proceedings to ensure 
“an expeditious and equitable determination of all claims to dormant accounts.” 
343  The CRT-I proceedings as a result were mostly document only proceedings, 
with the arbitrators basing their decisions on law and equity. 
In reviewing the claim, entitlement was to be established in accordance 
with the relaxed standards of proof provided in Article 22.344 Article 22 of the 
Rules of Procedure provided that “[t]he claimant must show that it is plausible 
in light of all of the circumstances that he or she is entitled, in whole or in part, 
to the dormant account.”345 This plausibility standard was balanced against the 
circumstances that faced the claimants at the time as reflected by the fact that 
CRT-I decision makers were instructed to “bear in mind the difficulties of 
proving a claim after the destruction of the Second World War and the 
Holocaust and the long time that has elapsed since the opening of these dormant 
accounts.”346 Even with this low standard of proof, claims were difficult to 
prove as heirs often had little or no evidence to establish familial connections to 
the account holder and the banks, for the most part, had very little biographical 
information about the account holder.347  The relaxed standard of proof as 
applied by CRT-I meant that information known to the claimant is often used as 
a substitute for documentary evidence of a familial relationship.348  Specifically, 
if a claimant provided biographical information about his or her relative that 
 
 338. Hans Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 74-75. 
 339. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 14. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 90. 
 342. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 17. 
 343. Id. art. 15. 
 344. Id. art. 15. 
 345. Id. art. 22 (emphasis added). 
 346. Id. 
 347. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 94. 
 348. Wade, supra note 321, at 20. 
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matched unpublished information about the account holder, such as date of 
birth, occupation, or address, this information likely was sufficient to establish 
entitlement to the account.349 
If the CRT-I determined that the claimant was entitled to the account, it 
would render a Partial Award that directed the bank to distribute the assets to the 
claimant.350  Once the Independent Claims Resolution Foundation issued the 
Rules on Interest, Charges and Fees,351 the CRT-I determined whether the 
claimant was entitled to an upward adjustment of its award to reflect unpaid 
simple interest on the account since 1945 and to compensate for bank fees 
deducted from the account for the same period.352 The claimant would receive 
the adjustment in a Final Award if the account holder was determined to be a 
victim or target of Nazi persecution.353 
Through its process of initial screening and fast track and ordinary 
procedure, CRT-I reviewed over 9,900 claims.354 Upon finishing this review in 
September 2001, the CRT-I had awarded 49 million Swiss Francs 
(approximately $30 million) to claimants who claimed “non-Victim” accounts 
and 16 million Swiss Francs (approximately $10 million) to claimants who were 
awarded accounts owned by victims of Nazi persecution.355 
CRT-II, as a successor entity to CRT-I, continued to adjudicate claims to 
dormant bank accounts on a case-by-case basis to determine if the claimant was 
plausibly entitled to the claimed account. CRT-II was tasked with resolving 
claims to dormant Swiss accounts as part of the implementation of a Settlement 
Agreement reached in a consolidated class action lawsuit brought in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against major Swiss 
banks.356 The lawsuits were settled in 1999, with the banks agreeing to fund a 
$1.25 billion settlement.357  The court then appointed a special master to 
determine the appropriate allocation of the settlement fund among the different 
 
 349. Id.; Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 94. 
 350. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, arts. 31-33. 
 351. See www.crt-ii.org/_crt-i/rules_interest.html for the complete text of the Rules on Interest, 
Charges and Fees for Arbitral Decision of the Claims Resolution Tribunal [hereinafter Rules on 
Interest]. 
 352. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 284. See also Holocaust Claims 
Against Swiss Banks, supra note 308, at 263 for a fuller discussion of the four-step process for 
calculating the interest and fees. 
 353. Rules on Interest, supra note 351, art. 4B. A victim of Nazi persecution was defined in the 
Rules on Interest as “[a]ny individual, corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, unincorporated 
association, community, congregation, group, organization, or other entity persecuted or targeted for 
persecution by the Nazi Regime because they were or were believed to be Jewish, Romani, 
Jehovah‟s Witness, homosexual, or physically or mentally disabled or handicapped.” Id. art. 2I. 
 354. Hans Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 75. 
 355. See CRT-I Progress Report/Statistics, http://www.crt-ii.org/_crt-i/frame.html. 
 356. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 25. 
 357. Settlement Agreement, In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., CV-96-4849 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), 
available at www.swissbankclaims.com/PDFs_Eng/exhibit1toPlanofAllocation.pdf. 
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classes that composed the class action.358 Once drafted and approved by the 
court, the Plan of Allocation and Distribution359 constituted the CRT-II as the 
entity to “decide claims to assets deposited with Swiss banks by victims or 
targets of Nazi persecution in accounts that were open or opened during the 
period 1933 to 1945.”360 
While CRT-I was designed as an international arbitration process and 
functioned as such, the CRT-II was “a court-sponsored alternative dispute 
resolution process.”361  It was not an arbitral tribunal as the banks no longer had 
an interest in the proceedings.  All payments to successful claimants from 
dormant accounts of victims of Nazi persecution, whether already paid or 
pending payment, were credited against the allocated $800 million in the 
Settlement Fund.362  Thus, while retaining the nature of an international 
tribunal, CRT-II‟s function was to act as a class action settlement distribution 
body.363 The CRT-II was not instructed to adjudicate claims between the bank 
and claimants; rather, it applied a series of presumptions contained in the CRT-
II Rules of Procedure to determine whether the claimant was entitled to the 
dormant account.364 
The CRT-II‟s Rules of Procedure, instead of implementing the Initial 
Screening process of CRT-I, provided for standards of admissibility based on 
whether the claimant presented any information that provided a reasoned and 
satisfactory basis for further examination of the claim.365 In order for a claim to 
be admissible, Article 18 of the Rules Governing the Claims Resolution Process 
(the “Rules”) required that the claim be sufficiently detailed about the account 
holder to provide enough information to determine eligibility for entitlement.366  
Additionally, claims were inadmissible if a victim or target of Nazi persecution 
did not hold the account. 367 
 
 358. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 26. 
 359. Special Master‟s Proposed Plan of Allocation and Distribution of Settlement Proceeds, 
www.swissbankclaims.com/DistributionPlan.htm [hereinafter Plan of Allocation and Distribution]. 
The Plan of Allocation and Distribution was approved by the U.S. district court on November 20, 
2000. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 2000 WL 33241660 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff‟d, 413 F.3d 
183 (2d Cir. 2005). Out of the $1.25 billion, $800 million dollars was allocated for distribution to 
claimants who filed claims for dormant accounts held by Swiss banks. 
 360. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 26. 
 361. Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks, supra note 308, at 265. 
 362. T. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 101. 
 363. For a discussion of the legal nature of the CRT-II, see Beauchamp, supra note 312, at 
1026-34. 
 364. CRT-II Rules Governing the Claims Resolution Process, art. 28, available at 
http://www.crt-ii.org/_pdf/governing_rules_en.pdf [hereinafter CRT-II Rules of Procedure]. 
 365. Id. art. 18. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. art. 14 (providing “[t]he CRT shall have jurisdiction to resolve claims to Accounts of 
Victims open or opened in Swiss banks during the Relevant Period and to certify to the Court for 
payment of the value of Accounts.”); art. 46(4) (stating that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
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If the claimant successfully passed this admissibility requirement, 
eligibility for an award of the claimed account was now determined by 
computerized matching of account holders to claimants.368  This step, referred 
to as “matching” in Article 19 of the CRT-II Rules, occurred when one or more 
accounts in the computerized Account History Database was the same or similar 
to the name of the relative of the claimant asserting the claim.369  In the case of 
a successful match, the CRT-II then made a determination under Article 22 
using a relaxed standard of proof370 that the claimed owner and the actual owner 
of the account were the same individual.371 Article 28 of the CRT-II Rules 
provided a number of presumptions that the Tribunal was to apply to the claim 
explaining why the account holder did not receive the proceeds of the account 
that would justify an award of the account, absent plausible evidence to the 
contrary.372 
Once a determination was made that the Account Holder never received the 
proceeds of the account, the CRT-II determined distribution.  CRT-I, in making 
this determination, relied upon the inheritance laws applicable between the 
account holder and the individuals claiming the account.373  Under the CRT-II 
Rules, Article 23 provided rules of distribution for the amounts awarded, in the 
absence of a will or other inheritance documents.374 
Since 2001, when CRT-II began, it has received over 33,000 claims for 
accounts held in Swiss banks since the Second World War.  As of March 2010, 
the CRT-II had awarded 2,902 claims for a total of approximately $472 
million.375 
III.  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED IMCPS AND TJCPS 
We now turn to a comparative analysis of the two types of claims 
procedures illustrated in the previous section. Contrary to the approach of most 
 
to resolve claims submitted for an account whose holder was not a victim of Nazi persecution). 
 368. Id. arts. 19-21. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. art. 17. CRT-II adopted the same relaxed standard as CRT-I. Article 17 provides that 
“[e]ach Claimant shall demonstrate that it is plausible in light of all the circumstances that he or she 
is entitled, in whole or in part, to the claimed Account.” Id. 
 371. Id. art. 22. 
 372. Id. art. 28. 
 373. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 16. 
 374. CRT-II Rules of Procedure, supra note 364, art. 23. 
 375. See www.crt-ii.org/_awards/index.phtm. Despite the fact that it has placed a premium on 
speed and efficiency due to an elderly Holocaust survivor claimant community, the CRT-II has been 
in operation for over nine years and is still processing claims today. Id.; Holocaust Claims Against 
Swiss Banks, supra note 308, at 277. 
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commentators,376 we start by looking at the differences between the two types 
of claims procedures, before addressing the parallels.377 The most obvious 
difference, of course, is the context in which each takes place: most IMCPs play 
largely on the field of international law and international relations, while TJCPs 
are shaped primarily by powerful social-political forces in the domestic 
realm.378 Not surprisingly, from the dissimilar political contexts involved, a 
number of other significant divergences between the two types of claims 
procedures are derived. Foremost among these is the distinct nature of the 
constituting legal norms underpinning each set of procedures. IMCPs are 
generally framed by international agreements by, between, or among states, or 
by agreements to arbitrate internationalized issues between parties;379 TJCPs, on 
the other hand, are exclusively a product of domestic executive and legislative 
legal processes. 380 Since the settings and foundations of these two types of 
claims procedures are so different, it is not surprising that the divergences 
outnumber the convergences. 
For these reasons, we start by examining a number of basic differences 
between the two types of mass claims processes, beginning with the distinct 
goals and values promoted by each. Other differences involve key issues like 
determinations of liability; the nature of the parties and the claims processes; the 
types of decision makers employed; the remedies offered; and the mechanisms 
established for the payment and enforcement of awards. It is also instructive to 
contrast the degree to which the lessons learned from a given mass claims 
process can benefit subsequent efforts; such “transferability” varies greatly 
between the institutionalized “recycling” of IMCP experiences and the inherent 
 
 376. See supra Introduction. 
 377. A necessary caveat to this approach is to recognize that the IMCP and TJCP categories are 
neither homogenous nor static. On the one hand, there are significant variations between and among 
types of IMCPs as well as TJCP experiences as we have defined them. Each claims process, 
regardless of context, is a dynamic response to the particular circumstances within which it arises. 
Moreover, the two fields are in flux, so there are few absolutes in either direction. That said, it is 
equally clear that the categories as defined either mirror accepted terminology or reflect widely 
shared understandings in the international mass claims and transitional justice fields, respectively. In 
addition, the methodical analysis of paradigmatic TJCPs and IMCPs in Part II further substantiates 
our reliance upon a broad set of widely accepted definitional parameters for each category, which are 
based on past and current practice. Our intention is not to circumscribe these processes to artificial 
boundaries or ignore the significant variations that may exist between them. Rather, we seek to 
capture the essence of each process‟ evolution to enable constructive comparative analyses in the 
future. 
 378. Domestic actors or forces within state parties may influence the development of IMCPs, 
and TJCPs may be susceptible to international law‟s influence on internal processes. See supra Part 
II. However, the essential nature of each is undisputedly anchored in the distinct arenas described, 
despite some overlap. 
 379. See infra Part III.A.3; HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 17. 
 380. See infra Part III.A.3; see also Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global 
Justice: A New Frontier, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 498; SHELTON, supra 
note 15, at 400. 
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uniqueness of every TJCP. The objective of this sub-section, then, is to bring to 
the fore several of the key contextual, conceptual, structural and practical 
differences that distinguish traditional IMCPs from their home-grown cousins, 
the TJCPs. 
After exploring these dissimilarities, we will engage in a more informed 
study of apparent and actual parallels between the two mechanisms viewed in 
light of the preceding analysis. Any contemplation of similarities between 
IMCPs and TJCPs is substantively affected when conducted after careful study 
of the myriad differences that separate them. By applying this methodology, we 
are inevitably drawn to a number of operational aspects of these claims 
processes that, upon closer examination, share a functional equivalency in either 
context. The best examples are provided by those operational principles and 
procedures inherent in any mass claims process, regardless of context, such as 
establishing credibility or identifying and screening claimants. On the other 
hand, some frequently cited characteristics that appear to be shared, and thus, 
comparable, including those relating to the remedial nature of both IMCPs and 
TJCPs, turn out upon closer examination not to be as substantially equivalent as 
generally presumed. But, this conclusion can only be fully appreciated after a 
thorough examination of the differences that reign between the two. 
A. IMCPs and TJCPs: How are they different? 
1. Divergent Goals and Values Promoted 
IMCPs and TJCPs exist on different planes and arise within different 
normative frameworks.381 What is perhaps less obvious is that, because the 
institutional goals pursued by each are shaped by the distinct contexts involved, 
these goals and the underlying values they promote can be substantively 
different. By contrasting the prevailing definitions for each type of claims 
process, one can begin to look past nominal similarities to discern just how 
dissimilar the two can be in function as well as purpose. 
As a rule, IMCPs are established as an alternative to judicial and other 
dispute resolution mechanisms,382 often in the interest of promoting 
international peace and stability.383 It is no coincidence that modern day IMCPs 
grew out of the evolution of international arbitration procedures and 
corresponding institutions such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration.384 
Indeed, in several notable instances, such processes have been charged with 
 
 381. See infra Part III.A.3. See also Falk, supra note 380, at 498; SHELTON, supra note 15, at 
400. 
 382. Crook, supra note 1, at 55; see also Das, supra note 30, at 5; HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 1, 6; see also infra note 420 et seq. and accompanying text. 
 383. See Holtzmann, Forward, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1, at v. 
 384. Id. 
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adjudicating the liability of a state or other party before establishing the arbitral 
award or granting compensation.385 This variation notwithstanding, the 
overarching goal of any IMCP is to provide “effective remedies for numerous 
individuals who suffered losses, damage or injuries as a result of an armed 
conflict or a similar event causing widespread damage.”386 These remedies, as 
Howard Holtzmann points out, are generally limited in practice to monetary 
compensation or restitution because they are most often directed at redressing 
property claims.387 With few exceptions, the compensation of personal injuries 
has traditionally taken a back seat to property losses in the international 
context.388 On the other hand, IMCPs are generally successful at achieving 
elevated degrees of “completeness,” understood as the “ability of a program to 
cover [the] universe of potential beneficiaries.”389 
Another defining characteristic of IMCPs is the creation of an adjudicatory 
and/or administrative organ, called “a tribunal, a commission, or other dispute 
resolution body,”390 which is charged with implementing the specific mandate 
defined by the parties to the underlying agreement.391 In this key respect, 
“[IMCPs] are usually self-contained ad hoc regimes . . . driven by the 
administrator rather than the parties.”392 The primary challenge faced by these 
claims processing bodies is resolving  
the tension between individualized justice, on the one hand, and efficiency and 
speed, on the other . . . . [In other words, a] balance must be struck between the 
traditional requirements of fairness [in individual cases] and the imperative to 
provide justice quickly to all claimants.393  
The emphasis, however, is clearly on efficiency: IMCPs are usually judged on 
their ability to advance procedural goals such as “speed of process, cost-
effectiveness, and consistency in the handling of claims and decision 
making.”394 Hans Das, quoting from a study of the UNCC, summarizes: “The 
guiding principle . . . is one of „practical justice: that is, a justice that would be 
 
 385. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 386. Das, supra note 30, at 5. 
 387. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 72-73. See infra Parts III.A.3, III.A.5. 
 388. All eleven of the international mass claims processes analyzed in HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, deal with property or contractual claims, among others; only two – 
UNCC and EECC – contemplate compensation for personal injuries resulting from violations of 
international law. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 389. De Greiff, supra note 14, at 6. The taxonomy of terms used to describe the effectiveness of 
reparations programs from which this concept is drawn is discussed in greater detail, infra. A good 
example of the comprehensiveness achieved by IMCPs on the whole is the UNCC, which processed 
US$ 2.6 million claims. See Das, supra note 30, at 7. 
 390. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 6. 
 391. Id. at 17-19, 37-38. 
 392. Das, supra note 30, at 10. A notable exception to this general rule is the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal. See supra note 376 and accompanying text. 
 393. Id. 
 394. T. van den Hout, supra note 1, at xxx. 
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swift and efficient, yet not rough.‟”395 
Now, contrast international mass claims processes with those taking place 
in the transitional justice context. TJCPs, as previously noted, are best defined as 
domestic programs enacted by government authorities through legislation and 
other legal means to provide reparations to citizens or residents who were 
victims of gross and often systematic human rights abuses that occurred in the 
country.396 As we have seen, these programs are generally comprised of 
legislatively driven administrative regimes that can overlap with existing 
procedures under domestic law for providing state granted benefits or redressing 
related types of harm.397 Or, they may require the creation of specialized 
mechanisms to fulfill their mandate,398 or both.399 Regardless of the actual 
configuration, state practice over the past several decades confirms the existence 
of what Ruti Teitel calls “a paradigm of transitional reparatory justice associated 
with transitional times”400 involving radical political change: 
[This paradigm] is a complex conception, as it does work advancing multiple 
purposes mediating and constructing the transition. Transitional reparations 
publicly recognize and instantiate individual rights that are, in a sense, 
 
 395. Das, supra note 30, at 10, quoting David D. Caron and Brian Morris, The United Nations 
Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, Not Retribution, 13(1) EUR. J. INT‟L L. 188 (2002). 
 396. See Argentina, South Africa and Hungary case studies supra Part II. See also SHELTON, 
supra note 15, at 400; Pablo de Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 
supra note 14, at 453 [hereinafter De Greiff II]. These abuses are usually attributable to the state 
directly, but may sometimes include abuses committed by non-state actors such as paramilitary 
groups acting in concert with state agents (Colombia) or armed opposition groups (Peru). For 
general background on the Colombian conflict and recent reparations processes, see Julian Guerrero 
Orozco and Mariana Goetz, Reparations for Victims in Colombia: Colombia‟s Law on Justice and 
Peace, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 435-58. For an overview of the Peruvian 
experience, see JULIE GUILLEROT & LISA MAGARRELL, MEMORIAS DE UN PROCESO INACABADO: 
REPARACIONES EN LA TRANSICIÓN PERUANA (ICTJ/OXFAM/APRODEH 2006).  
 397. See, e.g., Argentina case study, supra Part II (illustrating the use of administrative law and 
procedure to disburse pensions, compensation and other benefits. This was likewise the model 
employed in Chile, where social benefits were administered through pre-existing government 
ministries or agencies). Elizabeth Lira, The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in 
Chile, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 59 (pensions), 68-69 (health benefits). 
Similarly, in Hungary, the Executive‟s justice office has been charged with implementing the 
administrative schemes created by the post-transition compensation.  See supra notes 217-47 and 
accompanying text. 
 398. See South Africa case study, supra Part II (discussing mandate of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in relation to reparations); see also Lira, supra note 397, at 60 
(describing the National Corporation for Reparations and Reconciliation created to implement the 
recommendations of the Chilean Truth and reconciliation Commission). A good example of recent 
reparatory initiatives that required the creation of new institutions is from Colombia, where the 
National Reparations and Reconciliation Commission was created as part of the so called “Justice 
and Peace” process with demobilized paramilitary groups. See Arturo Carrillo, Truth, Justice, and 
Reparations in Colombia: The Path to Peace and Reconciliation?, in COLOMBIA: BUILDING PEACE 
IN A TIME OF WAR 133, 145 (USIP Press 2009). 
 399. See Argentina and South Africa case studies supra Part II; see also Lira, supra note 397, 
55-71 (describing different components of Chile‟s reparations program). 
 400. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 146. 
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predominantly symbolic. Often they are not truly compensatory, bearing little or 
no relation to the material loss, exemplified in the Latin American “moral 
reparations” or the post-communist rehabilitations. Transitional reparations may 
take many forms: They can be in kind, as in property restitutions, monetary 
payments, or nonconventional redress, such as education vouchers or other 
collective public benefits, such as memorials, legislative rehabilitations, and 
apologies.401 
Even so, redressing the harm suffered by victims of human rights abuses is 
not the only goal of such reparatory polices nor, some would argue, the most 
important one. In the transitional justice context, reparations programs are one 
of several initiatives linked to a broader political strategy aimed at promoting 
national reconciliation and consolidating democratic institutions.402 Such 
programs are part and parcel of the transformative policies adopted by 
transitional governments. At the same time, however, they are subject – and 
sometimes subordinated – to other priorities. South Africa provides a stark 
example where an emphasis on truth telling facilitated by amnesties eclipsed the 
government‟s minimal efforts to adequately compensate or otherwise redress 
victims.403 In part, this tension is due to competing political demands on limited 
resources in hard times; it is one of the threshold challenges facing domestic 
decision makers. But, it also reflects the fact that “[t]he reparatory projects of 
societies in the extraordinary context of political flux [must] advance purposes 
related to radical political change other than those conventionally considered 
remedial, such as societal reconciliation and economic transformation.”404 
Policymakers in countries undergoing such transformations therefore must 
grapple with the conundrum of providing a viable degree of “justice” for 
multitudes of individual human rights victims while ensuring the overarching 
social, political, and economic objectives of the transition.405 In addition, as 
numerous commentators have observed, honoring the concept of “justice” in the 
strictly reparatory sense is itself fraught with difficulties.406 In countries 
transitioning from repressive authoritarian regimes to liberal democratic ones, 
 
 401. Id. 
 402. See generally id; see also De Greiff, supra note 14, at 11 (recognizing that reparations 
programs should be “designed in such a way as to bear a close relationship with other transitional 
mechanisms, i.e. minimally, with criminal justice [prosecutions], truth telling, and institutional 
reform”); SHELTON, supra note 15, at 390-91. 
 403. See South Africa case study, supra Part II. 
 404. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 132; Shelton explains further how remedies in the transitional 
justice context “have to be adjusted to achieve other goals, including cessation of conflict, 
prevention of future conflict, deterrence of individual wrongdoing, rehabilitation of society and 
victims, and reconciliation of individuals and groups.” See supra note 15, at 390. 
 405. De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 451-72; see also Rama Mani, Reparation as a Component 
of Transitional Justice: Pursuing „Reparative Justice‟ in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict, in OUT 
OF THE ASHES, supra note 11, at 55. 
 406. See, e.g., De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 467-71; Arturo Carrillo, Justice in Context: The 
Relevance of Inter-American Human Rights Law and Practice in Repairing the Past, in HANDBOOK 
OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 505-09, 527-30. 
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like Eastern European nations formerly under communist rule or like South 
Africa under Apartheid, the challenge is determining who should be redressed if, 
in effect, “everyone suffered”.407 Even where state-sponsored atrocity has 
produced distinct classes of victims, as is typical in Latin America, it is not 
always clear where to best draw the line; domestic decision makers must make 
hard choices about which types of victims (and violations) will be covered by 
their reparatory measures and which ones will be excluded.408 
Finally, policymakers must strive to determine what constitutes “justice” 
for the victims selected, as well as how to achieve it.  In other words, “what 
should victims in fairness receive?”409 This question alone has generated 
endless debate in the literature.410 It suffices for our purposes to emphasize that, 
regardless of the actual policy adopted, decision makers in transitional regimes 
generally have a range of possible reparatory strategies available to them,411 as 
well as an extensive array of remedial measures – pecuniary and non-pecuniary, 
or symbolic – all of which can be combined and calibrated to achieve the 
objectives selected to varying degrees.412 One of the issues and challenges 
inherent in this exercise is to reconcile the conflict that can arise between 
reparations for individual victims and the goal of promoting collective redress 
for groups or communities of victims.413 Given the zero-sum nature of financial 
and, often, political capital, to what extent does an emphasis on the former 
(reparations for individual victims) come at the expense of achieving the latter 
(collective or communal redress), thereby undercutting the overarching goal of 
reconciliation? 
 
 407. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 132 (emphasis added) (quoting V. Havel). 
 408. See De Greiff, supra note 14, at 9 (describing how different reparations programs at 
different times have excluded certain classes of victims due to political or other factors). The classic 
example is Chile, which omitted political prisoners and victims of torture from the original purview 
of its compensation policies. See Lira, supra note 397, at 77. 
 409. De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 455. 
 410. See generally OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11; HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra 
note 14. 
 411. See supra note 399 and accompanying text. 
 412. See De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 467-71 (outlining the range of possible pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary reparations measures). See also infra Part III.A.5. 
 413. This paradigmatic debate tends to pit the focus on monetary compensation for individuals 
against the goal of “collective and symbolic reparation” for groups or communities of victims more 
broadly. Colvin, supra note 251, at 191. South Africa provides an enduring example of this dilemma 
operating at different levels, that is, not only within the design of a reparations program, but also in 
terms of transitional justice policy more generally. See id. at 184-86 (describing lawsuit brought by 
individual victims challenging the amnesty provisions of the TRC Act as unconstitutional because it 
foreclosed their rights to pursue judicial remedies). A recent example of this contraposition is Peru, 
where legislators removed the figure of individual compensation from the reparations proposal 
submitted by the TRC, opting instead to focus exclusively on collective reparations in the form of 
social benefits and development aid to communities. See Decreto Supremo No. 015-2006-JUS, 
Reglamento de la Ley No. 28592, Ley que crea el Plan Integral de Reparaciones, July 6, 2006 [initial 
regulations to Reparations Law defining modalities of reparations], available at 
http://www.registrodevictimas.gob.pe/normas.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2009). 
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2. Issues of Liability 
How IMCPs and TJCPs respectively approach the issue of liability is 
further illustrative of the dynamic of difference between the two. By liability we 
refer to the process of determining whether a legal duty to compensate or 
otherwise redress the claimant exists through arbitration or some other dispute 
resolution mechanism that takes place as an integral part of the mass claims 
process. Deciding questions of liability is a pre-condition to the awarding of 
benefits in a regime that adopts this approach. As it happens, IMCPs can address 
liability issues; TJCPs do not. 
IMCPs can be erected as the arbiters of legal responsibility with respect to 
state parties to the constituting agreements, or the nationals of state parties, as 
well as provide the mechanisms to ensure that successful claims are 
compensated.414 The first IMCP of modern times, the US-Iran Claims Tribunal, 
is a perfect example. It was charged with deciding contractual and property 
related claims by nationals of the United States or Iran brought against the other 
state, as well as adjudicating disputes between the two states themselves.415 
Another recent experience is the Ethiopia Eritrea Claims Commission, which 
adjudicated inter alia the responsibility of each state party for the harm 
unlawfully inflicted on the nationals of the opposing state and their property 
during the course of the war between them.416 An arbitral approach to claims 
between private parties as opposed to states can be seen in the Claims 
Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland (CRT-1), which had 
“arbitrators acting pursuant to arbitration law, with the power to issue final and 
binding [judgments and] awards.”417 And, even where an IMCP is engaged in a 
systematic sampling of claims for the purpose of extrapolating to the general 
claimant population, examining the merits of the sampled claims implicate 
decision making of an administrative and quasi-judicial nature.418 
 
 414. See Norbert Wühler, The Different Contexts in which International Arbitration is Being 
Used: International Claims Tribunals and Commissions, 4 J. OF WORLD INVESTMENT  379, 379-97 
(June 2003) (noting the rise of claims tribunals and arbitration commissions in a variety of settings 
and examining their similarities and differences); see also HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra 
note 8, at 97-98. 
 415. See Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal case study supra Part II. 
 416. Agreement between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and 
the Government of the State of Eritrea, Dec.12, 2000, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 [hereinafter Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement]. 
 417. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 99-100. Even though the arbitration 
was between private parties, the participation of the Swiss and United States governments was 
critical to the establishment of the Claims Resolution Tribunal.  See CRT case study, supra Part II. 
 418. The UNCC Panel of Commissioners decided the claims and issued reports that 
recommended payments to compensate for losses suffered. The Commissioners would review the 
factual details of the claims and apply the appropriate international legal principles to resolve the 
disputes. The UNCC Commissioner was vested with full discretion in reviewing the facts and 
applying the appropriate law. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 183. In this regard, 
the role of the UNCC Commissioner in issuing its decision was closer to what an administrative law 
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In contrast, transitional justice reparations programs in have been 
characterized primarily by domestic administrative procedures for the disbursal 
of reparations to persons who qualify as victims. Liability for the underlying 
violations is not at issue in these claims processes; it is generally pre-established 
or presumed.419 The primary questions are whether a given individual qualifies 
as a victim and whether he or she can establish a recognized claim to the 
benefits offered. In most cases, state responsibility for the harms redressed is 
established beforehand, often by a government-sponsored truth commission, 420 
or acknowledged by the successor regime implementing the reparations 
program. The newly democratic government in Hungary, where no truth 
commission operated, exemplifies the latter process in that it recognized 
expressly that it had a legal obligation to redress the abuses committed by the 
predecessor communist regime.421 Regardless of the approach, in the 
transitional justice context, it is the reparations program‟s place among various 
other interlocking government policies, including those that address the issue of 
liability separately that explains this division of labor.422 
3. Nature of Parties and Claims Process 
Additional differences between the two processes can be discerned by 
looking to the nature of the parties involved and the claims processes they 
create. In this section, we examine the instrumentalities that establish a claims 
process and the role its creators play in the development thereof. As we have 
seen, government actors tend to create IMCPs through the negotiation and 
execution of international instruments. The principal effort emanates from the 
executive who implements international agreements through his or her role as 
head of state. In contrast, TJCPs rely almost exclusively on individual political 
actors operating in the domestic arena. National legislatures develop statutory 
schemes that explicitly detail the workings of the reparatory programs. These 
legislative efforts tend to be sponsored, supported, and implemented by the 
executive acting in a role very different from the one he or she plays when 
negotiating, establishing and supporting an IMCP. 
 
judge does than the decision-making role of officials in the Argentine or Chilean ministries, who 
were merely charged with distributing benefits pursuant to a fixed statutory scheme to persons who 
managed to prove the violation and their relation to the victim.   See United Nations Compensation 
Commission and Argentina case studies supra Part II. 
 419. Of course, this can happen with IMCPs as well. See SHELTON, supra note 15, at 405 (“The 
decision of the Security Council to establish the UNCC has been analogized to „what is tantamount 
to a summary judgment holding Iraq responsible for a whole series of breaches of international 
law.‟” ) (quoting Stanley J. Glod, International Claims Arising from Iraq‟s Invasion of Kuwait, 25 
INT‟L LAW. 713, 715 (1991)). Even so, this approach did not completely remove liability issues from 
the Commissioners‟ purview. See supra note 415 and accompanying text. 
 420. See, e.g., Argentina and South Africa case studies, supra Part II. 
 421. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 15-17. 
 422. See supra notes 401-04 and accompanying text. 
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In IMCPs, the state qua state is the engine behind the process, whether 
acting individually or collectively. The instrumentalities that are developed to 
resolve disputed claims result from state acquiescence to the principles of 
international law, specifically the concept of state responsibility.423 Treaties, 
international agreements, or United Nations actions are frequently the conduits 
through which states enforce a party‟s responsibility for its wrongdoing. Third 
party mediation between Iran and the United States created the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal which adjudicated claims of expropriation and breach of contract 
resulting from Iran‟s wrongful seizure of the U.S. Embassy. Negotiated peace 
agreements to adjudicate claims of property losses that were the result of 
hostilities between the parties resulted in the Commission for Real Property 
Claims of Displaced Persons (CRPC) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission.424 State responsibility was also clearly 
implicated when the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted 
Resolution 687 imposing a duty on Iraq to provide reparations for the losses 
suffered as a result of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. 425 Thus, the 
willingness of states to submit to international agreements or instrumentalities in 
resolving the disputes between them is the sine qua non for the existence of 
most IMCPs. 
Unlike the establishment of an international mass claims process, where the 
state must act vis-à-vis another state or states pursuant to international law to 
resolve disputes between them. In a TJCP, domestic authorities within a state 
(e.g., the legislature, executive, and judiciary) act vis-à-vis each other in more 
starkly political terms to provide remedies to a sector of the domestic population 
harmed by prior governments. In South Africa and especially Argentina, the 
crucial role played by the newly elected presidents and their governments in 
promoting reparations as part of their transitional policies cannot be 
overstated.426 Similarly, the Hungarian Parliament, like the Argentine Congress, 
was the legislative motor behind the compensation schemes enacted during the 
democratic transition period. The judiciary in South Africa and Hungary also 
 
 423. See generally International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (July 2001). States 
recognize that “[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility 
of that State.”  Id. art. 1. The corresponding precept is that a party injured due to an internationally 
wrongful act must be repaired. See Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, 
at 27, 28 (Sept. 13, 1928). In order to make these reparations, dispute resolution mechanisms are 
usually (although not exclusively) established by multilateral or bilateral government-to-government 
negotiations. See, e.g., supra notes 39-48 and 143-150 and accompanying text. 
 424. See HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 23, 33 for fuller discussion of the 
constituting method of these two institutions.  Note that even though the CRPC was ultimately a 
domestically oriented procedure like those typical of TJCPs, e.g. Hungary, it was conceived and 
constructed as an IMCP, hence its inclusion as a case study in the Holtzmann & Kristjansdottir  
treatise on international mass claims processes. 
 425. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 138; see also SHELTON, supra note 15, at 405. 
 426. The same can be said of Chile. See Lira, supra note 397, passim. 
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played a central part in ensuring the viability of the respective governments‟ 
reparations plan.427 And, one cannot forget that domestic non-state actors, 
including other parties to internal conflict or regime change, can also be critical 
to the development of TJCPs. South Africa presents just such a case in that 
negotiations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the National 
Party (NP) government resulted in the dismantling of the apartheid regime and 
the proposal of reparations for the wrongs committed.428 In almost all cases, 
however, TJCPs are designed, adopted, and implemented by government and 
state officials on behalf of the domestic victims of massive or widespread abuses 
committed by their predecessors.429 
The difference in the nature of the two types of claims processes is perhaps 
best reflected in the role played by international law in advancing the respective 
objectives of each.430 With respect to IMCPs, as noted, international law is the 
normative bedrock upon which such processes are erected; it generally provides 
not only jurisdiction as a function of state responsibility, but also governs the 
instrumentalities (treaties, agreements, and UN resolutions) that create them. 
The IMCPs‟ rules of procedure emanate from established international norms 
and practices and, in some instances, their decisions possess legal authority 
beyond the confines of the claims process itself, forming an integral part of the 
corpus of international law.431 Conversely, domestic law entirely governs 
TJCPs, even where reference to the state‟s international obligations is 
present.432 Procedurally, they are as much creatures of national legislatures as 
 
 427. See South Africa and Hungary case studies, supra Part II. 
 428. See South Africa and Argentina case studies, supra Part II. Victims groups and their NGO 
allies have also influenced the design and implementation of reparations programs, most notably in 
Argentina and Chile. See case studies supra Part II. Certainly non-state actors can also be important 
to IMCPs, as was the case with the CRT-I proceedings, but in the main such actors play a lesser role 
in the IMCP context than that of TJCPs. 
 429. Important recent exceptions include the Justice and Peace process in Colombia which 
provides for reparations to victims of the demobilized paramilitary groups. See Carrillo, supra note 
398, at 143-48. In Peru, reparations programs benefit victims of the Shining Path guerrillas as well 
as state agents. In Peru, the definition of “victim” in the law creating the Reparations Plan refers to 
all persons who during the 20-year reference period suffered any of a series of listed abuses in the 
course of the internal armed conflict, regardless of whether the perpetrator was a state or private 
actor. Ley No. 28592, 20 July 2005, Congreso de la Republica, Ley que crea el Plan Integral de 
Reparaciones – PIR, available at http://www.registrodevictimas.gob.pe/normas.html (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2009). 
 430. Richard Falk distinguishes three scenarios involving reparations under international law: 
“disputes between states, and increasingly other actors,” “war/peace settings in which the victorious 
side imposes obligations on the losing side,” and “transitions to democracy setting in which the prior 
governing authority is held accountable for alleged wrongs.” See Falk, supra note 380, at 480. 
 431. Examples include the awards made by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the judgments 
handed down by the EECC. 
 432. It is widely accepted that states have an obligation under international law to provide 
remedies and reparations to victims of gross and systematic violations of human rights and serious 
violations of humanitarian law. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
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IMCPs are of international law and relations. Thus, in the TJCP context, 
to the extent that international law is relevant at all, it is to provide legal 
arguments or jurisprudential background useful for representatives and advocates 
of victims‟ rights in domestic political arenas to the effect that victims are legally 
entitled to reparations, and that the domestic system is obliged to make this right 
tangible by providing meaningful procedures.433 
4. Decision Makers 
Issues related to the “macro” decisions about whether and how to create a 
mass claim process, as well as to the role of the parties that shape them, were 
addressed in prior sections.434 Here we focus exclusively on the “micro” 
component of decision making in the process of resolving individual claims 
once a mass claim procedure has been established. By “decision makers” we 
refer to those officials within a mass claims regime authorized to hear and/or 
resolve the legal issues leading to the decision to recognize a particular claim 
and award the corresponding benefits.435 What interests us here, however, is not 
so much what is decided as who decides it and how. Again, major differences 
are apparent. 
All IMCPs require “a body that considers the merits of the claims.”436 As a 
rule IMCPs are divided into two kinds: those in which the body charged with 
examining claims – called a tribunal or commission – makes the final decision 
on the merits, and those in which the body “makes recommendations or rulings 
that subject to approval by a supervisory organ.”437 Examples of the former 
include the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, and the EECC, while the UNCC is a 
perfect illustration of the latter approach. Moreover, as noted, IMCPs often 
grapple with questions of liability, which can be central to the kind of decision 
maker selected.438 Thus, regardless of the type of IMCP chosen, the individuals 
selected to make final determinations tend to be persons of various nationalities 
with extensive prior experience in the field of international arbitration and/or 
 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 
16, 2005) [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines]. 
 433. Falk, supra note 380, at 481 (emphasis in the original). Ruti Teitel agrees, viewing 
international law as a “mediating concept” that transcends domestic law and politics, thereby 
providing constructive and constitutive elements to the political debates that shape domestic 
transitional justice policies. Supra note 211, at 20; see also id. at 213-25 (describing a theory of 
transitional justice and the “transformative” role of law.).  
 434.  See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3. 
 435. See supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3. 
 436. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8 at 179. 
 437. Id. 
 438. See supra Part III.A.2. In some cases, policy making, executive and administrative 
function, such as setting the IMCP‟s budget fall on the main decision makers as well. HOLTZMANN 
& KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 299 et seq.; see, e.g.., Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal; see also 
EECC. 
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mass claim processing.439 Such experts, whether they are called “Judge” or 
“Commissioner” or any other of the terms applied to IMCP decision makers, are 
always appointed through a carefully balanced selection process that, while 
allowing for each party‟s input, emphasizes impartiality and expertise.440 
In stark contrast to the experience expected of IMCP decision makers, 
TJCP decision makers are not required to have experience in transitional justice 
to carry out the compensation or other redress provided to domestic victims of 
human rights abuses.  The “decision makers” in the transitional justice context 
are generally charged with determining the eligibility of individual claimants 
within a pre-established procedure. They tend to be government officials 
operating in an administrative capacity to implement a legislatively supported 
reparations scheme or program.441 As noted already, specialized institutions or 
procedures are sometimes created within the executive branch to implement 
such programs; other times, existing state or government agencies are called 
upon to execute the new regime (or parts of it), just as they would any other 
legislative or executive act.442 The question of implementation is separate, of 
course, from the issue of defining reparations policy, which may involve the 
participation of civil society and international experts on the subject, as in South 
Africa during the TRC experience, or in Argentina through victims‟ 
organizations. 
On a related note, it is telling that a defining characteristic of the IMCP 
field is the extensive “recycling,” in the constructive sense, of experienced 
international arbitrators and experts in mass claims commissions from one 
IMCP to another.443 The list of dignitaries who have comprised the PCA‟s 
Steering Committee on Mass Claims Processes illustrates this fact: several 
members have served on two or more IMCPs, and some on three or more.444 
This profile is intentional; the idea is that institutional knowledge has been and 
should be passed from IMCP to IMCP, not least through those individuals who 
are primary actors or decision makers.445 In other words, international mass 
claims processing is a field dominated, in the positive sense, by a reduced 
number of eminent persons, and by institutions like the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration with which they are affiliated.446 Obviously, no such dynamic exists 
 
 439. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 5, 7, 375 (indicating the multiple 
IMCP experiences of the PCA Steering Committee on Mass Claims Processes members).  
 440. See id. at 180. 
 441. See, e.g., case studies supra Part II; see also De Greiff, supra note 14, at 17 n.22. 
 442. See supra note 392 and accompanying text. 
 443. See HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 5, 7, Annex A (indicating multiple 
IMCP experience of the PCA Steering Committee on Mass Claims Processes members). 
 444. Id. at Annex A. 
 445. Id. at 7. 
 446. For example, Lucy Reed was the Agent at the U.S-Iran Claims Tribunal, an arbitrator on 
the EECC panel, and one of the co-directors of the CRT-I. Howard Holtzmann was a judge for the 
Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, the CRT-I and the CRT-II. Hans van Houtte was a judge for the CRT-I 
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in the TJCP context; nor could it. Such an approach would be wholly out of 
place in the respective domestic arenas in which local elected officials debate, 
design, adopt and implement domestic policies on reparations through 
administrative and other legal channels.447 
5. Remedies 
Perhaps no other issue is as critical to the analysis underway than that of 
the remedies awarded by the two types of claims processes. Indeed, the 
prevailing wisdom depicted in the introduction holds that these restitutionary 
processes are “comparable” precisely because they appear to do similar things, 
i.e. provide relief to persons who have suffered some sort of harm.448 
Nonetheless, as we have seen, there is a great deal more to contrast in these 
claims processes than meets the eye. Unsurprisingly, the significant variations 
that exist in the form, focus and purpose of the remedies provided within their 
respective contexts mirror the substantial divergences between IMCPs and 
TJCPs already described in terms of goals, function, and composition. 
It is helpful to recall the nature of the claims processes analyzed to 
highlight once more that IMCPs often serve an arbitral function entailing the 
adjudication of claims to establish liability for losses suffered at the hands of a 
specific party.449 These claims processes provide declaratory relief to the parties 
before them as well as remedies.450 Moreover, they often offer the added benefit 
of influencing subsequent decisions in similar cases where decisions are made 
public.451 Because transparency is generally considered a virtue,452 arbitral 
awards and other IMCP decisions are regularly published. The Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal Rules require all awards and decisions to be made public.453 Those of 
the Ethiopia Eritrea Claims Commission are available on its website.454 The 
publication of such findings within a given international claims process is 
 
and an arbitrator on the EECC panel.  
 447. This is not to say that there is no expertise accumulated or shared in the transitional justice 
area among domestic actors and international experts. It exists, but on a different order of magnitude. 
For a detailed discussion of the differences involved, see infra Part III.A.8 (discussing the 
transferability of experiences). 
 448. Crook, supra note 1, at 55; see also OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11, at 417-18. 
 449. See supra notes 411-15 and accompanying text. 
 450. See SHELTON, supra note 15, at 34 (stating “[c]ourts [and tribunals] have the power to 
declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. A 
declaratory judgment is the least coercive form of remedy and is often used for resolving uncertainty 
in legal relations.”). 
 451. See HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 116-117, 122-23 (describing the 
practice of de facto precedent by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and the EECC). 
 452. See id. at 369. 
 453. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Rules, supra note 56, art. 32, ¶ 5; see also supra note 81. 
 454. See Permanent Court of Arbitration – Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, available at 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (last visited Apr. 29, 2009). 
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important because it allows decision makers to “refer to past cases in the interest 
of fostering uniformity, and [at the same time,] submissions by parties and 
awards [will] typically include references to earlier decisions which, while not 
binding, are often influential.” 455 In addition to promoting internal consistency, 
the publication of arbitral decisions and awards can also contribute to the 
development of international law more broadly.456 This contribution has 
certainly been seen with the Iran-US Claims Tribunal‟s jurisprudence457 and 
that of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission.458 
Regardless of whether an IMCP is constituted as an arbitral tribunal or an 
administrative proceeding, the primary remedy awarded to successful claimants 
is limited to either monetary compensation or restitution of property or assets. 
Of the ten international mass claims processes examined by Howard Holtzmann 
and Edda Kristjansdottir in their landmark comparative analysis for the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, every one provided predominantly, if not 
exclusively, for compensation or restitution as a remedy for property loss. In the 
few instances where personal injuries were also addressed (e.g., UNCC), 
monetary compensation was the sole remedy.459 Notably, the EECC, while 
emphasizing monetary compensation as the “appropriate” remedy for successful 
claims, left the door open to “other types of remedies in appropriate cases,” 
though it did not specify what those remedies might be or under what 
circumstances they would be available.460 Nonetheless, it is plain that the IMCP 
framework, premised as it is on state responsibility principles under 
international law,461 is characterized by a marked remedial focus on monetary 
compensation: “Of the various forms of reparations, compensation is perhaps 
 
 455. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 118. The same influence can be true of 
quasi-administrative bodies such as the UNCC, which published all of its decisions online as well. 
See United Nations Claims Commission Website, available at http://www.uncc.ch (last visited Apr. 
29, 2009). 
 456. The arbitral decisions are frequently cited in international law and have made notable 
contributions to its development. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
19-20 (5th ed. 1998). 
 457. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
     458.   See Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law: The 
Jurisprudence of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in the Hague, 25 WIS. INT‟L. L. J. 21, 23 
(2007). 
 459. See HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 72-82. This general practice is, of 
course, reflected in the IMCP case studies in Part II. Other remedial measures contemplated in rare 
instances are injunctions and specific performance, as ordered by the Iran-US CT. See id. at 74. 
 460. EECC Decision No. 3: Remedies (July 24, 2001) available at http://www.pca-cpa.org (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2009). Apparently there was concern on the part of the Tribunal that other types of 
remedies might be necessary to redress aspects of the social and economic chaos caused by the 
brutal armed conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. See HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra 
note 8, at 81. 
 461. See supra Part III.A.3; see also Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 423, arts. 31, 34-36. 
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the most commonly sought in international practice.”462 This is especially true 
where restitution of property or assets is not available,463 or where personal 
injury is the harm redressed.464 In short, keeping in mind their potential arbitral 
function, IMCPs are created through the operation of international law primarily 
to compensate successful claimants for losses or harms incurred.465 
Countries form TJCPs in order to provide reparations, which can include 
compensation, to eligible victims for past human rights violations. Three 
fundamental principles underlie the differences in practice between IMCPs and 
TJCPs. First, TJCPs, as a rule, do not engage with issues of liability and thus 
afford no declaratory relief to individual claimants.466 Unlike IMCPs, TJCPs are 
never adversarial in nature.467 The exclusive purpose of domestic reparations 
programs is to resolve the claims of qualified victims of selected human rights 
abuses for whom certain entitlements have been recognized. Such was the case 
in each of the three TJCP case studies summarized in Part II, and this continues 
to be the common practice.468 There are no decisions or awards in the 
adjudicatory sense, since the only “decision” to be made is an administrative 
determination as to which applicants claiming reparatory benefits are eligible 
according to pre-determined criteria. 
Second, TJCPs can do much more than just provide monetary 
compensation to victims. As we have seen, “[t]ransitional reparations may take 
many forms: They can be in kind, as in property restitutions, monetary 
payments, or nonconventional redress, such as education vouchers or other 
collective public benefits, such as memorials, legislative rehabilitations, and 
apologies.”469 The transitional governments in South Africa, Argentina and 
Chile sought to combine compensation with other types of redress including 
enhanced social benefits and state efforts aimed at victim dignification.470 This 
multifaceted approach to construing remedies for victims of mass political 
 
 462. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION‟S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 218 (2002). 
 463. Id. at 218-19. 
 464. See SHELTON, supra note 15, at 103 (noting “[i]t appears from the law of state 
responsibility for injury to aliens that restitution is often impossible due to the nature of the injury 
and that compensation for material and moral harm therefore constitutes the general form of 
reparation.”). 
 465. See supra note 378 and accompanying text. 
 466. See supra note 419 and accompanying text. The Colombian Justice and Peace Process is 
arguably a notable deviation from this otherwise uniform practice, despite the fact that it represents a 
sui generis approach to a unique and complex situation. See Carrillo, supra note 398, at 133-51. 
 467. See supra note 420 and accompanying text. 
 468. A current example is provided by the Peruvian reparations process. See supra note 396-97 
and accompanying text. 
 469. TEITEL, supra note 211, at 146. 
 470. See Argentina and South Africa case studies supra Part II; Lira, supra note 397, at 55-101 
(discussing Chile‟s various programs providing pensions, military service exceptions, as well as 
health and educational benefits to surviving victims of the political repression).  
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violence is the prevalent one today.471 International human rights law 
recognizes a diverse array of reparatory measures available to those designing 
domestic reparations programs,472 each configured to address a different 
dimension of the profound personal harm inflicted by serious human rights 
violations.473 Monetary compensation is but one such measure, and increasingly 
not the preferred one in the transitional justice context.474 The ongoing 
reparations programs in Peru, for instance, omit individual payments altogether, 
and focus instead on providing health and educational benefits to the Andean 
communities most affected by the brutal conflict with Sendero Luminoso.475 
Third, even where compensation is central to a domestic reparations 
program, it is but one of various means adopted to reach a variety of transitional 
justice ends. In addition to the role that indemnification can play within the 
broader reparatory calculus, when combined with other remedial measures to 
maximize effective redress to individual victims, it must also complement 
national reconciliation policies that preoccupy transitional governments.476 In 
other words, just as compensation is inherently part of a larger reparations 
program, these programs are themselves inextricably linked to other transitional 
 
 471. When the government in Colombia attempted to implement transitional justice type 
legislation that did not fully recognize the rights of victims to reparations, among others, 
international and domestic pressure obliged law-makers to reform the law to ensure that the 
reparations regime comported with Inter-American and other legal standards to which Colombia had 
adhered. See Carrillo, supra note 398, at 133-58. 
 472. See G.A. Res. 60/147, supra note 432. See also Velasquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988); TEITEL, supra note 211, at 124-29 (describing the influence of the Velasquez-
Rodriquez Judgment and subsequent Court practice on development of reparations policy and 
practice in Latin America). For a recent analysis of the influence of the Court on the development of 
reparation under international human rights law, see Thomas Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to 
Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT‟L L. 351 (2008). 
 473. See Martien Schotsmans, Victims‟ Expectations, Needs and Perspectives after Gross and 
Systematic Human Rights Violations, in OUT OF  THE ASHES,  supra note 11; see also Brandon 
Hamber, The Dilemmas of Reparations: In Search of a Process-Driven Approach, in OUT OF  THE 
ASHES,  supra note 11. 
 474. In domestic reparations practice, as opposed to that derived from the adjudication of 
individual cases under international human rights law, reparatory measures can be generally 
organized as follows: (1) symbolic measures, both individual and collective in nature; (2) service or 
benefits packages, including medical, educational and housing assistance; and (3) individual grants 
or monetary compensation. See De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 467-71. In South Africa, a form of 
symbolic compensation was made only after intense national and international pressure was brought 
to bear on the ANC government. See Colvin, supra note 251, at 200 -2009 (describing the „fight for 
reparations‟ after the TRC‟s recommendations were published).  
 475. See supra note 413 and accompanying text. Concerns about the strain that “full” 
compensation can place on the state‟s resources has led numerous commentators to disfavor 
anything more than mere symbolic compensation in the context of mass reparations programs. See, 
e.g., Falk, supra note 380, at 492. 
 476. See supra note 399 and accompanying text. One perceived conflict is that which arises 
when emphasis is placed on individual grants at the expense of collective reparations promoting 
reconciliation. See, e.g., De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 467. 
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policies writ large.477 In South Africa, victims challenged the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission‟s authority to expend amnesties through its truth-
telling process on the ground that the Commission unconstitutionally curtailed 
the victims‟ right to pursue not only criminal justice vis-à-vis perpetrators, but 
also civil remedies (damages).478 The judgment upholding the South African 
Parliament‟s prerogative to subordinate individual victims‟ rights in this respect 
to the overarching constitutional aims of reconstruction and reconciliation had 
important implications for the underlying issue of reparations. Advocates read 
the judgment as confirming the legal basis for a substantial reparations program 
because “by immunizing itself and those individuals responsible for human 
rights violations, the State . . . assumed the burden of responsibility to 
compensate those victims whose right to criminal and civil redress was 
denied.”479 Although the formal trade-off envisioned by this interpretation was 
neither explicitly recognized in the judgment nor borne out by subsequent 
events, the intense polemic it generated illustrates the interrelated nature and 
inherent tensions between parallel transitional policies regarding truth, justice 
and reparations.480 
6. Claimant Participation 
Significant differences also exist between IMCPs and TJCPs with respect 
to the roles that the communities of persons affected by the claims processes 
play. One could expect that potential claimants should have an influence on the 
formation, development, and implementation of those processes. As it happens, 
such claimant participation is virtually unheard of in the IMCP context, but 
significant with respect to most TJCPs. Given the predominantly interstate 
nature of IMCP formation, parties behind such an initiative tend to act on behalf 
of claimant communities that have little or no impact on the negotiations or 
implementation of the claims mechanism.481 In comparison, the victim 
communities who ultimately benefit from TJCPs are often actively involved in 
 
 477. For a discussion of the overlapping and at times competing goals of reparatory and 
transitional justice, see supra Parts III.A.1 and III.A.3. 
 478. Constitutional Court of South Africa, Judgment in Case CCT 17/96, at ¶ 8. 
 479. Colvin, supra note 251, at 186, citing Mpho Leseka, The TRC‟s Recommendations on 
Rehabilitation and Reparation, in FROM RHETORIC TO RESPONSIBILITY: MAKING REPARATIONS TO 
THE SURVIVORS OF PAST POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 2 (B. Hamber and T. Mofoken 
eds., 2000). 
 480. In relevant part, the prevailing interpretation of the judgment seems to be that “a 
reparations program could take any number of forms and need not necessarily be tied down to the 
specific question of the loss of rights of redress of particular individuals.” Colvin, supra note 251, at 
187. 
 481. Notable exceptions to this general practice are the CRT processes, as well as other 
Holocaust-related claims processes, which due to their unique nature benefitted from the influence of 
well-organized and politically powerful Jewish claimant communities. See HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 91. 
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the discussions that drive government actions to create and guide such 
processes. 
Due to the exclusive role of the executive branch in negotiating the 
instrumentalities governing IMCPs,482 individuals in claimant groups have little 
or no input into the development of these entities. IMCPs exist because 
governments make binding international obligations that create them. In so 
doing, the executive exercises the sovereign right to negotiate treaties under 
international law, 483 thereby eliminating the citizens‟ ability to provide 
meaningful input into the formation of the dispute resolution mechanism. When 
the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was created, tens of thousands of U.S. citizens who 
had claims against Iran were impacted by the United States‟ exercise of its 
sovereign authority. Yet there was no claimant participation in the negotiation of 
the Algiers Accords.484 In the negotiation, the U.S. agreed to nullify the 
opportunity for U.S. citizens to litigate such claims in U.S. courts; instead the 
aggrieved parties were required to bring their claims exclusively to the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal.485  Indeed, since states are the constituting parties behind most 
IMCPs, they often play the role of formal claimant on behalf of their citizens 
who have suffered losses or injuries. At the UNCC, for instance, eligible 
governments filing claims on behalf of their citizens had to distribute the awards 
received to the individual beneficiaries.486 
Unlike IMCPs, TJCPs like those in Argentina and South Africa and 
elsewhere, saw victims and civil society organizations play instrumental roles in 
the development of the reparations programs eventually adopted.487 “The most 
general aim of a program of reparations is to do justice to the victims.”488 Thus, 
within the newly democratic institutions characteristic of most transitional 
societies, victim communities and local civil society organizations tend to play 
active roles in the debates that lead to the creation of TJCPs.489 For instance, in 
 
 482. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 483. For instance, only officials of the United States and Iran, through Algerian government 
officials, negotiated the Algiers Accords, with no expectation of a role for individual claimants in 
either the formation of the Tribunal‟s policy or procedure. See Owens, supra note 38, at 297-324. 
 484. Id.; see also HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 19-21. 
 485. See supra Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal case study, Part II.  
 486. See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. 
 487. Andrea Armstrong defines these local organizations as “civil society groups.” Broadly 
speaking, these groups include informal traditional associations, voluntary religious, ethnic, and 
professional entities, and formal non-governmental organizations. Armstrong, supra note 127, at 
245. For a historical perspective on the role of civil society actors in the first successful individual 
reparations program, see id. at 247-51 (discussing the role of Jewish advocacy organizations, 
including the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, in negotiating Germany‟s 
reparations laws implemented to compensate victims of the Nazi government).  
 488. De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 455. 
 489. Local organizations often play an important role in the “origin, design, and implementation 
of reparation legislation within the context of transitional justice.”  Armstrong, supra note 127, at 
245. 
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Argentina, thanks to the judicial cases brought by or on behalf of the persons 
detained during the dictatorship, the Argentinean government decided to grant 
economic reparations to all persons detained during the dictatorship.490 Further, 
due to the adamant advocacy of relatives of persons who were “disappeared”,491 
Argentina enacted a series of laws in which the assignees of the nearly 9,000 
victims of forced disappearance automatically had a right to compensation 
without having to first declare their loved ones dead, as under the previous 
rules.492 Similarly, in South Africa, the disenfranchised and victimized 
communities of the apartheid regime provided the impetus for the notion that 
any reparations program must include a compensatory component. In designing 
a general reparations policy to recommend to the government, the Committee on 
Reparations and Rehabilitation, appointed by the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, relied heavily on its nationwide consultations with these victims, 
incorporating their preference for monetary compensation in the broader 
reparations strategy it recommended.493 
7. Payment and Enforcement of Decisions 
One of the more notable differences that exist between IMCPs and TJCPs 
is the role of funding for the claims process. This issue, both in terms of 
operational funding, as well as that available for compensation, is a function of 
the political strength of the constituting entity or entities. It is also a function of 
their capacity to obtain and implement monies to finance the process. With 
regard to IMCPs, compensation for claimants‟ property losses or personal harm 
suffered is the raison d‟être for the establishment of the claims process under 
international law. Accordingly, either the governments that have created the 
IMCP or independent sources that have a vested interest in insuring the IMCP‟s 
 
 490. See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text. 
 491. See Guembe, supra note 84, at 38.  However, victims‟ groups were not uniform in their 
support of reparations for “forced disappearances”.  Mothers of Plaza de Mayo Association believed 
that accepting economic reparations was akin to prostituting themselves, while Mothers of Plaza de 
Mayo – Founding Group asserted that the decision to accept or reject reparations was a choice that 
had to be made by the affected individual.  See also id. 
 492.  See Argentina case study, supra Part II.  Prior to this, the Ecumenical Movement for 
Human Rights lobbied for the creation of the legal status of  “disappeared” that did not presume 
death and drafted the first version of Law 24,321, which was adopted in May 1994.  See Armstrong, 
supra note 127, at 253 (citing Guembe, supra note 84). 
 493. In order to develop a final reparations policy, the Commission on Reparations and 
Rehabilitation (CRR) consulted with individual victims and victim advocacy groups. Orr, supra note 
250, at 242; see also Colvin, supra note 251, at 191 (discussing that most victims when asked in 
private by the CRR about their needs listed money or compensation as their first priority).  In 1997 
and 1998, the CRR also held a series of public meeting throughout the country seeking input from 
victims, NGOs, community-based organizations, and churches. Id. Due to the active role played by 
the TRC and CRR, local organizations found it difficult to exist independently and were more 
reactive than proactive, unlike the civil organizations in Argentina. See Armstrong, supra note 127, 
at 259, 262. 
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success usually guarantee the availability of funds for both the operation of the 
institution as well as payment of its awards.494 In contrast, funding for TJCPs 
tends to be more difficult as resources are often scarce in the developing 
countries that tend to undergo radical transitions. At the same time, there are 
always competing social-political interests that vie for the limited resources 
available to compensate the massive human rights violations at issue. For all of 
these reasons, among others, many transitional countries with legacies of human 
rights abuses forego pursuing reparations programs.495 
Sources for funding an IMCP are often quite divergent and depend upon 
the type of mechanism that the constituting instruments have created. “Each 
arrangement is largely the result of political circumstances, as well as the 
relative financial abilities and bargaining strengths of the parties funding the 
particular [p]rocess.”496 In the IMCP context, governments, as sovereign actors, 
are usually creating institutions to resolve property disputes between them. As a 
result, they tend to possess the political will and financial wherewithal to 
achieve the successful funding. In addition, IMCPs are often structured such that 
the party-governments fund the operating expenses of the institution. For 
example, the Algiers Accords explicitly set forth the funding for the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal, providing that each government would pay one-half of the 
expenses of the Tribunal.497 Likewise, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Agreement provided 
that the two governments were to fund the EECC Claims Process.498 
Other IMCPs have had their expenses paid from a settlement funded by one 
party whose obligations for funding the IMCP were explicitly delineated or 
imposed by the party-governments establishing the mechanism. At the UNCC, 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq had to pay all expenses 
for the operating costs of the UNCC.499 Similarly, the Swiss banks (with the 
tacit approval of the Swiss government) paid all expenses for the Claims 
Resolution Tribunal.500  In the latter two circumstances, the party that had to 
pay the operating expenses had the economic capacity to comply with this 
obligation.  As a rule, however, the lack of funding will not usually affect the 
day-to-day operations of an IMCP. Regardless of the method by which the 
IMCP was constituted, state parties recognize their international legal 
 
 494. This observation is not suggesting that the financing of IMCPs is necessarily 
straightforward or non-contentious. States and other administering bodies involved in such initiatives 
can struggle to ensure availability of sufficient resources, as has been the case with the Iran-U.S. 
Claims Tribunal. See C. Pinto, supra note 64, at 108. But the difference is nonetheless palpable vis-
a-vis national governments seeking to implement a domestic reparations policy, especially one that 
includes compensation. 
 495. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 496. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 357. 
 497. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. 
 498. Ethiopia-Eritrea Agreement, supra note 416, art. 5, ¶15. 
 499. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text. 
 500. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 360. 
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obligations and tend to ensure suitable funding exists for the payment of awards. 
501 
In contrast, funding for TJCPs is often elusive since domestic social and 
political realities create impediments to effective funding of both operations and 
remedial measures. Two models exist for funding reparation programs: national 
and international resources financing the creation of special funds, and direct 
financing of the reparations program using funds from the public budget.502 
Experience shows that governments that support the direct financing of 
reparations programs through the public budget, such as those in Chile, 
Argentina, and Brazil, are likely to enjoy more stable and adequate financing of 
their reparations programs.503  However, governments internally are not subject 
to the types of pressures that states face internationally, making it more difficult 
to guarantee funding adequate to effectuate the recommendations made by truth 
commissions or otherwise established in relation to reparations.504  Transitional 
governments with scant financial resources in particular have often to choose 
between funding programs for reparations or other important social programs. 
In the transitional justice context, financing is “fundamentally a political 
process that requires considerable mobilization of public financial resources, 
achieved by either a reorientation of existing resources and/or obtaining 
additional resources.”505 The challenges in both respects are substantial. Not 
surprisingly, some transitional governments prefer to fund social programs that 
appear to address structural problems, such as poverty, inequality, and 
exclusion, over reparations programs that directly compensate victims and their 
families for human right abuses.506 Ultimately, the decision to fund such 
programs depends on the existence of adequate political will or the ability of 
proponents to forge that will in the branches of the transitional government. 
Guatemala is a clear example of inadequate political will. Despite the 
recommendations in the Peace Agreements to compensate victims, in practice, 
 
 501. State responsibility principles, especially the duty incumbent upon states to repair the harm 
caused by their wrongful acts, which often consists of compensation, likely play an important role in 
ensuring that many IMCPs receive funding. See supra note 423 and accompanying text. In other 
words, states are most likely to produce funds, voluntarily or involuntarily, when they have engaged 
in serious violations of international legal obligations held vis a vis other states. These principles will 
at the same time tend to reinforce the diplomatic efforts directed at ensuring the success of a given 
IMCP, as was evident, for example, in the creation of the UNCC. See supra note 425 and 
accompanying text. 
 502. Alex Segovia, The Reparations Proposals of the Truth Commissions in El Salvador and 
Haiti: A History of Non-Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14, at 660. 
 503. Id. 
 504. Id. at 651.  Segovia posits that governments in this situation are not willing “to risk their 
political capital for seeking a mobilization of those resources.”  Id. See also supra notes 433, 500-02 
and accompanying text, to the effect that international law plays more of an indirect role in guiding 
domestic political debates and decisions than it does internationally between states. 
 505. Segovia, supra note 502, at 655. 
 506. Id. at 654, 673 n.13. 
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the state has advanced very few reparation measures; a circumstance that the 
government attributes to a lack of financial resources to fund such a process.507 
Sometimes even political will is not enough; though Argentina was largely 
successful in implementing a series of compensation schemes,508 payment was 
still halted during Argentina‟s financial crisis.509 
Generally speaking, reparations programs that include compensation for 
victims have been feasible only when the political parties or coalitions in power 
are committed to adopting the necessary measures and making the promised 
payments.510 States that have looked to the international community for support 
have often disappointed in the response.511 Ultimately, a strong political 
incentive in favor of such efforts accompanied by support from the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches of government must exist to mobilize the fiscal 
resources necessary for a functional TJCP. 
8. Transferability of Experiences 
As noted earlier, IMCPs tend to share institutional and personnel resources 
in ways that facilitate the accumulation of expertise over time.512 The 
identification of a handful of international experts who sit on multiple IMCPs is 
clear evidence of this dynamic, one that ensures the beneficial and desirable 
outcome of maintaining continuity of experience in the field.513 It was no 
coincidence that when the parties were choosing their candidates for the EECC, 
persons with prior experience in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, the UNCC and 
CRT I were at the top of the list. Institutions like the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration have become repositories for this specialized knowledge and have 
strived to capitalize on it through successful efforts at systematization and 
comparative analysis.514  The model rules of procedure that the PCA crafted, for 
 
 507. Segovia, supra note 502, at 662. Until recently a similar situation existed in El Salvador. 
Id. 
 508. Guembe, supra note 84, at 45. “The Argentinean experience stands outs among these 
transitions for its efforts regarding truth telling, prosecution of the military juntas and economic 
reparations for victims.” Id. 
 509. Crook, supra note 1, at 57 (citing Larry Rohter, In Argentina, A New Injustice, INT‟L 
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 14, 2002, at 2). 
 510. Segovia, supra note 502, at 666. For instance, Chile‟s reparation program was directly 
financed from the public budget without any major opposition since the political parties that came to 
power post-Pinochet supported reparations. Id. 
 511. Id. at 659. 
 512. See supra notes 443-46 and accompanying text. 
 513. Id. 
 514. The PCA in particular created the Steering Committee on Mass Claims Procedures for this 
purpose, building on a prior body of work to publish new and more comprehensive studies of the 
field, most notably International Mass Claims Process. See the PCA‟s website for more information 
on its leading role in the mass claims processes area, available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1059. 
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instance, are often the first stop for decision makers developing a new IMCP.515 
In light of these practices, it is easy to see why the assumption that the PCA and 
others have actively promoted that many of the lessons that a given IMCP taught 
will be relevant, if not directly transferable, to subsequent mass claims processes 
of a similar nature.516 Almost by definition, IMCPs today are to be built upon 
the foundation provided by the structural, procedural, and substantive legacies of 
their predecessors. 
Despite similar efforts to systematize the TJCP experience,517 nothing 
approaching the high degree of “transferability” which characterizes the IMCP 
practice exists with respect to the development of domestic reparations 
programs. Any country undergoing a radical political transformation will have 
to obey primarily domestic forces, even while recognizing the relevance of other 
TJCPs that have gone before. In South Africa, where input from Argentina and 
Chile was key to informing the process, the government arrived at a different 
blend of truth, justice and reparations than these predecessors.518 Similarly, in 
Colombia, state, government and civil society actors have exhaustively studied 
the transitional justice experiences in those and other countries such as Northern 
Ireland and Sierra Leone, but have innovated an entirely new approach tailored 
to the particulars of its transitional process.519 This is not to say that expertise is 
not accumulated or shared in the transitional justice field. Organizations like the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), along with experts from 
other countries that have undergone such transformations, are actively involved 
in advising policy-makers and other key actors, including civil society, in places 
where such processes are underway.520 But the transference and implementation 
of “lessons learned” between domestic actors in the TCJP context do not, and 
arguably cannot occur to nearly the same degree as in the IMCP setting.521 
B. IMCPs and TJCPs: How are they comparable? 
The Article now turns to a review of actual and apparent similarities 
identified in light of the preceding analysis. To facilitate the discussion, this 
section is organized into two sub-sections, the first addressing “true” parallels, 
the second dedicated to exploring a number of “partial” parallels suggested by 
 
 515. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 205. 
 516. See, e.g., Holtzmann, supra note 383, at vi. 
 517. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 14; OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11. 
 518. See South Africa case study, supra Part II. 
 519. See Carrillo, supra note 398, at 133-58. 
 520. The ICTJ website provides a good account of its advisory function and other activities 
throughout the world.  International Center for Transitional Justice, http://www.ictj.org (last visited 
Mar. 29, 2010). In Colombia, the ICTJ has an office in Bogota headed by the former executive 
secretary of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
 521. See infra Part III.C. 
 521. See infra Part III.C. 
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our exploration of the divergences above. The former looks at traits or 
mechanisms shared by IMCPs and TJCPs possessing functional equivalencies. 
The partial parallels consist of characteristics that are ostensibly shared by the 
two, but that, when viewed in close context, are not as operationally compatible 
or interchangeable as they may first appear. By distinguishing between true and 
partial parallels, we hope to set the stage for a better method of evaluating and 
applying the lessons learned from transnational mass claim processes: the 
subject of Part IV. 
1. True Parallels 
The true parallels between IMCPs and TJCPs are best viewed as procedural 
mechanisms and techniques that share a high degree of operational 
interchangeability. We define true parallels for purposes of our analysis as 
functionally comparable principles and procedures inherent in any mass claims 
process, regardless of context. One such principle is that of credibility: all mass 
claims processes struggle in similar ways to establish their legitimacy in the eyes 
of beneficiaries, as well as those of the parties and societies responsible for their 
creation. The best examples of functionally comparable procedures are those 
that define the process of mass claims processing: outreach; identifying and 
screening claimants; collecting and evaluating evidence; as well as, more 
recently, techniques for handling large numbers of mass claims. These principles 
and procedures provide a better basis for comparative analysis of mass claims 
type processes than other aspects because: 1) they are largely impervious to the 
social, legal and political context within which they operate; and 2) their basic 
content, form and function will not vary substantially from context to context. 
One of the hallmarks of any successful claims process is credibility. A 
claim process, whether IMCP or TJCP, must not only be legitimate and fair, but 
also perceived as such to establish credibility.522 Legitimacy in either context is 
established by the exercise of recognized authority through established legal 
procedures, as when TJCPs are created and operated through coordinated 
executive, legislative and judicial action,523 or when state parties reach 
agreements under international law defining the IMCP.524  But such origins are 
themselves insufficient to definitely establish the credibility of an IMCP or 
TJCP; any claims process must also ensure that legitimate outcomes are 
achieved in a manner that is fair and is perceived as such. Generally speaking, a 
number of basic elements go into making a claims process fair; these include the 
trustworthiness of the implementing institution or mechanism, decision-maker 
neutrality, the opportunity for claimants to be actively involved in the procedure, 
 
 522. See, e.g., Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 107; De Greiff II, supra note 396, at 471. 
 523. See Argentina, South Africa and Hungary case studies, Part II supra. 
 524. Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 107; see also supra Nature of Parties and Claims 
Processes, Part III.A.3. 
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and, of course, the treatment of claimants with dignity and respect.525 Also 
essential to fairness is the principle of non-discrimination – in other words, that 
similar cases be treated in a similar manner.526 These factors are critical to 
establishing credibility, itself a prerequisite to ensuring the successful 
implementation of any mass claims process. Because of their ability to guarantee 
the presence of several, if not all, of these factors, all of the IMCPs and most of 
the TJCPs described in Part II have enjoyed high degrees of credibility.527 
But perhaps the strongest parallels exist at the level of the functionally 
comparable procedures that make up the mechanics of mass claims processing. 
These are like the basic parts of a car – fan belts, spark plugs, tires, etc. – that 
tend to be interchangeable between similar makes and models of automobile, 
year after year. Such basic mass claim component “parts” include procedures for 
determining claimant eligibility, carrying out outreach to claimant communities, 
conducting initial screening of potential claimants, as well as collecting, 
processing and evaluating evidence in thousands of cases, and sometimes more. 
Regardless of the constituting method employed or context at issue, each of 
these elements embodies a fundamental dynamic of mass claim processing that, 
at some level, must be present. The functional interchangeability and similarity 
in form of these basic components guarantee not just the relevance, but the 
utility as well of the parallels they represent to the comparative analysis of 
IMCPs and TJCPs. 
What follows is a brief introduction to these process-based parallels, 
focusing on those that we believe offer the best opportunities for productive 
cross-referencing between mass claim types. This survey is by no means 
exhaustive, nor is it intended to provide a definitive statement of each 
component. Rather, our goal is to shift the focus of debate in this area to those 
elements of mass claims processes that best lend themselves to fruitful 
comparative analysis. 
a. Claimant eligibility and outreach 
Any mass claim process must determine who will be an eligible claimant 
and inform him or her of its existence through some form of outreach.528 
Usually the eligibility standards for IMCPs are explicitly defined in the 
constituting instruments for the claims process or the procedural rules. Likewise, 
statutory provisions or executive decrees provide the criteria for eligibility in 
 
 525. Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 111-12. 
 526. See Rombouts et al., supra note 12, at 459. 
 527. The exception on the TJCP side appears to be the South African reparations program. The 
government‟s reticence to compensate in accordance with the TRC recommendations, among other 
shortcomings, has been widely criticized for not responding to the needs of the victim community. 
See supra notes 303-304 and accompanying text. 
 528. Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 139. 
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TJCPs. These sources tend to establish access by demarcating the types of 
claims that can be made as well as identifying who can make them. Interesting 
parallels will arise in situations where a shared substantive focus exists between 
mass claims processes, e.g., where the type of harm addressed stems primarily 
from human rights-type violations. This occurs when eligibility in the IMCP 
context, like with all TJCPs, turns on who is defined as a “victim” of state 
abuse.529 These types of parallels, like several of those to follow, will become 
increasingly important as new IMCPs are set up to provide compensation and 
other redress to victims of international crimes.530 
Once the claimant categories are identified, an outreach strategy must be 
implemented to inform potential beneficiaries of the remedies available. “A 
Mass Claims Process has little practical value unless the potential claimants are 
aware of the opportunity to make claims and are given information on how to do 
so.”531 To the extent that an IMCP focuses on claims arising within a country or 
defined geographic region, the strategies it employs will correlate well with 
those available to TJCPs undertaking the same task. Typically, in both contexts, 
the strategies involved will draw upon all types of media to implement an 
informational campaign targeting the communities of potential claimants, as 
well as the public at large. 
b. Initial screening procedures 
Regardless of the type of mass claims mechanism or context involved, once 
the claims start arriving they must be screened, sorted, and processed. The 
objective of these efforts will generally be the same across the board: “to weed 
out claims that fall outside the scope of the . . . programme or that are 
incomplete.”532 Over time, IMCPs in particular have developed and honed a 
range of effective procedures for this function. For instance, initial screenings 
for procedural requirements, like timeliness and sufficiency of the filing, are 
often performed by a registrar or secretariat, as occurs at the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal and the UNCC.533 The CRT-I provided for an arbitrator to make an 
 
 529. For instance, the CRT-II Governing Rules established claimant eligibility by defining 
victims entitled to file a claim as “any person or entity persecuted or target for persecution by the 
Nazi regime because they were or were believed to be Jewish, Romani, Jehovah‟s Witness, 
homosexual, or physically or mentally disabled or handicapped.” CRT-II Rules, supra note 364, art. 
46, ¶ 26. 
 530. See Pablo de Greiff & Marieke Wierda, The Trust Fund for Victims of the International 
Criminal Court: Between Possibilities and Constraints, in OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11, at 235 
(discussing how the “experiences of societies in transition may be instructive” in setting up and 
operating the Victims Trust Fund of the International Criminal Court). See infra Part IV.D. 
 531. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 141. 
 532. Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 151. 
 533. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 164.  The Registrar‟s decisions were 
subject to review by the Tribunal if the claimant filed a timely objection. Procedural Rules, supra 
note 56, art. 2, ¶ 5. The UNCC Secretariat would send a notification of deficiency and allow the 
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initial determination as to the viability of the claim on the merits, though at a 
“very low threshold”.534 Of course, the TJCPs studied in Part II all had to 
implement similar administrative procedures to ensure the accurate sorting of 
victims‟ claims. In Argentina, for example, a government ministry was charged 
with fulfilling the role of secretariat in this respect, and in South Africa, a 
committee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission performed these 
functions.535 The point of this parallel is merely to highlight the overlap in 
approaches, and to suggest that some cross-referencing may be possible. TJCPs 
can reasonably look to the initial screening procedures replicated over time by 
IMCPs that have dealt with tens of thousands, even millions, of claimants; 
IMCPs that share a similar substantive focus to TJCPs, dealing with claims 
arising from human rights violations, could benefit from the administrative 
procedures employed by the TJCPs in screening those types of claims. 
c. Collection and evaluation of evidence 
The violent circumstances that drive governments to create either IMCPs or 
TJCPs are themselves often responsible for producing a lack of evidence to 
buttress claims. From an evidentiary perspective, the challenges faced in these 
situations can be very similar, even identical. Thus, experiences in the collection 
and assessment of evidence can provide ample opportunity for constructive 
exchange between the two types of processes. One innovative technique 
employed by IMCPs and TJCPs alike is to provide for a “relaxed” standard of 
proof with regard to evidentiary submissions.536 In this respect, the UNCC was 
a pioneer among IMCPs, requiring claims to provide only “appropriate evidence 
of the circumstances and amount of the loss,” at a “reasonable minimum”.537 
Subsequently, the CRT-I took the notion of a relaxed standard of proof even 
further by introducing the evidentiary test of mere “plausibility”.538 In South 
Africa, evidence gathering among victim communities was often conducted 
through informal means.  Moreover, IMCPs themselves will sometimes collect 
evidence for purposes of efficiency in verification, basing decision making at 
 
party sixty days to remedy the defect. UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 15. 
 534. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 83. See also CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, 
art. 10. 
 535. See supra notes 82-137 and accompanying text (Argentina); supra notes 249-304 and 
accompanying text (South Africa). 
 536. Buergenthal, supra note 316, at 83; see also Argentina case study, supra notes 82-137 and 
accompanying text. 
 537. UNCC Provisional Rules, supra note 159, art. 35(2)(c). The appropriate evidence of the 
circumstance included the difficult conditions claimants faced in making quick departures from 
Kuwait and Iraq, which often resulted in loss of their personal property, passports, and other 
documents. Wühler, supra note 139, at 20. 
 538. CRT-I Rules of Procedure, supra note 322, art. 22. “The claimant must show that it is 
plausible in light of all the circumstances that he or she is entitled, in whole or in part, to the dormant 
account.” Id. 
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least in part upon an institution‟s internal databases.539 These institutions have 
been particularly good at developing uniform methods for the assessment and 
evaluation of evidence where overwhelming number of claims are filed 
requiring resolution in a timely and fair manner, especially where claimants face 
difficulties in producing documentary evidence.540 At the domestic level, the 
specialized administrative bodies in both Argentina and South Africa charged 
with studying the merits of victims‟ claims also adopted flexible standards in the 
face of challenging circumstances for the evaluation of available evidence.541 
d. Techniques for processing mass claims 
Information technology provides various means to enhance the 
effectiveness of claims procedures when faced with an overwhelming number of 
potential beneficiaries, often tens of thousands or more.542 IMCPs in particular 
have been making productive use of information technology. In this context, 
information technology serves three key functions: 1) it facilitates the planning 
and management of the process; 2) it permits computerized decision making and 
use of mass claims processing techniques such as statistical sampling and 
“matching;” and 3) it allows for decisions based on grouping as opposed to 
individual case-by-case determinations.543 By building on prior experiences, 
especially that of the UNCC, international mass claims processes have 
increasingly applied a series of techniques for evaluating very large numbers of 
claims that would undoubtedly be of great utility to TJCPs as well.544 The most 
promising of these techniques are these: 
 Statistical sampling and modeling. This technique was pioneered 
by the UNCC, which faced millions of claims that had to be 
resolved within a limited period of time. Statistical sampling, for 
instance, permitted the UNCC to formulate evidentiary 
presumptions on the basis of decisions taken with respect to 
 
 539. See Van Houtte et al., supra note 323, at 156 (discussing the collection efforts of the 
UNCC Secretariat in gathering evidence from governments and international organizations for its 
computerized verification database for Category “A” and “B” claims).  
 540. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 211. 
 541. See supra Parts II.A.2, 5. 
 542. See Veijo Heiskanen, Virtue Out of Necessity: International Mass Claims and the New 
Uses of Information Technology, in REDRESSING INJUSTICES, supra note 1, at 27. For instance, the 
UNCC, using information technology that allowed for computerized matching and statistical 
sampling, reviewed 2.6 million claims in under ten years, as compared to the United States-German 
Mixed Claims Commission that spent seventeen years resolving approximately 20,000 claims. Id. 
TJCPs will naturally benefit from technology as well for many of the same reasons. 
 543. Id. at 29. 
 544. Most of these techniques did not actually originate with international arbitral or mass 
claims institutions, but rather are derived from the statistical and computer-processing techniques 
developed by mass tort class action litigation and large insurance cases in the United States. See 
HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 244. 
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random but representative samples drawn from a predefined 
population of claimants sharing similar legal and factual issues.545 
It then applied the presumptions to the other similarly situated 
claimants from the target population.546 
 Computerized Matching.  Matching is computerized decision 
making on “large numbers of individual claims that can be 
resolved by determining relatively limited specific facts.”547  It is 
made possible by entering basic claim information into one 
database which is then compared against a second “verification 
database” containing evidentiary data “collected from sources 
such as banks, historical archives or property registers.”548 For 
example, the CRT-II employed this useful methodology, 
contrasting claims information in one database with another 
containing bank account records. When the computer program 
generated a “match,” this result either provided sufficient grounds 
for an award of compensation or provided a basis for additional 
research to confirm the match.549 
 Grouping and precedent setting.  Claims that are too complex or 
large to be susceptible to matching may be managed through a 
decision making process that involves individual categorization of 
claims based on the similarity of their legal and factual issues. 
Claims are “grouped” according to key characteristics entered into 
a database, allowing decision makers “to focus on resolving the 
principal legal and factual issues [shared] by a large number of 
claims, without having to consider each of them separately.”550 
Some IMCPs take grouping a step further by allowing initial 
decisions taken with respect to certain claims presenting common 
issues to act as “precedent” in resolving “all subsequent similar 
cases.”551 
 Standardized verification and valuation. Specialized techniques 
have been developed by technical experts in other fields that allow 
for the standardized verification of claims “using certain 
 
 545. Id. at 244-45, 248-49. 
 546. “The basic method of statistical sampling and modeling is, first, to design a sample that is 
representative of the entire population constituting a similarly situated group of claimants; secondly, 
to analyze the claims of that sample groups to answer the factual and legal questions that determine 
its eligibility for compensation; and, finally, to extrapolate or apply the results of the analysis of the 
sample to all other similarly situated claims.” Id. at 245. 
 547. Id. at 245. 
 548. Id. 
 549. Id. at 250-51. 
 550. Id. at 256. 
 551. Id. at 246. See also supra note 80 and accompanying text (Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal). 
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evidentiary presumptions justified by knowledge obtained from 
historical research or fact-finding about the event in question to 
fill in gaps in individual records.”552 These are methods are 
employed by IMCPs to address the dearth of reliable evidence 
characterizing post-conflict scenarios as well as to avoid the great 
expense in time and resources associated with the verification of 
individual claims.553 
In light of the foregoing, it is fair to say that information technology “has 
become the enabling factor of modern mass claims processing in cases where 
most, if not all, of the claims arose during the same time period and involved 
many of the same legal and factual issues.”554 This is as true for TJCPs as it has 
been for IMCPs. It would seem, therefore, that the marvelous advances in IT 
methodologies promoted by IMCPs, such as statistical sampling, matching, 
grouping, and standardized verification, represent an important but 
underexploited source of expertise for those working on large-scale reparations 
programs in the transitional justice context. 
2. Partial Parallels 
We have provocatively dubbed “partial” parallels as those traits sharing a 
surface similarity that upon closer examination turn out not to be as equivalent 
in substance as generally presumed. Partial parallels tend to flow from key 
concepts common to claims processing generally that are assumed to be 
comparable or interchangeable. In practice, however, these concepts can be 
understood and implemented in substantially different ways depending on the 
context. Basic notions of “fairness,” “remedies,” and even “compensation,” 
which can seem standard in an IMCP setting, may in fact fulfill a substantially 
different role when operating within a transitional justice framework. In other 
words, their meaning may vary according to the function assigned to them by 
the respective IMCPs or TJCP. They are a kind of “conceptual homonym,” 
commonly used terms for basic concepts that may nonetheless take on varying 
connotations depending on the type of mass claims process at issue. 
The concept of basic fairness is a good example. While IMCPs and TJCPs 
both strive to be fair, the differences between the two described in prior sections 
ensure that this term will not necessarily mean the same thing in both contexts. 
Where IMCPs are configured as arbitral tribunals or commissions charged with 
establishing liability prior to making awards, the proceedings are adversarial in 
nature. In this environment, fairness means due process. It requires an 
opportunity for parties to present evidence in support of their claim, to be heard, 
and to challenge opposing evidence, all before a competent and impartial 
 
 552. Id. at 246. 
 553. Heiskanen, supra note 542, at 34. 
 554. HOLTZMANN & KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 244. 
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adjudicator.
 555 Where proceedings are essentially administrative, as is the case 
with most TJCPs (and some IMCPs), fairness more accurately represents 
efficiency, particularly in avoiding undue delays, and consistency in decision 
making. 556 This means, among other things, treating similarly situated claims 
substantively in the same manner: “At an individual level, fair reparation 
requires that the distribution of reparation is done in a fair manner, [which] 
means without discrimination among groups or categories of beneficiaries (i.e. 
victims).”557 
Perhaps the most misleading of the partial parallels are those relating to the 
core function of remedies, especially compensation. To illustrate why this is so, 
we should recall the examples from the Introduction where commentators 
writing on IMCPs and TJCPs drew such comparisons. On the one hand, the 
reference by an IMCP expert to “reparations [as] important components of 
settlement” for victims of human rights abuses, in a publication dedicated 
primarily to the study of IMCPs, is intended to suggest a parallel to the function 
of remedies in international mass claims processing.558 The fact that access to 
remedies, sometimes referred to as procedural reparations, is central to the 
redress for victims as required by international human rights law, surely 
contributes to the impression that the two concepts are functionally 
interchangeable or naturally comparable.559 But, as we saw in the preceding 
sections, the profound differences that distinguish the two fields have a direct 
effect on the nature and function of the redress implemented by TJCPs. When 
the aforementioned differences in the transitional justice context are taken 
together with the diversity of reparatory measures available to domestic 
policymakers, they tend to render comparisons with IMCP remedies – 
themselves essentially limited to monetary compensation or asset restitution –
virtually meaningless. Thus, suggesting or assuming such parallels, without a 
concomitant effort to engage with the universe of differences that reigns 
between TJCPs and IMCPs, is at best an incomplete exercise. 
The same is largely true of the potential parallels presumed by TJCPs 
experts with respect to the utility of constructing a comparative approach with 
TMCPs around “measures of material compensation,” the one remedial strategy 
adopted by all the paradigmatic claims processes studied in Part II.
  
It is true that, 
on the surface, the similarities appear obvious: beneficiaries of either IMCPs or 
TJCPs who meet certain pre-established criteria for harm and eligibility will 
receive economic redress via the operation of a legally constituted procedure. 
However, as we have seen, these shared characteristics are insufficient by 
themselves to enable a meaningful comparative analysis of the role of 
 
 555. Id. at 263. 
 556. See Das, supra note 30, at 9-10. 
 557. Rombouts et al., supra note 12, at 459. 
 558. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 559. See Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 432. 
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compensation within, between and among particular mass claim processes. 
Compliance with state responsibility principles makes “compensation” 
distributed by IMCPs for property loss or personal injury functionally a more 
limited concept than that which characterizes the indemnifications or “grants” 
paid by governments to victims of serious human rights abuses and their 
families in the domestic context. Among other defining distinctions, one 
typically carries out the latter to advance both a reparatory strategy as well as an 
overarching transitional justice policy.560 Simply put, TJCP compensation is 
best viewed as one of several interlocking means to a set of overarching ends; 
IMCP compensation, on the other hand, is more accurately viewed as an end in 
itself. 
C. Concluding Observations 
The previous sections have exposed a substantial number of inherent 
limitations to the comparison of IMCPs and TJCPs; they have also delineated 
more clearly a narrow but promising path of intriguing synergies. It should now 
be apparent that the ground considered common to the two types of claims 
processes is neither as broad nor as even as commonly assumed. Regarding the 
purported relevance of IMCP experience to emerging TJCPs, the primary axis of 
comparison in the literature, we have shown that a number of basic IMCP 
characteristics and components apparently shared with TJCPs in fact provide a 
doubtful foundation for a constructive comparison. Sweeping or implied 
presumptions of compatibility in this respect, then, tend to be imprecise and 
potentially misleading. At the same time, it is evident from the previous section 
not only that a set of “true parallels” do exist as between IMCPs and TJCPs, but 
also that these parallels represent avenues for cross-fertilization in both 
directions. It is, in other words, a two-way street, even if the traffic to date has 
predominantly flowed only in one direction. That under certain circumstances 
the TJCP experience may be a productive source of inspiration and input to 
IMCP experts devising or implementing new procedures is itself a paradigm-
shifting conclusion. In any event, the foregoing are all significant findings 
running counter to prevailing wisdom that could, in our view, contribute to 
reorienting in more fruitful directions the scope of future studies contrasting 
different types of mass claims processes. 
Ultimately, this rethinking of transnational mass claims processes is meant 
to contribute to improving the personal experience of the countless numbers of 
victims of mass atrocity who are their beneficiaries. How this goal can be 
realized in practice is the subject of the next Part. A final question to address 
 
 560. TJCPs capture this distinction in the notion of symbolic compensation, as in South Africa, 
where cash payments expressly were intended to convey recognition of victims and their claims, but 
not formal redress of the harms at issue, in substantial part due to resource and political limitations. 
No IMCP has ever claimed its payments to be purely symbolic. 
. 
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here, albeit briefly, is this: why are IMCPs and TJCPs not as comparable as has 
been generally assumed? It is one thing to demonstrate that they are not; it is 
quite another to explain why such a difference in perception persists. 
Without purporting to provide a definitive response to this query, we offer 
a preliminary reflection. It seems to us that the element of “transferability” 
provides a particularly illustrative lens. We noted above that while IMCP 
experiences tend to translate well into lessons learned for their successors, one 
rarely reproduces such a dynamic within the transitional justice arena. Indeed, 
when one considers that TJCP experiences are barely “transferable” between 
and among themselves, it becomes instantly evident why they are not more 
functionally comparable even to similar IMCPs.561 As it turns out, the reasons 
for the former premise hold largely true for the latter one as well. 
Almost by definition, TJCPs experiences are non-cumulative, context-
specific, and resistant to precedent. Unlike IMCPs, international law or practice 
influences but does not govern TJCPs. Efforts to systematize the study of TJCPs 
highlight their uniqueness, which flows from several defining traits of any 
domestic reparations program. One is the intensely indigenous nature of radical 
political transition. Another is the predominance of national actors as the 
primary decision makers who work predominantly within a domestic political 
context. A third is the nationalistic resistance to copying outside experiences that 
characterizes many native decision makers, often coupled with the need to tailor 
reparations to compelling domestic circumstances. And then there is the inherent 
non-transferability of domestic legislation and other normative decisions 
shaping country specific TJCPs, which will add layers of resistance to efforts to 
import concrete approaches adopted by other countries and cultures. Together 
these and related factors typical of the transitional justice context impede 
attempts to draw (much less assume the existence of) straightforward parallels 
between not just TJCPS, but also between these claims processes and their 
international counterparts. 
IV.  
THE TMCP FRAMEWORK 
A. Rationale 
The preceding Part provided a more comprehensive response than 
previously existed to the interrogatories posed in the Introduction regarding the 
extent to which IMCPs and TJCPs are truly comparable. On the one hand, it 
confirms the instinct of most observers that there are common denominators 
 
 561. Note also what could be considered properly contextualized comparisons, such as 
restitution and compensation mechanisms in Eastern Europe with similar property centered IMCPs 
such as the BHZG Restitution Commission. See TEITEL, supra note 211, at 129-31. 
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between the claims processing experiences in both realms, limited as they might 
be. On the other, the analysis in Part III challenges several assumptions 
underlying the conventional wisdom about which “principles and precedents” 
are most pertinent to the comparative exercise, as well as how to view them. 
Contrary to prevailing perspectives, it establishes that the starting point for any 
analysis of parallels should be an express recognition of the deep divergences 
that separate international and domestic claims processes. These in turn not only 
dictate what aspects of a given mass claims process lend themselves to a 
meaningful comparative analysis, but also inform the extent to which useful 
lessons, procedures or practices in one context are functionally transferable to 
another. It is this dynamic that we seek to capture with the transnational mass 
claim process or TMCP framework. 
A threshold issue worth attending to before outlining our framework 
concerns why commentators in both fields have tended to assume or suggest 
untenable degrees of IMCP and TJCP comparability. There are several likely 
reasons that can be deduced from the analyses of the preceding Part; we 
highlight but a few of them here. The first is undoubtedly the increasing trend 
towards an overlapping of subject matter involving human rights abuses 
between international and transitional justice mass claims processes.562 The 
UNCC provides an early example. Because it is one of the few IMCP 
experiences to compensate personal injury, including harm that in a domestic 
context would clearly constitute human rights violations, commentators have 
readily considered it alongside the more traditional TJCP experiences.563 
Likewise, the CRT can be recognized as straddling the divide between 
traditional IMCPs and domestic TJCPs as the institution achieved “reparations 
and the moral accounting . . . through Holocaust restitution and reparations 
claims.”564 Such a statement recognizes the value of “moral compensation” 
which provides restitution for a property loss, bank accounts, but also recognizes 
the reparation aspect of the payment for the human rights atrocity that was the 
Holocaust. 
The notion of “conceptual homonyms” discussed in the preceding part 
explains a second contributing factor. The overlap of nominally identical 
terminology (such as “compensation”) can suggest a stronger interchangeability 
of key principles and procedures than is borne out in practice. A third 
consideration is the relative autonomy with which the two camps have 
developed until recently, which has led practitioners without detailed knowledge 
of the companion field to accept such apparent overlap at face value. Lastly, as 
noted, there are indeed significant parallels that lend themselves to productive 
analysis, some of which require careful contextualization, others less so. The 
challenge now is to move beyond mere comparison and towards a more 
 
 562. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 563. See, e.g., SHELTON, supra note 15, at 404. 
 564. Holocaust Claims Against Swiss Banks, supra note 308, at 251. 
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purposeful, comprehensive and nuanced examination of the ways IMCPs and 
TJCPs interrelate. 
In other words, to paraphrase an old adage, you cannot assume to compare 
apples and oranges, unless, of course, you are talking about fruit. As the adage 
suggests, it is a matter of proper perspective. The TMCP framework introduced 
in the following section is intended as a corrective lens. It can guide analysts in 
breaking down the constituent parts of any mass claim procedure regardless of 
context to better understand the extent to which its key components will relate or 
“translate” when contrasted with those of another process. By stepping back and 
viewing mass claim processes at a slightly higher level of generality than 
heretofore employed, commentators using the TMCP framework can identify 
those considerations, conditions and qualifiers needed to most appropriately 
frame a comparative analysis of parallels, principles and precedents. We expect 
this new approach to move the discussion of IMCPs and TJCPs away from mere 
pronouncements or suggestions of mutual relevance, and towards a plane of 
deeper integration through the strategic exploitation of true parallels. 
B. A Framework for the Study of Transnational Mass Claims Processes 
(“TMCPs”) 
Transnational mass claim processes are those that take place in the 
international or domestic context to resolve claims by persons acting 
individually or collectively, usually against a state, where such claims are 
brought for serious personal harm or property loss resulting from armed conflict, 
political repression and/or social upheaval. Depending on the type of procedure 
involved, the affected persons can bring such claims either directly or through 
their respective governments. 
To facilitate the analysis of TMCPs, we have developed a “checklist” built 
around basic elements shared by all such mechanisms, regardless of context.565 
It can be utilized to establish the TMCP “profile” of a given claims process , 
which in turn provides a more comprehensive reference for productive 
comparison with other processes similarly profiled. Among other things, the 
TMCP checklist outlined below is designed to make explicit the consideration of 
key issues relating to the context and manner in which TMCPs are created; the 
purpose and nature of the mechanism(s) established; the nature and function of 
the procedures employed; the remedies prescribed and their disbursal; their 
overall funding; and their transparency. The comparative analysis of TMCP 
“profiles,” as opposed to the decontextualized consideration of certain 
components thereof, should provide designers of mass claims processes in any 
 
 565. The TMCP Checklist presented draws extensively from that compiled by Howard 
Holtzmann and Edda Kristjánsdóttir in their study of IMCPs. See Annex E to HOLTZMANN & 
KRISTJANSDOTTIR, supra note 8, at 419. No similar checklist exists on in the transitional justice 
field, though important efforts to systematize the rubric of reparations have been undertaken. See, 
e.g., De Greiff, supra note 14; OUT OF THE ASHES, supra note 11. 
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context with a heightened capacity to identify and integrate functionally 
compatible elements of other experiences in a manner that better advances their 
own particular objectives. 
C. The TMCP Checklist 
1. Constituting Method and Instrument(s): Refers to the process and to the 
constituent instrument(s) by which a TMCP is created. Includes reference to 
political context and related formative events. 
 1.1 Who are the parties creating the TMCP? E.g., states, IGOs, domestic 
authorities (executive, legislative, judicial), etc. 
 1.2 What are the relevant political circumstances, domestic and/or 
international? 
 1.3 What are the enabling normative sources or instruments? E.g., treaties, 
agreements, judicial decisions, legislation, executive decrees, etc. 
 1.4 What are the stated goals of the TMCP? 
 1.5 To what extent do the constituting instruments detail the norms, rules 
and procedures to be applied by the TMCP? 
 1.6 What is the role in the constituting process of the international 
community? 
 1.7 What is the role of the potential beneficiaries/claimants in the 
constituting process?? 
2. Legal and Procedural Norms I: Refers to jurisdiction as well as legal nature 
of proceedings and decisions. 
2.1 What is the nature of the claims process created? E.g., arbitration, 
administrative proceedings, etc. 
2.2 What is the range of claims covered by the TMCP? 
2.3 Who is entitled to remedies pursuant to these claims? 
2.4 Who is entitled to bring a claim? 
2.5 What substantive law applies, if any? 
2.6 How are the procedural rules defined and administered? 
2.7 How is fairness guaranteed? 
2.8 Are decisions final and binding? What is their legal authority? 
2.9 Can decisions be enforced? 
2.10 What is the effect on claimants’ legal rights to recourse in other 
jurisdictions, domestic or international? 
3. Legal and Procedural Norms II: Refers to the claims process, including the 
participants and procedures involved. 
3.1 How are potential claimants identified and informed of the process? 
3.2 What is the process for screening claims to ensure only those meeting 
prima facie criteria are processed? 
3.3 Is there a timetable for implementing the TMCP’s mandate, including 
deadlines and a wind-up date? 
3.4 Who makes decisions on claims? 
3.5 How were these decision makers selected? 
3.6 What rules apply to the submission of evidence by claimants? 
3.7 What rules apply to burdens and standards of proof? 
3.8 Are provisions made for oral hearings? 
3.9 What mass claim techniques, if any, are employed? 
3.10 What provisions exist to support claimants who may not have the 
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resources to access the TMCP? 
4. Remedies and Reparations: 
4.1 What types of loss or harm can be addressed? 
4.2 What types of individual remedies or reparations are offered to 
claimants? 
4.2.1 Restitution? 
4.2.2 Compensation? 
4.2.3 Non-monetary benefits or services? 
4.3 What types of collective remedies or reparations are offered to 
claimants? 
4.4 How are the rules governing compensation defined? 
4.5  How are the amounts of individual compensation fixed? 
4.6 How is compensation distributed? 
4.7 Is compensation subject to a maximum aggregate amount or other 
limitations? 
4.8 What non-pecuniary remedies or reparations (NPRs) are available? 
4.9 How are NPRs realized or distributed? 
5. Operational Funding 
5.1 What types of expenses are required to set up and operate the TMCP? 
E.g., staff salaries, other official fees and expenses, infrastructure costs, IT, etc. 
5.2 How are these operational costs funded? 
5.3 How are the available remedies and reparations, especially 
compensation, funded? 
5.4 Is the TMCP sustainable, that is, secured enough in terms of resources 
to carry out its mandate in substantial part? 
6. Transparency and Accountability 
6.1 Does the TMCP have a communications strategy? If so, who is 
responsible for it? 
6.2 What type of outreach, if any, does the TMCP engage in? E.g., to 
potential claimants, government institutions and authorities, the general public. 
6.3 What mechanisms exist to provide information to the public on the 
TMCPs activities? E.g., webpage, mass media announcements, etc. 
6.4 Does the TMCP engage in regular or periodic reporting on its activities? 
If so, what form does it take? 
6.5 What types of information are made available to the public? E.g., 
information on legal norms and procedures, rules, decisions and awards, number 
of claims, etc. 
D. Application of TMCP Framework 
The need for a more methodical approach to the study of transnational mass 
claims processes is more evident than ever. The area of international law 
dedicated to international tribunals and commissions has expanded enormously 
since the establishment of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal in 1981. The field of 
transitional justice, which did not exist two decades ago, is now an established 
and active area of academic as well as institutional pursuit. Mass claims 
experiences in both contexts are increasingly viewed in light of each other, due 
to a deepening convergence, first in practice, and now theory. The TMCP 
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framework outlined in the preceding sections represents a conscious step in this 
direction. It provides the analytical tools that were missing from prior studies to 
promote a more functional systematization of experiences in mass claims 
processing. As such, it enables practitioners and policymakers to engage in 
comparative analyses that are better informed, appropriately focused and, 
ultimately, more fruitful. International claims processes such as the Ethiopia-
Eritrea Claims Commission, or domestic reparations programs such as those 
active in Peru and Colombia, are examples of ongoing TMCPs that could benefit 
from the application of the framework outlined above, as well as the underlying 
analyses in Part III. And, of course, there are those mass claims experiences still 
to come.  The framework could prove instructive for instituting a procedure and 
resolving property claims arising from present conflicts, like that between the 
Palestinians and Israelis. 
At the outset we suggested that the TMCP framework could assist in the 
design of novel compensation or reparations scenarios, like the one that the 
International Criminal Court is developing. We noted that the context and large 
number of victims typical of several types of international crimes, for example 
genocide and crimes against humanity, point to the need for traditional mass 
claims processing techniques. Yet these crimes by their very definition arise 
from the widespread and systematic human rights abuses characteristic of 
transitional justice scenarios. The issue is whether the ICC would be best served 
by following IMCP approaches in designing its reparations procedures or 
whether it should also look to national programs despite their limiting 
specificity. Much has been written on the subject already. Some commentators 
rely primarily on conventional international mass claims experiences to draw 
lessons for the Court, making little reference to domestic practice.566 Other 
experts, however, observe that “[t]he experiences of societies in transition may 
be instructive,” especially as concerns the goals and remedial modalities of an 
ICC-administered reparations program.567 How, then, should the ICC proceed in 
evaluating its options? 
Even the cursory application of the TMCP framework to the challenge that 
the ICC poses illuminates a methodological pathway to resolving this question. 
It is evident, for example, that the ICC‟s reparations structure will more closely 
resembles traditional IMCPs in terms of the Court‟s constituting method and 
instruments, its decision makers, and the mass nature of most of the claims 
procedures to be adopted. Therefore, many of the lessons, mechanisms and 
techniques of mass claims processes like the UNCC will likely be directly 
relevant to the development of ICC reparations procedures.568 But a similar 
 
 566. See, e.g., Marc Henzelin et al., Reparations to Victims Before the International Criminal 
Court: Lessons from International Mass Claims Processes, 17 CRIM. L. F. 317 (2006). 
 567. De Greiff & Wierda, supra note 530, at 235. 
 568. See Edda Kristjándóttir, International Mass Claims Processes and the ICC Trust Fund for 
Victims, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS, supra note 18, at 167-95. 
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analysis of the other ICC features, such as the Rome Statute Art. 75‟s stated goal 
to provide “reparations” to victims, suggests that it should in other respects act 
more in line with the experience of TJCPs insofar as substantive measures of 
redress are concerned. It is undoubtedly for this reason that Art. 75 also speaks 
of the “rehabilitation” of victims while leaving the door open to other 
reparations derived from international human rights law. Another feature closer 
to the TJCP experience than that of IMCPs revolves around claimant 
participation given the standing that victims will have to participate in ICC 
reparatory proceedings.569 The monetary compensation and restitution measures 
typical of IMCPs and the expeditious “justice” they provide to a mass of largely 
disenfranchised claimants may therefore be insufficient in the ICC context. 
Rather, a hybrid system that draws appropriately from both the TMCP and 
TJCP contexts, as oriented by the TMCP framework, will be most likely to 
produce an effective ICC reparations program in any particular case. 
 
 
 
 569. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 75(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 89-97, 
U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 (Sept. 2002) (outlining procedures for victim participation).  
